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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the relation between Hong Kong people's cultural identity and 
their discrimination against mainlanders. This study explores through the angle of ； 
demeanor and body language. It describes and discusses Hong Kong people's daily 
behavior and their attitudes towards mainlanders' behavior. Through detail ： 
examination, Hong Kong people's bigoted attitudes reveal their resistance and their i 
complicated emotions towards mainland China and mainlanders. I argue that Hong ； 
Kong people's discrimination against mainlanders is a form of symbolic violence that : 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the subtle relationships between Hong Kong Chinese 
people and mainland Chinese people by studying demeanor and cultural identity. It is 
concerned with the difficulties of "new" mainland immigrants in getting membership 
in Hong Kong since the mid-1970s. The sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) over a decade ago, and since then, the 
situation of new mainland immigrants integrating into the local community has 
gradually improved, yet many of them still continue to face discrimination. Up until 
now, these mainlanders have been still left out of Hong Kong society, where ethnic 
Chinese comprise the vast majority of the population, as "unwanted". They are 
labeled as "parasites" in Hong Kong mass media, and are culturally excluded as 
"outsiders," despite being officially named "compatriots." In 2002, a survey showed 
that over 90 per cent of "new [mainland] immigrants" were discriminated against 
{Hong Kong Daily News 2002a). The problem has calmed down, but in 2009, 
another survey found that around 80 percent of interviewers (mainland immigrants) 
said they had experienced discrimination {Hong Kong Commercial Daily 2009). 
Many mainlanders face negative criticisms leveled at their behavior. 
"Uneducated"(無教養)，"dirty"(污糟）and "disgusting"(核突）are often used by ： 
Hong Kong people to describe "mainlanders' behavior". In this thesis, I will examine 
and distinguish what Hong Kong people mean by "mainlanders' demeanor", and 
unpack why "mainlanders' demeanor" is often criticized. In doing so, I aim to 
unravel three questions: 1) Now does demeanor contribute to the shaping of the 
； d i s t i n c t cultural identity of heunggongyahn (香港人)？ 2) How are the differences in 
demeanor used as a discourse to prevent mainlanders from obtaining membership as 
i • i ； i ： h e u n g g o n g y a h n , or being part of Hong Kong society? 3) What are the larger 
\ j 
:messages and implications of Hong Kong people ’s reluctance to accept mainlanders j 
： I 
as part of Hong Kong society? In other words, I look into the negative stereotypes or | 
； F 
:p re judice of "mainlanders' demeanor" and its consequences, namely the social 
” j 
marginalization of mainlanders in Hong Kong society. | 
； i 
To begin this discussion, this thesis examines how the categories of 
daaihlohkyahn (大陸人)，mainlanders, and "mainlanders' demeanor" are shaped as ； 
；opposing to the category of heunggongyahn (I will define these two categories in the 
i I 
next section). Hong Kong people did not use these two categories to distinguish 
： t h e m s e l v e s from mainlanders until the sense of heunggongyahn began to be I 
： I 
emphasized. From this, I try to elucidate the underlying reasons why mainlanders, I 
• i � ’ I 
！ who are believed to share the same ethnic origin and "five thousand years of history" 
with Hong Kong Chinese, are facing difficulties in obtaining socio-cultural 
；membership in Hong Kong. By tracing the changes in the relationship between 
mainland Chinese people and Hong Kong Chinese people in the last three decades, 
during which Hong Kong people experienced vast changes, this thesis aims to 
demonstrate Hong Kong people's resistance towards two transformations: 1) a 
political transformation in transiting from a liberal polity to a special administrative 
region with increasing communist authoritarian influence; 2) a descent in status from 
；b e i n g "superior" and "dominant" to being "inferior" and "dominated". The resistance | 
is reflected by Hong Kong people's reluctance in embracing mainland China as their 
"nation" and accepting mainland Chinese as their "compatriots". This thesis explores 
Hong Kong Chinese people's attempts to uphold their "status quo", maintain their 
^ 
. 2 ： 
• • ] 
liberal democracy, sense of superiority, and retain their power over mainlanders by 
stigmatizing "mainlanders' behaviors" as "uncivilized" and "dirty"^ 
Although some people may argue that the criticisms towards mainlanders' 
behavior are mainly due to the difference in social class between Hong Kong people 
and mainlanders, in this thesis I will demonstrate how it is beyond the issue of social 
class. Social class is about resource distribution and allocation, but it fails to explain 
the social problems that are not derived from labor markets (Anthias 2005: 25). The 
case of Hong Kong people discriminating mainlanders indeed involves more than 
material inequality, which will be further explained in Chapter 4. 
The distinct cultural identity of heunggongyahn began to be emphasized in the 
1970s, carrying a "middle-class" mentality, which was shaped by rapid economic 
development, increasing educational attainment and the city's widening networks to 
the "Western" world. This "middle-class" mentality, which symbolizes "wealth" and 
"knowledge", plays a crucial role in Hong Kong people's conscious demarcation 
between heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn. In this thesis, I demonstrate how 
certain forms of demeanor are viewed in a positive way and are perceived as distinct 
"Hong Kong people's demeanor" whilst some forms are given negative connotations 
and are stigmatized as "mainlanders' demeanor"^. Such depictions establish an 
1 The status quo is bracketed because the so-called "status quo" is indeed often changing and never in 
static. What do Hong Kong people mean by "status quo" also varies over time. I believe that the 
"status quo" in the 1980s meant to maintain Hong Kong's sovereignty under Britain, or not to be 
returned its sovereignty to the PRC. Today, the "status quo" is more related to the "superior" social 
status of Hong Kong people and their freedom and rights. I will further explain this in the ensuing 
chapters. 
2 I bracket the two discursive categories "Hong Kong people's demeanor" and “mainlanders， 
demeanor" because they may not concretely exist in Hong Kong society. Instead these two categories, 
like the discursive categories of heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn, are more likely to be created by 
Hong Kong people's imagination to distinguish Hong Kong people from mainlanders. These two 
terms reflect the conceived corporeal differences between Hong Kong people and mainlanders. 
Moreover, these two terms conceal the differences within the two groups of people, including their 
socio-economic backgrounds. Therefore the two categories "Hong Kong people's demeanor" and 
"mainlanders' demeanor" are only stereotypes. It is true that some forms of behavior are more likely 
to be performed by some mainlanders, but it is incorrect to call these as "mainlanders' demeanor". The 
same applies to "Hong Kong people's demeanor". The term "mainlanders' demeanor" is more 
: 3 
invisible social hierarchy. I will illustrate the establishment of the invisible hierarchy 
through dominant discourses: the Hong Kong government's discrimination against 
"new" immigrants (in its policies and some officials' comments towards mainlanders 
in Hong Kong), the mass media's negative portrayals of mainlanders and their 
behavior, and Hong Kong people's public discourse on "mainlanders' demeanor". 
This hierarchy not only positions the two groups in a polarized hierarchy, with Hong 
Kong Chinese people as superior and mainland Chinese people as inferior, it also 
homogenizes the members of the two groups and suppresses any heterogeneities of 
class and cultures in both categories. Thus, the dominant discourse legitimizes and 
empowers the identity of heunggongyahn as "law-abiding", "disciplined" and 
"dominant" whilst marginalizing the identity of daaihlohkyahn as "trouble-makers", 
"parasites", "deviants" and "intruders". 
The sense of distinct cultural identity could therefore be construed in a political 
way. With an almost identical physical appearance to the majority of mainland ’ 
Chinese people, Hong Kong Chinese people magnify the differences in demeanor 
between Hong Kong people and mainlanders^. Antithetical images between the two 
groups are spread and bequeathed in order to demarcate Hong Kong people from 
mainlanders. Demeanor, as a result, is used by Hong Kong Chinese people as an 
indicator to identify and segregate mainlanders. Or more precisely, demeanor is 
manipulated in the politics of cultural identity to distinguish "mainland Chinese" as 
"others" in Hong Kong society. The politics of cultural identity reveals the pivotal 
frequently talked about among Hong Kong people while the term "Hong Kong people's demeanor" is 
rarely mentioned. Although many Hong Kong people do not mention the term "Hong Kong people's 
demeanor", a conscious notion is revealed in their daily discourse, believing that certain forms of 
"their" demeanor distinguish themselves from mainlanders. I will further discuss the conceived 
differences between these two categories in the ensuing chapter. 
3 I do not argue that there are no visible differences in demeanor between Hong Kong people and 
mainlanders. However I believe that many Hong Kong people do enlarge the differences in order to 
criticize "mainlanders' demeanor" as "uncivilized". Differences in daily practices are often found in 
different cultures, but the differences may not be polarized as the case of "Hong Kong people's 
demeanor" and "mainlanders' demeanor". 
； . 
• I 
focus of this thesis: how cultural identity of heunggongyahn is shaped to distinguish : 
mainlanders from "us" as an expression of resistance to any change of the "status 
quo". 
Although most Hong Kong Chinese people accept and admit that Hong Kong is ； 
part of mainland China, many of them still bear no emotional attachment to their ; 
"motherland"'^. Therefore, the increasing number of mainlanders in Hong Kong is ： 
sometimes described as an "intrusion" and a "mainlandization" of Hong Kong. 
Mainlanders are also often treated as "outsiders" instead of "compatr iots" . : 
Mainlanders who are in Hong Kong are marginalized not because they have done 
odious things to Hong Kong Chinese but for what they represent - mainland China. 
Rejecting membership of the mainland Chinese community in Hong Kong conveys 
the message that many Hong Kong Chinese people are still reluctant to embrace : 
mainland China as their "motherland". Direct criticism of the PRC is often eschewed 
among Hong Kong people, yet vitriol towards "mainlanders' demeanor" is 
ubiquitous. Mainlanders as a whole, thus, serve as a scapegoat. This thesis argues 
that both the malignant portrayals and hidden heterogeneity of "main landers ' : 
demeanor" are a kind of symbolic violence, in which the identity of Daaihlohkyahn 
is stigmatized and mainlanders are belittled. This aggravates their difficulties in ； 
adapting to their new environment of Hong Kong. 
In this chapter, I will first give some background information regarding this 
thesis，such as the definitions of the terms that I use and Hong Kong's ethnic 
hierarchy. I will then write about the significance of this research in the field of 
cultural identity. Next, I will discuss literature written by anthropologists and other 
scholars on the study of cultural identity and the human body, and the methodology 
4 This is illustrated in Mathews et al.'s Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation (2008), 
and will be briefly discussed in the ensuing chapters. 
丨 5 
of my research. Finally, I will provide the structure of the thesis. 
Background 
WHAT IS DEMEANOR? 
Demeanor is the main focus of this thesis in exploring how cultural identity is 
expressed in everyday life. In a narrow sense, demeanor is defined as outward 
behavior towards other people. However, in this thesis, I define demeanor in a 
broader sense. On one hand, demeanor here means bodily disposition and behavioral 
attributes that are embedded as habitus and taken for granted (Bourdieu 1984). On 
the other, I am using demeanor to refer to all bodily behaviors and manners that are 
observed by people in public areas and gestures that are consciously performed. In 
other words, demeanor reveals one's underlying choices of cultural schemas ^  
(Strauss and Quinn 1994). In this thesis, I am concerned with the conscious 
manipulation of demeanor as a way to manifest one's cultural identity and , 
distinguish "us" from "others". Therefore, in this thesis, demeanor includes 
behaviors both in private and in public. Terms like bodily disposition, bodily 
comportment, socialized behavior, manner, and demeanor are used throughout the 
thesis. 
Demeanor is often seen as one of the media in indicating our levels of 
"civilization". Humans, as is sometimes argued, evolved from anthropoid apes with 
visible differences in demeanor, changing from climbing with four limbs to walking 
with two feet, from crawling to walking erectly (Engels 2007[1940]: 25). Norbert 
Elias (1978) traces the evolution of manners in Western Europe from the Middle Age 
until the twentieth century. He studied sexual behaviors, table manners and forms of 
5 Cultural schemas, according to Horoko Nishida，are a cognitive structure that consists of general 
knowledge and past experiences that are used to guide one's behaviors (2005: 402), 
• — — 
speech, arguing that certain forms of demeanor brought shame and were restrained. 
In the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie started "new regimes for the body", 
learning "etiquette" to distinguish themselves from others (Stallybrass and White ： 
2007[1986]). 
Demeanor, therefore, has long been a form of control, power struggle, and status 
display. Demeanor was also used by colonizers such as the British, as a tool to create 
a new sense of "civilized" order and hierarchy in the colonies. In Hong Kong, for 
instance, laws were made to control and restrain "uneducated" behaviors that 
disgusted the British. The Good Order and Cleanliness Ordinance was enacted in 
1845 by the colonial Hong Kong government to "civilize" the Hong Kong populace. 
According to the ordinance, behaviors such as littering，certain ways of riding and 
driving, and even feeding animals in public were forbidden. With the enactment of I 
such an ordinance, the Chinese population's public behavior became tightly 
controlled and under strict surveillance. With 156 years of rule by the British Hong 
Kong government, many rules have been inculcated and inscribed in the body as 
habitus and are performed as if innate by" many Hong Kong Chinese people. 
Although the sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to the PRC over a decade 
ago, the sense of nationalism and national identity in Hong Kong is still relatively 
weak. Many Hong Kong people still make a conscious demarcation between Hong 
Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese people. Hong Kong Chinese and i 
mainland Chinese, however, have the same physical features in appearance, and 
distinct identity cannot easily be seen. Differences in demeanor, therefore, are used ； 
as one of the visible vehicles in manifesting Hong Kong cultural identity. The focus 
L of the distinction is whether or not a particular action could mark a demarcation 
between Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese people. Daily behaviors : 
: 7 
； t h a t are used to distinguish between these two groups will be explored in this thesis. 
WHAT IS RESISTANCE? 
A key concept of this thesis is resistance, which is also my main argument in 
: t h i s thesis. I argue that Hong Kong people's resistance towards the PRC and the vast 
changes they do not want to face is manifested in their reluctance to embrace 
；mainland China as their "motherland" and to accept mainlanders as their 
"compatriots". 
According to Susan Seymour, who summarizes the ideas and arguments made 
： o n resistance in cultural and psychological anthropology, resistance refers to 
"intentional, and hence conscious, acts of defiance or opposition by a subordinate 
：individual or group of individuals against a superior individual or set of individuals" 
(Seymour 2006: 3). Unlike Seymour's definition, the case of Hong Kong is hard to 
；distinguish who is the "dominant" and who is the "dominated" between Hong Kong 
： p e o p l e and mainlanders. In most situations, Hong Kong people are positioned as the 
:dominan t in Hong Kong. Yet, in some contexts they are dominated by mainlanders. 
Since 1997，the economy of Hong Kong has been badly hit by a series of crises. 
Hong Kong was forced to "rely" more on mainland China both economically and 
：politically6. Wealthy mainland Chinese people, in this case, are dominant in a 
political sense. However in Hong Kong, mainlanders are depicted as "uneducated" 
i and are socially segregated, and in this case, mainlanders remain the dominated in a 
social sense. Therefore, there is no clear and static distinction between the dominant 
and the dominated in the case of heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn. However, 
6 The word rely in this case is problematic. On one hand, the mainland market is growing at a brisk 
pace and provides many opportunities to Hong Kong. On the other hand, Hong Kong provides 
mainland China with stable and reliable finance services. Thus, whether Hong Kong "relies" on 
mainland China economically or "cooperates" with mainland China depends much on how the Hong 
Kong government and the mass media portray this relationship. 
： / 
many Hong Kong people, wanting to believe themselves as "dominant", are reluctant 
to be ruled by mainlanders, who are considered to belong to the "lower class". In this 
case, resistance also exists when individual or group of individuals, regardless 
whether they are subordinate or superior, face unwanted situations which they have 
no enough power to change. 
In the thesis, I will show how Hong Kong people stigmatize "mainlanders' 
demeanor" to maintain their sense of superiority and retain their power over 
mainlanders. 
WHO ARE THEY? 
Three categories of people will be discussed in this thesis, namely Hong Kong 
Chinese people, mainland Chinese people and Caucasians. I will now define these 
terms. 
Heunggongyahn 
Heunggongyahn literally means Hong Kong people, which can be construed in 
two ways: 1) people in Hong Kong as a whole, or; 2) people who identify themselves 
as heunggongyahn as different from daaihlohkyahn Here, heunggongyahn is used 
to describe those who were bom in Hong Kong, of Chinese ethnicity, and identify 
themselves as heunggongyahn. Hong Kong people aged twenty-five to thirty-five are 
the main informants of this thesis. This group of Hong Kong people is called "the 
7 My use of the term heunggongyahn is controversial in a sense that there is no one definition. The i 
term can be defined both politically and culturally. Politically, the immigration law legitimizes the 
term heunggongyahn with the right of abode (ROA) in Hong Kong. Although the ROA is also 
controversial, the law makes a demarcation between Hong Kong Chinese and mainland Chinese. 
Heunggongyahn also means people who hold Hong Kong permanent identity cards and Hong Kong 
residence right. Culturally, heunggongyahn are people who have particular histories and ways of life, 
which are different from mainland Chinese. The identity heunggongyahn does not contradict to the 
"Chinese" identity since most Hong Kong people recognize their Chinese ethnicity. My informants 
identify themselves as heunggongyahn in both political and cultural ways, so my informants provide 
an accurate representation for the group aged 25 - 35 in Hong Kong. This group of Hong Kong people, 
although they have experienced the same historical events, does not hold the same attitudes. Variations 
are found during the interviews, yet the underlying reasons for such variations are not included in this 
thesis. Rather, I explore how these differences constitute the present situations where the majority of 
mainlanders are left out in the Hong Kong society. 
： 9 
： fou r th generation" by the sociologist Lui Tai-lok (Lui 2007)，and as "the post-80s" by 
the mass media. They identify themselves as both heunggongyahn ("Hongkonger") 
and Chinese. This generation of Hong Kong people grew up in a transitional period 
of sovereignty, facing unstable economic, social and political situations: stock market 
fluctuations, increased emigration overseas, and increasing involvement of the PRC 
； i n Hong Kong affairs. On one hand, they grew up under the colonial British 
government, with some familiar feeling towards some British governors. On the 
i other hand, they witnessed the return of the sovereignty, and feel uneasy having a 
Chinese leader as their ruler. The specific experience of the changing government 
i from British to Chinese in their teenage years, or childhood, distinguishes this 
generation of Hong Kong people from the rest of the population. 
Daaihlohkyahn 
Daaihlohkyahn (大陸人)，literally means mainland people and mainlanders, but 
does not necessarily mean "Chinese people"(中國人).Daaihlohkyahn is a general 
discursive term referring to all Chinese people from mainland China, and those who 
have migrated to Hong Kong since the 1980s. From the perspective of many Hong 
Kong people, the term "Chinese people" means those who are of Chinese ethnic 
origin. Daaihlohkyahn means people from mainland China and are of Chinese 
；ethnicity, but are just one "type" of Chinese people. Therefore, many Hong Kong 
people identify themselves as "Hong Kong Chinese" or "Chinese" but make a clear 
distinction from the category of daaihlohkyahn, whom they disdain. 
Without doubt, there are variations within these 1.3 billion mainland Chinese 
people, yet many Hong Kong people conceive daaihlohkyahn as a single and 
homogenous body, imagining that all mainlanders have the same social practices and 
the same bodily dispositions. As mentioned earlier, heterogeneities among 
• 一乂 i . "To 
mainlanders are hidden in Hong Kong people's public discourse. 
The vocabularies used to denote mainlanders have changed over time. In the 
1980s to 1990s，Hong Kong Chinese often called mainlanders A-Chaan (阿燥）and 
• Daaihlohklei (大陸喱）（Siu 1987: 1). A-Chaan was the protagonist of a famous TV \ 
soap drama, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (網中人)，and the name carries a .... 
degrading meaning, such as "uneducated" and "lazy", which will be further ： 
discussed later (Mathews el al. 2008). Also used during that period was Daaihlohklei, 
which has a negative connotation too. Interestingly, the use of these two negative 
terms has become less common since the handover in 1997, and this, to some extent, 
reflects the power struggle between Hong Kong people and mainlanders. 
Today, Daaihlohkyahn, is a common term used by Hong Kong people to refer to 
mainlanders. It is considered as a relatively neutral term, but it still carries negative ... 
connotations sometimes and categorizes mainland Chinese people in a separate 
group from Hong Kong Chinese people. Sanyiman (,新移民）was a term officially 
used to call mainland immigrants in the 1990s, however the term is problematic since 
Hong Kong was returned to mainland China in 1997，it is political incorrect to call : 
mainland residents in Hong Kong "immigrants". To tackle this issue, "new arrivals" 
(新來港人士）is the new term to call mainland "immigrants" in the 2000s. 
Gwdilou 
Gwdildu (鬼佬）literally means "ghost", which is a local term signifying \ 
Caucasian. It was used as a metaphor for their pale faces and the different colors of ； 
their eyes. When this term was used in earlier periods, it was derogatory, reflecting ； 
Chinese's sense of superiority over foreigners (De Mente 1996: 144-145). Today, the ； 
word gwdildu simply means Caucasians, with no insult intended. From the ； 
perspective of many Hong Kong people, those who have lighter skin colors, such as 
: 1 1 
；Americans and Europeans, are all called gwdilou. Hong Kong people rarely 
；distinguish ethnically or culturally among gwdilou. Gwdilou is another term for 
；H o n g Kong people to portray these foreigners as "outsiders". This group is discussed 
； i n the thesis in order to illustrate Hong Kong people's biased attitudes towards 
mainlanders. 
Research Significance 
This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of the politics of cultural 
； ident i ty and its relationships with demeanor by unpacking and exploring 1) how 
cultural identity is expressed through demeanor; 2) how demeanor is manipulated to 
. d e m a r c a t e "us" from "others" and "superior" from “inferior，，，and; 3) the hidden and 
； r a r e l y spoken messages that are conveyed. To do this, I examine in detail Hong Kong 
丨 people's daily life and their discourse towards mainlanders' behavior; these provide 
：empirical information on the above issues at the local level. I also investigate how 
； p o l i t i c a l , economic and social issues play a role in affecting the ways Hong Kong 
；p e o p l e treat and perceive mainlanders. In doing so, I attempt to unveil Hong Kong 
people's everyday politics and wisdom, and their subtle ways of conveying unspoken 
messages. 
In the initial stage of my research, I asked my informants about their attitudes 
towards other ethnic groups' behaviors. Often when I asked my Hong Kong 
\ informants about their attitudes towards other groups of people, such as Filipinos, 
: A f r i c a n s , Pakistanis and Caucasians, they did not have much to say, and usually 
...finished talking about them in a few sentences. Then they usually switched their 
: f o c u s to mainlanders and started talking about them; they made many complaints and 
；comments about the behaviors of mainlanders. After I realized the bigotry Hong 
Kong people had towards "mainlanders' demeanor”，I switched the focus of my 
i . " I T 
； i 
research to mainlanders. The abhorrence of "mainlanders' demeanor" will be also 
discussed in a broader sense. 
In short, this thesis provides a different angle to study the cultural identity of 
.Hong Kong: how cultural identity is expressed through demeanor. Why do so many 
Hong Kong Chinese people hold prejudices against mainlanders' demeanor, when 
mainlanders are supposed to be their "compatriots"? What messages are conveyed 
through these prejudices? This in-depth study on Hong Kong people's disdainful 
attitudes towards "mainlanders' demeanor" holds more significance than simple 
discrimination, I argue. 
Literature Review 
DEMEANOR： CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 
The human body is a site of contestation of issues such as gender and power. 
Anthropology of the body is not new. An enormous corpus of studies dealing with 
the human body has been done in the last two decades. Abundant research has been 
done on identity and the human body: discourse on the body (Gwyn 2003; Pandolfi 
2007), body technology (Lupton and Seymour 2003)，territory (Gardner and 
Gronfein 2006)，behavior (Fox 2004; Cahill 2006), dress and demeanor (Andrewes 
2005) and images of the body (Charmaz and Rosenfeld 2006). 
Mauss [2007 (1934)]，the pioneer in the field, examines how mundane 
behaviors such as eating, drinking and even sleeping, are nurtured by culture. He 
uses the term "techniques" to describe human habits such as walking, swimming, and 
sleeping. Different ideologies are embedded in the human body as bodily disposition, 
and are performed by socialized persons in everyday life. In the last three decades, 
Hong Kong people have manipulated the differences in bodily dispositions to 
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distinguish mainland Chinese people from Hong Kong Chinese people. Often the 
focus is on mundane behaviors. 
As mentioned earlier, many people for a long time tended to believe there was a 
： l inear path of "civilization": from hunter-gatherers to agriculturalists to technologists. 
Manner is one of the ways used to demarcate between "civilized" and "uncivilized". 
： T o "civilize" people's behavior, etiquette books were used in medieval European 
societies. These etiquette books give rules on behavior and attach specific meanings 
； t o different behaviors. Different values are imposed on different behaviors, which 
distinguish "bad" from "good", "uncivilized" from "civilized" and "lower class" 
\ from "higher class". Manners and etiquette are thus inculcated into the human body 
； a s "techniques". Foucault (1977) stresses institutional discipline on the body; through 
； t h e inculcation of discipline and punishment, our bodies eventually internalize the 
I rules and act accordingly. Education, therefore, as Mauss argued, was the dominant 
；p o w e r in shaping one's "techniques", which Bourdieu later termed habitus. Habitus 
\ (Bourdieu 1990: 56) means "embodied history, internalized as a second nature and 
forgotten as history", which is like a social schema that provides meaning and reason 
to human agents, and these meanings are embodied. Once the values of different 
demeanors are taken for granted, one easily judges another person based on bodily 
behavior. 
Csordas (1990: 36) proposes embodiment as a paradigm of anthropology. He 
defines the body as "an element among others in an objective universe," and also as 
"a setting in relation to the world". Understanding embodiment, therefore, involves 
an analysis of subject and object to the distinctions between mind and body, self and 
other, cognition and emotion, and subjectivity and objectivity (ibid.). In other words, 
self is manifested through the body by demeanor. 
. "T4 
Hong Kong, like other former colonies, carries postcolonial remains. Not only 
architecture, socio-political systems and memories of local people act as proof, but 
also the human body is strong evidence of colonial and postcolonial regimes. Lock 
and Farquhar (2007: 307) write, 
Hybrid bodies proliferate under colonial regimes in ways that surprise and 
frustrate the imperial impulse. Gone are older portrayals of unmediated 
domination by those in power over the health, illness, comportment, and 
reproduction of peoples cast as though they have no culture and little or no 
agency... Colonized bodies were understood as "symbolic inversions" of 
European bodies, as "disease, lazy and grotesque". 
To sum up, "decent", "impolite" or "right" ways of behaving would not exist 
without manners and rules. And value-judged behaviors are one of the ways to 
identify one's social status. Hong Kong Chinese people, who were educated with 
Hong Kong's cultural values but at the same time constrained by their regulations, 
have developed their own perception of this linear "path to civilization". Although 
there is no visible and definite evidence for the imagined "path to civilization", it 
seems to me that it exists in the heads of many Hong Kong Chinese, who believe 
they are "superior" and "better" under Hong Kong's education, rules and regulations, 
which are heavily influenced by Great Britain. As mentioned before, the British, as 
Caucasians，are seen as "better" and "superior" in the ethnic hierarchy in Hong Kong. 
The values Hong Kong Chinese learnt, therefore, set "paths" for "civilization". In 
their imagined "path to civilization", the behaviors of mainlanders are considered to 
be "uncivilized" and "dirty". Illustrations of this are provided in chapter 4. 
1 
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DEMEANOR： EMBODIMENT AND PRESENTATION OF CULTURAL 
IDENTITIES 
Demeanor is often practiced without a second thought, yet it is also frequently 
and consciously used to convey messages. Scholars I mentioned in the previous 
. s ec t ions focused on the unconscious messages conveyed by the socialized human 
body. However, demeanor is not always acted out unconsciously. The following 
section summarizes different scholars' works on the conscious use of the human 
body and bodily dispositions. 
Edward Hall (1969: 128) distinguishes four categories of relations - intimate, 
；personal, social and public - by observing the differences in distance, body 
movement and touching among middle class people in America. In Interaction 
\ Rituals, Erving Goffman (1967: 55) argues that rules of conduct are organized into 
；codes that encourage everyone to behave properly. He then distinguishes rules of 
behavior into substantial and ceremonial ones. Substantial rules comprise our "law, 
morality and ethics" whereas ceremonial rules are codes like etiquette (ibid.). Rules 
are often embedded in the human body and reflect the codes of cultural knowledge, 
which indicate one's cultural identity. Failing to perform "correctly" according to 
social rules could bring dreadful outcomes. For instance, jumping the queue in Hong 
Kong is seen as "uneducated" and is believed to be a bodily attribute of "lower class" 
group. Also, people who squat in streets in Hong Kong are seen as Daaihlohkyahn, 
an identity that carries stigma such as "outsiders" and "uneducated". Hence Hong 
Kong people are constrained not to jump queues or squat. Some mainlanders do not 
observe these rules and violate them. They are thus considered to be "uneducated". 
Therefore, not only is the body manipulated to indicate different kinds of 
inter-personal relationships, it also separates people into different groups. The human 
乂 
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body, including both physical appearance and bodily dispositions, is indeed a "ticket" 
to membership into the local community. 
Goffman uses the word "performance" to indicate the consciousness of a person 
when acting in public. He argues that we perform when we are with other 
"observers" (Goffman 1969: 19). Whatever we do in public, and sometimes in 
private as well, conveys messages; facial expressions, gestures, voices, and smells 
are all signifiers in presenting ourselves. To be acknowledged by others, we have to 
！ 
perform in culturally correct ways. Moreover, "face-work" is also involved when we 
are performing; one has to behave in corresponding ways that fit a certain social 
setting and one's own social identity in order to gain "face" (Goffman 1967: 11). 
Examining demeanor and dress in the south of Senegal, Andrewes echoes Goffman: 
"for the Muslim, a correct appearance and an appropriate demeanor are an integral 
part of social positioning" (Andrewes 2005: 12). Demeanor, like dress, is a 
signifying tool, indicating the social position of a person, yet it is imprinted on the 
human body. Using the same example mentioned above, anyone found jumping 
queues would be considered "uneducated”，so in general, Hong Kong people tend to 
line up in most situations where lining up is called for. 
To recapitulate, demeanor marks a social boundary between proper/improper, 
upper class/lower class, and us/them. Behaving properly is not only a way to gain 
face, but also social positioning - a shared cultural identity. A single gesture could be 
powerful enough to mark either inclusion or exclusion from a society, thereupon 
strengthening the social hierarchy. 
POLITICIZING DEMEANOR： STRUGGLING FOR POWER AND 
CONVEYING MESSAGES 
The last section showed that demeanor is used to present or identify one's 
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cultural identity. The following section discusses scholars' works on cultural identity. 
Stuart Hall defines cultural identity in two ways: 1) "people with a shared 
history and ancestry" (1990: 223), and 2) the senses of significant difference that 
constitute ‘what we really are, and 'what we have become' (1990: 225). Barth 
suggests that "ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the 
actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between 
people" (Barth 1969:10). Persons with the same cultural identity "play the same 
game" and share the same value judgment insomuch as interaction both requires and 
generates "a congruence of codes and values" (ibid.: 15-16). Both Hall and Barth 
define cultural identity as "shared" values. 
In her book Watching the English (2004)，Kate Fox examines the unwritten 
rules of English behavior and tries to determine "Englishness" from studying 
people's behavior. She gives plenty of examples of general rules of behavior at home, 
play and work, such as how the English talk and what they do in everyday life. She 
attempts to give illustrations of how mundane behaviors can reveal one's cultural 
identity. Her analysis is not sound enough to make a strong argument, since she does 
not explore the link between "Englishness" and "English behavior" in enough depth. 
Nonetheless, this thesis, like Fox's study, also aims to explore the connection 
between "Hong-Kongness" and their behavior. By examining Hong Kong people's 
conscious expressions through demeanor, specific codes and values are exposed and 
have become shared cultural knowledge, therefore revealing their cultural identity. 
On the contrary, people who do not behave "properly" carry a temporary stigma as 
"outsiders". This prevents "outsiders" from gaining access into a community. This 
explains why most mainlanders, with stigmatized image of not behaving "properly", 
face difficulties in getting membership in Hong Kong. 
, 
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Drawing upon James Scott's idea of "weapons of the weak" (1985), I discuss 
the manipulation of the category "mainlanders' demeanor" as a weapon. Scott studies 
peasants' daily life, revealing how peasants, the dominated, resist by creating ： 
derogatory names, and spreading gossip to attack landlords symbolically. Scott terms ； 
this a “hidden transcript" (2005 [1990]: 183). Stigmatizing certain forms of demeanor ； 
as "mainlanders' behavior" is similarly an everyday political tool employed by Hong : 
Kong people to express their discontent and resistance, which will be discussed in ； 
Chapter 3. In other words, this thesis illustrates how demeanor is used in a way to 
check the "intrusion" of mainlanders, who are perceived as "outsiders" in Hong ； 
Kong. 
HONG KONG IDENTITY： ITS SHAPING PROCESS 
Hong Kong identity is shaped by a number of factors, and various scholars have 
done research from different angles: mass media (Ma 1996; 1999; 2002; Mathews et ； 
al. 2008); civic education (Tse 2004; Mathews et al. 2008); immigration policies (Ku ； 
2004); identity cards (Cheng and Wong 2004); citizenship and immigration (Leung 
2004); and market mentality (Mathews et al. 2008). 
Policies on immigration and immigrants, as discussed by Ku (2004) and Leung ； 
(2004)，play a part in shaping Hong Kong identity in an official sense. Hong Kong : 
identity gradually emerged alongside increasingly tightened regulation of Chinese 
immigration from 1950 to 1980. The identity of Heunggongyahn was then further • 
developed officially under the definition of permanent resident in 1972 (Wong and .. 
Cheng 2004). Mainlanders began to be perceived as "social burdens" and : 
"trouble-makers" in official discourses I will further discuss how policies shape the \ 
cultural identity of Hong Kongers in the next chapter. 
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Apart from the official discourses, mass media has long been seen as one of the 
: c r u c i a l factors shaping a distinct Hong Kong identity. In the 1980s, mass media 
began to shape Hong Kong identity by "suppressing any sense of loyalty to the 
: C h i n e s e nation, and by stigmatizing mainlanders as outsiders lacking the positive 
values Hong Kong people attributed to themselves" (Mathews et al. 2008: 63). As I 
have briefly mentioned before, the famous TV drama, The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly, portrayed the contrasting images of Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland 
；Chinese people. While Hong Kong people are depicted as "hard-working", "smart" 
； a n d "well-educated", mainlanders are "lazy", "stupid" and "uneducated". The name 
\ of the protagonist A-Chaan, an illegal immigrant from mainland China, was used as 
； t h e common name for mainland migrants (Ma 1999; Mathews et al. 2008: 63). His 
:behav io r s were also stigmatized as "mainlanders' behavior，，，such as jumping the 
； l i nes , littering, atid stealing. As Mathews et al. argue, Hong Kong people's sense of 
丨 proper public behavior is illustrated in the drama (Mathews et al. 2008: 64). After the 
: :s igning of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the portrayals of mainlanders in 
; T V dramas and films were less negative (Ma 1999). On the cusp of the handover, the 
stigmatization of mainlanders was restrained. Mass media started promoting the 
"joy" of "reunification". 
Mathews et al. (2008) argue that market forces play a role in controlling the 
mainlanders' contents. To gain a market share in mainland China, the stigmatization 
of mainlanders has been checked. Instead, they started depicting mainlanders as 
："compatriots". The allure of mainland China's market became in Hong Kongers， 
interest. Money and market forces become Hong Kong's raison d'etre (Mathews et al. 
2008: 151). With their eyes on the potential gains from the Chinese market, Hong 
Kong people demonstrate a flexible, pragmatic and situational nationalism, which 
may comprise their loyalty to the nation but not to the state. 
In Chapter 2,1 borrow the case of Britain as an example to show how "identity" 
is used by the "whites" to build up an "invisible empire" in England. In her book The 
Invisible Empire (2009), Georgie Wemyss explores how "white discourse", the 
dominant discourse, is used by the British to retain their power over other ethnic 
minorities. Categories like "Muslims" and "middle class" are created and reinforced 
throughout the dominant discourse. She argues that the "white" ethnicity and identity 
are still dominating the discourse in Britain and establishing the invisible "British 
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Empire", which socially isolate other ethnic groups as being "non-British" and : 
"inferior". Hong Kong Chinese，like the British described in The Invisible Empire, 
identify themselves as different from "mainland Chinese". Unlike the case above, 
Hong Kong Chinese people could not use physical appearance to demonstrate the 
"differences", and instead, they categorize certain forms of demeanor as 
"mainlander's behavior" and stigmatize it as "uncivilized" and "inferior". The 
"invisible" social hierarchy thus reproduces, strengthens and reinforces Hong Kong 
identity as distinct from Daaihlohkyahn. • 
Methodology 
Hong Kong is the main fieldsite where most observations and interviews were 
conducted. Some observations were conducted in mainland China. 
ENTERING THE FIELD： DAILY OBSERVATION 
As I am a native Hong Kong person, I have taken my culture for granted, which 
has made it difficult for me to observe the rules that seem natural to me. Like all 
anthropologists, entering the field means doing observation intensively. Daily : 
observation was mainly carried out from September 2008 to September 2009 as a ； 
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； b a s e to collect data for interview use. Yet, doing fieldwork in a familiar place lured 
me to relax during observations, especially during the first two weeks. Eventually, I 
was able to take up my role as an observer. After three months of intensive 
：observation, I felt exhausted and out of place. Turning a familiar and natural 
environment into an unfamiliar and unnatural one suffocated me. Taking public 
transportation was such an everyday practice to me that I did not pay much attention 
: t o other passengers and their activities before I did my research. However，the 
； in tensive observation while traveling on public transportation provided me with 
important data on how people behave in front of others in a closed environment. 
During my daily observations, pictures and videos were taken as an interview 
tool. These pictures and incidents were shown and described as scenarios to my 
； informants to jog their memories^ Also, they helped make abstract concepts and 
different forms of demeanor more concrete and comprehensible to my informants in 
： t h e interviews. Most pictures were taken with my cell phone, which I carry with me 
；everyday. Using a cell phone to take pictures offers two advantages: 1) It is less 
：disturbing, which fits in the golden rule of Hong Kong, "Do not disturb others, 
especially strangers"^, 2) It can be easily carried around. Since the data obtained 
from daily observation is only used in interviews with my informants, so the age and 
cultural identity of the characters in the photos will not affect the result of my thesis. 
PILOT TEST 
During my three months of intensive daily observation, I also launched a pilot 
test. In the test, I asked my Hong Kong Chinese informants simple questions before 
determining a focus for in-depth interviews. These questions include: 1) How are 
8 Some of the pictures are shown in the thesis. 
9 This rule will be further illustrated in Chapter 4 as one of the positive attributes that Hong Kong 
Chinese proclaim, and is used to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese. 
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Hong Kong Chinese different from mainland Chinese in terms of demeanor? 2) How 
do you view mainland Chinese in terms of demeanor? Since I am a native Hong 
Kong Chinese, I am tempted to use my intuitive knowledge to lead the research, yet 
my personal knowledge does not represent a general cultural norm in Hong Kong. 
This pilot test, however, enabled me to find out which forms of demeanor are more 
important and frequently used in presenting cultural identities. The focus of this 
research is the corporeal behavior that is used as a way to present one's cultural 
identity. 
IN-DEPTH, SEMI-STRUCTURED AND STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were conducted between January 2009 and January 2010. I 
interviewed forty-two Hong Kong Chinese aged from twenty-five to thirty-five, of ； 
which twenty-one were in-depth interviews. They were all Hong Kong born Chinese 
who identified themselves as "Hong Kong people", and most of them also identified : 
themselves as "Chinese". In-depth interviews explored the most important questions 
in this thesis, including 1) How do my informants identify themselves differently ; 
from mainland Chinese people in terms of demeanor? 2) How do they react in certain 
situations, with scenarios provided? 3) How do they view the handover in 1997? 4) 
How do they feel about changes in Hong Kong through the last decade? 
During these in-depth interviews, my informants were asked to recall their 
memories about 1) differences with "others" in demeanor during overseas travels and 
in Hong Kong; 2) the transitional period of the handover. Also, they were asked to 
comment on the scenarios and photos I obtained from daily observation. Moreover, 
recent issues in mainland China were brought into discussion, such as the World : 
Exposition in Shanghai, the Olympics in Beijing, the Sichuan earthquake and 
mainland China's food poisoning issues. Thus, the data I collected were both present ： 
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and historical. 
Most in-depth interviews were conducted individually. Interview locations 
include cafes, restaurants and sometimes my informants' homes. Most questions 
were open-ended to encourage my informants to freely share their viewpoints and 
experiences. Unstructured interviews were carried out in a more informal way and 
some were carried out in groups. This stimulated my informants to share and discuss 
views. Therefore unstructured interviews usually took place in outdoor public areas, 
such as on trains and streets. I also did interviews through web messenger, which is 
one of the most common ways for my targeted informants to discuss and share their 
viewpoints. Questions relating to abstract concepts were discussed in the telephone 
or face-to-face in-depth interviews. 
Being a native hinders my research in certain ways. Since I am a native Hong 
Kong person, many of my informants expect me to know and understand most of the 
behavioral rules, and thus they did not explain them clearly, so that I had to ask for 
further illustrations. Some of them even thought that my questions were stupid and 
mduUuh (無耶P), and laughed at me since the answers seemed too "obvious" and 
"simple" to the general Hong Kong people^®. 
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
Participant observation, here, means joining certain activities with my 
informants so that I could observe their bodily disposition in practice. The places 
include Hong Kong, mainland China, Korea and the Philippines. The aim of 
participant observation is to observe how my informants carry their bodies in order to 
express their distinct Hong Kong identity, and to distinguish themselves from 
MduUuh is commonly use in many situations. There is not an English word that means the same 
with mdulluh. It basically means boring, not interesting, something meaningless, which could be used 
to describe a situation or a person. For my case, my informants thought that my questions were 
meaningless since the answers were "obvious". 
1 
i .. 24 
"mainland Chinese" through demeanor. Hence, I could find out whether or not their 
actual behavior fits in with their comments made during their interviews. 
Furthermore, some information could only be obtained through participant 
observation, such as their immediate reactions towards demeanor that breaks the 
unwritten cultural rules in Hong Kong. 
Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis explores everyday life politics. Expressions are not only evinced 
through verbal or written languages; it is often revealed through the body. By 
observing the daily practices of demeanor and everyday discourse on demeanor, this 
thesis aims to disentangle the multifaceted attitudes of some Hong Kong people 
towards mainland China and PRC. 
Chapter 2，''Heunggongyahn and Daaihlohkyahn'\ shows how an imbalanced 
power and social hierarchy could be generated and reinforced by privileging and 
stigmatizing certain demeanor. I begin by describing the "path to civilization" that 
many Hong Kong people hold in their minds as truth. Then I examine how certain 
demeanor is attributed with positive values, such as "superior", and is believed to be 
"Hong Kong people's demeanor" whilst certain demeanor is imposed with negative 
connotations, such as "inferior" and "uncivilized", and is stigmatized as 
"mainlander's demeanor". The polarized hierarchical position of "Hong Kong 
Chinese people" and "mainland Chinese people" produces and reproduces social 
inequalities and strengthens the "invisible" social hierarchy. 
Chapter 3，"My Informants' Everyday Life”，further explores the social 
hierarchy that is by the conceived differences mentioned in Chapter 2. I begin with ； 
Hong Kong people's imagination of linear "path to civilization", which is reflected 
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by their attitudes towards different forms of demeanor. The practices of lining up and 
using seat-toilet "properly"- are employed as illustrations. I then elucidate demeanor 
as capital - cultural, social and economic capital. I also demonstrate that many Hong 
Kong people feel shame when misidentified as Daaihlohkyahn. In doing so, I unpack 
and expose how Hong Kong people consciously present their cultural identity to 
\ distinguish themselves from mainlanders. I also explore how cultural identity is 
unwittingly embodied in demeanor. 
Chapter 4, "Hong Kong Cultural Identity", gives an introduction to Hong Kong 
： ident i ty and brings out the arguments that this thesis attempts to make. I start with a 
picture of the changing relationships between Hong Kong and mainland China in 
terms of Hong Kong's political, economic and social situations. I then give a brief 
historical review of the shaping of Hong Kong's cultural identity. Exploring a few 
factors such as economic differences and levels of corruption, I illustrate that the 
identity of Heunggongyahn carries a sense of superiority whilst the identity of � 
Daaihlohkyahn is believed to be "inferior". I also explore the role of the 
"middle-class" mentality that shared by Hong Kong people in demarcating 
Daaihlohkyahn from Heunggongyahn, and is expressed through demeanor. 
Moreover, examining the case of Berlin, I show that a distinct cultural identity 
separates people who were once compatriots. After demonstrating the distinct sense 
of cultural identity that is shared by many Hong Kong people, I finally bring out 
Hong Kong people's rejection of mainlanders as members, in which reveals Hong 
Kong people's resistance: many of them are still reluctant to emotionally embrace 
mainland China as their "motherland" and "nation". 
Chapter 5，"Demeanor, Emotions and Resistance", elucidates the relationships 
among demeanor, emotions, and resistance. I begin with the double/multiple 
： 
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standards that Hong Kong people hold to value others' demeanor and this reveal that 
mainlanders are targeted and stigmatized. I then explored Hong Kong people's 
complicated emotions towards mainland Chinese. From this, I argue that the category 
“mainlanders，demeanor" is a way to socially marginalize mainlanders in Hong 
Kong, where they are treated as scapegoats. I also account for the underlying reasons 
for Hong Kong people's fears and concerns for expressing direct resistance. Hong 
Kong people's resistance is directed by their distinct cultural identity and their 
emotions towards mainland Chinese, in which resistance is expressed through 
demeanor and its discourses. Drawing on James Scott's (1985) argument of ; 
"weapons of the weak", I illustrate how demeanor and its discourses are manipulated 
as a weapon to upset the reputation of mainlanders and thus to maintain Hong Kong 
people's sense of superiority. Therefore, this chapter argues that the stigmatization of .. 
"mainlanders' demeanor" is indeed a form of symbolic violence. 
Chapter 6，"Conclusion", recapitulates the arguments presented in this thesis 
and speculates on the relationship between Hong Kong people and mainlanders in 
the coming years. This chapter also explores the larger questions of: What does the 
case of Hong Kong teach us about the manipulation of the bodily dispositions as 
weapons to convey unspoken yet crucial messages? Would mainland Chinese, if the 
identity as Heunggongyahn gradually faded away and the identity as Chinese 
gradually strengthened, be accepted as a part of Hong Kong society? Or would 
mainland Chinese still be discredited based on their bodily comportment? 
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Informants，Details 
Name Age Gender Professional 丨 
Ah sang 27 M Accountant 
Ah-Ching 28 M C ^ 
Ah-Fung 27 M Work in Restaurant 
Ah-Ga 29 M Designer 
Ah-Ka 27 M Electronic Company 
Ah-mak 27 M Marketing buyer 
Ah-mo 25 F Student 
Ah-nap ^ M Computer 
Ah-yi 25 F Clerk 
Amanda 26 F Secretary 
Andrew 26 M Accountant 
Chris F " Clerk 
Fat-Wai 28 M employees in telecommunicative 
Gloria 25 F Marketing sales 
JJ. 35 M Customer Servicer 
Janice ^ F Marketing Sales 
Jessie 28' F Secretary ‘ 
John 34 M Overseas Sales � 
Johnny 35 M Financial analyst 
June ^ F Trading company 
Ken 29 M Unemployed 
Kenneth 26 M Activity Organizer 
Lena 26 F Secretary 
Leo 26 M Teacher 
Name Age Gender Occupation 
Louis 34 M Employer 
Mace 25 F Secondary School Teacher 
Mandy 26 - F Teacher 
May 26 F Student . . 
Michael 34 M Employer 
Nathalie 28 F ^ 
Paul 28 M Unemployed 
Peter 27 M c t t 
Priscilla 25 F Advertising Company 
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Simon ^ M Sales Manager 
Steve 30 M Work in Security Company 
Steven ^ M Project Engineer 
Vince 30 M History Teacher 
Wai-tsai 28 M Project Engineer 
Yanny 28 F Journalist | 
Yoyo 26 F Work in Bank 
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Chapter 2. 
Heunggongyahn and Daaihlohkyahn 
...if we want to understand what it means to be human, we need to 
understand how the body is constructed through symbols, codes, signs, 
signifying activities, and discursive practices. (Blackman 2008: 22) 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I unpack and elucidate what Hong Kong people mean by 
"corporeal differences from mainlanders": what are "Hong Kong people's 
demeanor" and "mainlanders' demeanor"? It is undeniable that certain forms of 
demeanor are practiced more frequently by some mainlanders，but many Hong 
Kong people stereotype them as "mainlanders' demeanor" and neglect the 
heterogeneities in mainlanders. This chapter is structured in two sections. The 
first section deals with the demeanor that Hong Kong people believe as 
representing their "superiority". The second section focuses on the demeanor that 
many Hong Kong people stigmatize as reflecting mainlanders' "inferiority". 
The imagined social class differences - Hong Kong people as "middle 
class" and mainland people as "lower class - is believed to be presented through 
demeanor by many Hong Kong people. Under such imagination, mainland 
Chinese people are viewed as homogenous and static, sharing the same demeanor. 
The conceived "mainlanders' demeanor" is disparaged and stigmatized, which 
denigrates their "uncivilized" identity. An invisible social hierarchy is thus 
produced and reproduced by continuously distinguishing and developing the 
ideas of "Hong Kong people's demeanor" and "mainlanders' demeanor". Here, I 
argue that the establishment of the "invisible social hierarchy" could be shaped 
and reaffirmed by demeanor. 
Heunggongyahn and Daaihlohkyahn 
The argument for the idea of "invisible social hierarchy" is inspired by a 
recent work by anthropologist, Georgie Wemyss. Her book named The Invisible 
Empire: White Discourse, Tolerance and Belonging (2009), explores the invisible 
race hierarchy and cultural hegemony that are constructed under the "white's" 
(the "white" British's) dominant discourse and the discrimination faced by 
Muslims in England. The contrasting values that are attached to Hong Kong • 
people's demeanor and mainlanders' demeanor are also useful in understanding 
Hong Kong people's prejudice against mainlanders' demeanor. 
Before digging into details, Table 2.1 summarizes the conceived differences 
between Hong Kong Chinese and mainland Chinese. The left column lists out the 
demeanor that represents the "civilized" Hong Kong people, while the right 
column lists out the demeanor of "uncivilized" mainlanders. 
Heunssdnsvahn: More “Civilized” Daaihlohkyahn: “Uncivilized” 
Line Up Don't line up/ Jump queues 
Use Seat Toilet "Properly" Use Squat Toilet/ Squat on Seat 
Toilet 
Spit on Tissue Paper Spit in Streets/ Indoor 
Avoid Disturbance to Others Talk Loudly/ Touch Others 
Avoid Squatting Squat Everywhere 
Sit "Properly" Sit "Improperly" 
Don't Pick Nose in Public Pick Nose Publicly 
Avoid Conflicts in Public Argue Loudly in Public 
Table 2.1: Perceived differences in demeanor between Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland 
Chinese people. ‘ 
Pride: Certain Demeanor as “Superior，，Prestige 
. i 
This section explores the pride Hong Kong people have about their "proper" 
demeanor. The bodily dispositions that they believe are representative of Hong 
Kong Chinese people are often associated with values inculcated by social 
institutions, such as schools and families. Many Hong Kong Chinese people 
genuinely consider these values as symbols of being "well-educated" and 
"civilized". Their daily practices, however, may not necessarily correspond to 
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their beliefs. The discrepancy between Hong Kong people's beliefs and their 
daily practices will bq discussed in Chapter 5. Here, I will focus on my analysis 
on "Hong Kong people's demeanor", which acts as the medium of building up 
pride and a sense of superiority, and thus distinguishing Hong Kong people from 
mainlanders. 
Values of "superiority" are hidden behind the conception of "Hong Kong 
people's demeanor": avoid damaging public spaces, holding public virtue, 
respecting others, conforming to rules and being polite. These values are 
reflected and embodied in demeanor. The following section explores how Hong 
Kong Chinese people carry themselves in public. 
THE PRESTIGE IN NOT DISTURBING OTHERS 
Hong Kong people always say "don't disturb others" for they believe this as 
one of the differences between Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland 
Chinese people. They perceive that it is a way to show others that they know how � 
to respect others. Hong Kong people, according to my informants, most of times, 
consciously avoid disturbing others. Mainlanders, who are believed to be the 
opposite of Hong Kong people, have no or little awareness of respecting others. 
Noise or talking loudly is considered one of the disturbances in public areas. 
"Once I was travelling by the Shenzhen subway, there was a guy listening to 
music loudly, that really disturbed other passengers," said Nathalie, my 
informant, 28 years old. Ah-Chong, a friend of Nathalie, added on Nathalie's 
comment, "It's not surprising to hear mainlanders listening to music without 
using headsets. I often see them playing mobiles games or other games with loud 
music on. Maybe they don't consider that as disturbance." 
The actions of occupying public properties and invading others "personal 
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space" are also considered selfish and disturbing^. Once I travelled with six 
heunggongyahn to Guangzhou as part of my participant observation. An incident 
happened and aroused their attention: 
Fieldnotes, Guangzhou, 16 August 2009, around 18:30 
Seven of us stood around a handrail, forming a little circle. Then, a young 
girl, aged around 25, got onto the train, broke into our circle and leaned on 
the handrail that one of my informants and me were holding. Not only had 
she stood right in the middle of us, disturbing our conversation, she even 
leaned on our hands. We were stunned and moved our hands away since the 
girl had no intention to move. After getting off from the train, my 
informants burst into laughter. They were all very surprised by her action, 
and one of them mocked, "what a strong nation, keuhnggwok (強國尸！ That 
girl really didn't care how disturbing she was. We were chatting and she 
stood right in the middle, blocking our conversation. She is so rude so 
selfish." The train was not crowded and there was enough space for her to 
stand elsewhere. The circular space, as understood by my informants, was 
our space, her action invaded our space. They termed this as a "mainlander 
behavior", which is rude and selfish. 
The above case demonstrates three areas that many Hong Kong people 
consider as "inappropriate", "selfish" and "uncivilized". First, the circular space, 
as believed by my informants, belonged to their "personal space". Walking in the 
circular space meant an intrusion into their personal space. Second, my 
informants were in a conversation when that girl interrupted. Third, the girl 
leaned on my informants' hands and "occupied" the handrail with her body, this 
is also considered as "selfish" by many Hong Kong people. Fig.2.1 illustrates 
what my informant meant by leaning on handrails. One of my informants told me 
about another incident that happened once when he was traveling on MTR, 
Few days ago I was travelling on the MTR, there was a middle-aged woman 
leaning on a handrail. A group of teenagers stood next to her, they wanted to 
hold the handrail but had no space. The woman got off at Wong Tai Sin 
station, and one of the teenagers shouted, 'Hey, si-ndaih (師奶)，you left 
11 I would not discuss the differences in defining "personal space" between Hong Kong people 
and mainlanders. My main point here is to demonstrate how Hong Kong people react and think 
when "others" intrude their "personal space". Deborah Pellow (1996). argues that mainland 
Chinese people have a different definition for "public space". 
12 Keuhnggwok is used ironically by heunggongyahn to mock China as a growing world power, 
yet the "standard" of its citizens is still below average in the eyes of many heunggongyahn. 
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something here’". The woman turned around and the teenagers continued, 
'You forgot the handrail.' The teenagers burst into laughter and the woman 
left embarrassedly. 
Disturbing others, such as occupying public space and invading others' 
"personal space", is considered "selfish", "inappropriate" and "uneducated". 
i 國 
i _ 誦 
^ ^ H ^ K ^ ^ h Q Fig.2.1\ Two middle-aged people leaning on 
^ ^^^V^^i^P-'' a handrail in Guangzhou (photography by 
J B H i ^ N H m author in August 2008). 
THE PRESETIGE OF SITTING "PROPERLY": PRESERVING CITY'S 
IMAGE 
In Hong Kong the ways of sitting is believed to be another indicator of one's 
education-level. Sitting "properly" refers to both how to sit and where to sit. 
Failure to sit "properly" is considered damaging to the image of Hong Kong and 
an eyesore in public space. I will demonstrate how social institutions constrain 
Hong Kong people in their ways of sitting. 
How to Sit? 
Schools in Hong Kong often emphasize strict discipline in demeanor. Both 
students and teachers are rigorously controlled. A Chinese proverb, "Example is 
"Si-ndaih literally means housewife, generally used, with a negative sense, in addressing 
\ middle-aged women who are not fashionable. It can be used to address both married and 
unmarried women. 
""IT 
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better than precept (言教不如身教)，，，illustrates the importance of teachers ； 
setting the right examples to students. This also implies teachers should behave 
"properly" as a concrete way of demonstrating to their students. The concept of 
sitting "properly" is one of the examples. Teachers often sit "properly". Students 
can then imitate and learn from observations. The three photos in Fig.2.2 were 
taken in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s respectively, illustrating the ways teachers 
sat in the last three decades. 
I ^ H H H H ^ ^ H S H I 
Fig.2.2: Top: The 1980s. Middle: The 1990s. Bottom: The 2000s. (The first two photos were 
captured from school archives, and the third picture was taken by the author in 2008). | 
Sitting "properly" at school means to sit like a "lady" or a "gentleman". 
Teachers and students' behaviors both affect the school's reputation and their 
personal image (I will further illustrate this point in the next chapter). Ideas of 
how to be a "lady" or a "gentleman" vary along time, but there is a general 
preferable way of sitting. As shown in Fig.2.2, female teachers sat either closed 
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laps or crossed legs while male teachers sat with opened laps. From the pictures, 
we could see that females are still educated to sit with closed laps or crossed legs 
whilst male with opened laps. 
Students are also trained to behave like "ladies" or "gentlemen" by learning 
how to sit "properly". For students, not only do they sit according to rules, they 
also have to sit still in class in order to be viewed as "educated" and "good" 
students. One of my informants, Ah-mo, 25 years old, recalled, 
I still remember when I was four, we [other students and I] were instructed 
to sit up straight with hands on desks. No kids were allowed to leave their 
seats and play around in a kindergarten. Once I did not sit 'properly': I tilted 
the chair back (跑登).My teacher got very angry, so she called me out and 
punished me. She used a ruler to hit my hands, it really hurt, but I was not 
allowed to cry, otherwise I would get another punishment. I was only four 
years old，but they [schools] already have strict rules on how to sit, how to 
line up and how to be a good student. Since then, I never tilt the chair back. 
Ah-mo's case shows us that schools have established strict rules on the way 
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of sitting. Mandy, 26 years old, also shared similar experience, "I remember 
some of my naughty classmates were often punished because they did not sit 
properly. They often couldn't sit still, so my teachers asked them to stand for the 
whole lesson." Failure to sit "properly", not only brings punishment to students, 
but it also causes students to be labeled as "naughty". The way of sitting, thus, is 
one of the outward indicators for being "well-educated". 
The rules on sitting properly do not only apply in schools, but also in work 
places and public space. It continues in workplaces by supervisors and in public 
areas restrained by public discourses. Priscilla, 25 years old, told me, "I am not 
allowed to wear slippers to work. I like sitting with legs crossing on the chair 
because it's more convenient and it's more comfortable to wear slippers (refer to 
Fig.2.3 for an illustration). The way I sit doesn't affect my working ability, but 
my supervisor forbids me to do so. She thinks that it is impolite and improper to 
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behave too causally in the office.’，The above examples, all illustrate the point 
that people in Hong Kong often relate the way of sitting to academic 
performance, working ability and education levels (I will further explore this in 
terms of capital in Chapter 3). Furthermore, Priscilla's case reveals that the idea 
of sitting "properly" also takes external features such as ways shoes are worn 
into account. This is illustrated in Fig.2.4. Fig.2.5 consists of nine photos that • 
were taken in a public area of Hong Kong. The photos demonstrate the daily 
practices of Hong Kong people. Slight discrepancies are found in the way people 
sit and their belief in sitting "properly". The photos demonstrate that men in 
general sit with open laps, though some sit with crossed legs, while women 
usually sit with closed laps; but both males and females hold two basic elements 
of sitting "properly": wearing their shoes "properly" and dressing "properly". 
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Fig.2.3: Sit crossing leg On Priscilla's case). 
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Fig.2.4. Top: (Improper sitting) A man sitting with his stomach exposed in the public (photograph 
taken by the author in Guangxi, mainland China, in June 2009). 
Bottom: (Improper sitting) A woman was sitting with her shoes taken off and rubbing 
her feet in Hong Kong, (photograph taken by the author in Hong Kong, in 
January 2009). 
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Fig.2.5: Pictures showing the actual sitting practices of Hong Kong Chinese (photograph taken 
by the author during the whole research period). From the above pictures, we can see 
that women tend to sit with closed laps while men tend to sit with open laps, which takes 
more space. Consuming more space is also a kind of performing masculinity in Hong 
Kong. The last two pictures demonstrate that some men sit with crossed legs, and this is 
often considered sissy and not masculine enough. The ways of sitting, thus, demonstrate 
ideas of gender are taught in schools and other social institutions. Furthermore, all of 
them sit with shoes and clothes "properly" on, and they do not rub their feet or expose 
their stomachs. ！ 
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Fig.2.4 shows two photos with "improper" ways of sitting. The man in the 
left photo was wearing shabby clothes. Exposing one's stomach publicly is 
considered "improper", "disgusting" and "low class" by Hong Kong people. 
Michael, a businessman, dislikes the action of exposing one's stomach in public. 
To him, this action is "disgusting" and he would assume that performer has 
"low" education level. The woman in the right photo also violated the rule of 
sitting "properly" by taking her shoes off and rubbing her feet in public. Many of 
my informants think that the actions of exposing one's stomach and taking shoes 
off in public damage the image of Hong Kong and creates eyesores in public 
space. It is generally believed that public space belong to all Hong Kong citizens, 
so everyone has the responsibility to not do anything that would damage or 
deface them. The above two cases 一 Priscilla wearing slippers in the office and 
this woman taking off her shoes in public - can both be considered as "improper 
way of sitting". � 
In sum, not only does the "improper action" damage one's personal image, 
it also brings damage to people's impressions of a city. 
Where to Sit? 
Sitting "properly" does not only refer to the way one sits but also where to 
sit. At schools，students are educated to sit on chairs or benches. At home, 
children are usually taught to sit on chairs and sofas. The following three photos, 
Fig. 2.6.，2.7 and 4.8, illustrate the "improper" places to sit: floors, stairs, and 
stands. These three places are considered "dirty" and thus not suitable for sitting. 
Again, sitting in the wrong places is considered an eyesore, which Hong Kong 
people do not welcome. Failure in sitting "properly" in the public may result in 
being misidentified as "mainlanders". These unspoken rules will be further 
, 
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explored and discussed in Chapter 3. 
Fig. 2.6: (Top Left) A man sitting on the floor in MTR in Hong Kong (photography taken by the 
author in December 2009) 
Fig. 2.7: (Down) A few women sitting on the stairs in Hong Kong (photography by the author in 
November, 2009). 
Fig.2.8: (Top Right) A girl sitting on a stand in a boutique in Hong Kong (photography by the 
author in September 2009). 
THE PRESETIGE IN HAVING Gungdaksam, PUBLIC VIRTUE 
In promoting certain values relating to the public, such as cleaning and 
hygiene, the idea of gungdaksam (公德心）is often linked. Literally, gung means 
public, dak means ethical and sam means heart and intention. Gungdaksam 
(public virtue), is also directly linked with one's personal conduct, the idea of 
maintaining a high-quality public space and a good Hong Kong image. Most 
I 41 
Hong Kong people, therefore, act according to the established social rules and 
laws to avoid being .blamed for having no giingdaksam. This is similar to be 
being labeled "uneducated". 
Fieldnotes, Hong Kong, 8 July 2009’ around 14.30 
I was travelling on the MTR with Priscilla, 25 years old, heunggongyahn^''. 
A Caucasian, gwdilou (鬼倦)，rushed onto the train. He looked short of 
breath, and he picked out a paper-box packed drink, and drank hastily. 
Priscilla was surprised by this since eating and drinking are forbidden on the 
MTR. She didn't expect a gwdilou, who is supposed to be more "civilized", 
to break the rule. She recalled, "I was once eating snacks on the MTR. A 
member of staff came over and reminded me that no eating and drinking 
was allowed on the MTR. I felt so embarrassed. Since then, I have never 
tried to eat on the MTR, it is too embarrassing to be warned like that as an 
adult. I am an educated girl." 
Ah-Nap, heunggongyahn, 28 year old, echoes Priscilla, "Usually I buy 
breakfast somewhere near my work place, though it is a lot cheaper to buy in 
Sheungshui (上水）[where he lives]. Because I can't eat and drink on the MTR, 
breakfast would become too cold and dry when I get off the train." Although both 
Priscilla and Ah-nap did not mention the word giingdaksam, it is embodied in . 
their actions. To understand the vague concept of giingdaksam, I asked Pricilla a 
few more questions. I asked Priscilla if she eats or drinks on the bus. And she 
replied, 
Yes, I do it sometimes. Unlike on the MTR, there won't be any staff coming 
up to catch me for eating. Also, the bus usually takes a longer travelling 
time, and it's easier to find a seat, so it's more convenient to eat there. 
However, I only eat bread on bus. Some people eat curry fish balls and 
dumplings, which give out strong smells and the smells spread all over the 
bus. What if others don't like that smell? These people have no 
giingdaksam. 
Ah-sang, heunggongyahn, 27 years old, shares a similar view, "I won't eat 
on the MTR, but I do drink sometimes. Food usually smells, which affect others, 
but drinks have no smell. 'Don't do to others what you don't want to be done to 
14 MTR, Mass Transit Railway, also named as metro, subway or underground in other countries, 




According to my informants, gungdaksam means one's speech or actions 
should not disturb or affect others in public; this links back to the general rule in 
Hong Kong: Do not disturb others. Apart from the examples listed by Priscilla 
and Ah-sang, spitting and littering in public are also seen as having no 
gungdaksam; I will discuss these two behaviors further in the later part of this 
chapter. 
One of my informants told me, "The main difference between 
heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn lies in whether they have gungdaksam or not. 
Mainlanders usually don't have gungdaksam. They do not care about public 
space, so many of them throw rubbish and spit everywhere." 
In sum, we can see that Hong Kong people in general are conscious of 
restraining their behavior in public in order to maintain gungdaksam and the 
appearance of public space. 
THE PRESTIGE IN KEEPING SOME DISTANCE FROM STRANGERS 
The majority of Hong Kong people prefer to keep some distance from 
strangers, even when traveling on the MTR during peak hours. According to my 
informants, they usually try not to touch others, keeping at least an inch from 
strangers. In contrast, my informants say, mainland Chinese people often squeeze 
onto the train by pushing and touching others even when it is not crowded. 
V 
Ah-mo said， 
It seems to me that mainlanders don't really have the sense to avoid any 
physical contact with strangers. Many times when I was holding the 
handrail, they [mainland Chinese] just leaned on my hand, as if my hand 
was nothing. Once I travelled to mainland China with friends and took a 
public bus. Mainlanders squeezed together with no space in between. 
Luckily I had friends around me so that I wasn't touched by those strangers. 
It [being touched by strangers] feels so disgusting. 
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I will further discuss how Hong Kong people react to situations they dislike 
in the next section. In their daily life, Hong Kong people carefully not to touch 
strangers to avoid conflicts. 
THE PRESTIGE IN ENDURANCE AND KEEPING QUIET: SAVING 
FACE 
The aforementioned case of a group of teenagers verbally mocking a 
middle-aged woman who leaned on the handrail is not common in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong Chinese in general do not want to provoke fights and arguments, 
thus tend to endure irritating encounters in silence. Here are some cases that I 
obtained from daily observation and interviews. 
Ah-Ching, 28, my informant, described her experience, 
One evening, I took the MTR back home from work. A middle-aged 
mainlander sitting next to me picked his nose^^ He picked his nose with a 
dark-lined dirty finger, and he even slung the mucus. That was so disgusting. 
I squinted at him, but he didn't stop. Since I had no other way to prevent his 
mucus from slinging onto me, I walked away. � 
Walking away is one of the most frequently used methods in dealing with 
irksome events and in conveying complaints. Nathalie, 28 year old, has another 
way of dealing with these people. Nathalie dislikes people who lean on the 
handrails. She told me, "If these irritating people lean on the handrail that I am 
holding, I usually use my fingernails to poke at their back. I won't let them lean 
on it comfortably. They are the offenders and intruders." Nathalie is not the only 
informant who "punishes" offenders. My male informants, unlike Nathalie who 
has long fingernails, have their ways in achieving the same goal - making the 
handrail less comfortable to lean on. Some of my male informants use their 
IS Ah-Ching, like many Hong Kong people, believes people who pick their nose in public must 
be mainlanders. In the case she described, she did not know for sure whether the man was a Hong 
Kong person or a mainlander. However, she assumed he was a mainlander. The connection 
between "nose picking" and "mainlanders" will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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finger joints to poke at offenders' back. Ah-Nap, 28 years old, told me, 
Usually I move my hand away if others lean on the handrail, or maybe just 
move up or down a little to avoid being leaned on. Sometimes I stare at 
them. I rarely scold them. Actually I think the body is like a weapon, these 
offenders use their bodies to occupy the handrail. [He described it like a war 
between the hands and the body] Bodies usually win over the hands since 
they are bigger and stronger. I think most Hong Kong people believe that 
"the less trouble the better"(多一事不如少一事)，therefore they choose not 
to get involved in any conflict. I would only voice out if I really can't stand 
it, but usually I would just walk away. 
Paul, 28 years old, has similar reactions with Ah-nap. He told me, “I guess I 
would just move my hand away, I am tall enough to hold other places. But 
maybe I would add a sound 'aiyd' [a sound signifying the pain (being hurt)] to 
give a message to the offender that ‘Oh! You are leaning on my hand'. I think I 
would do this to express my complaint." A student from Japan told me, "Hong 
Kong people really like making a tssk sound, ze (嘖)，to express complaints. In 
Japan, the tssk sound is considered very rude and impolite." When do Hong 
Kong people make this tssk sound? Jessie, 28 years old, told me she once wanted 
to get off the train when a group of passengers pushed onto it. She forced her 
way out fiercely and made the tssk sound. After getting off the train, she started 
to complain to her boyfriend and cursed the people who pushed her. She rarely 
expresses her resentment directly, Jessie explains, "Yes, I hate these people, but I 
think it is useless to argue with them. I don't want to lose my face by arguing 
with them in public." The tssk sound, therefore, is one of Hong Kong people's ^ 
ways to express grievance. 
Chris's experience sheds light on why many Hong Kong people tend to 
avoid conflicts in public. Chris, 25 years old, recalled, . 
Once I had hot pot with my colleagues. My boss was upset about an extra 
corkage charge for red wine. He drank three bottles of red wine, and the 
staff charged him twenty-five (Hong Kong) dollars for each bottle, which 
was seventy-five dollars in total. He argued with the staff there, claiming 
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that no staff had told him about the fees before hand. He argued angrily and 
loudly with the staffs，other customers turned around to look at us. I felt so 
embarrassed at.that time, some of my colleagues felt the same. We all 
agreed that he should have dealt with it in a softer way, at least not to arouse 
other diners' attention. It is never good to start a fight in public, which loses 
face. 
The following ethnographic data further illustrates this issue. 
Fieldnotes, 15 June, 2009, Hong Kong, around 15.00 
In the afternoon, I happened to see a conflict aroused by staring. A 
middle-aged woman sat on the MTR，with a middle-aged man sitting next to 
her. On the way, the woman kept holding up her two arms and fiddling with 
her hair. All of a sudden, she screamed out loud, catching the attention of 
the passengers in that carriage，"What the hell are you looking at?"(望哮呀 
望)，and the man replied loudly, "I 'm not looking at you，，(又唔係望你)， 
they continued to argue for five minutes, until the man got off the MTR. 
I described this incident to my informants and asked for their views. Some 
of them commented on that woman, saying that she must be a si-ndaih. Priscilla 
told me a similar idea，"You know, in Hong Kong only sl-ndaih and a-suk (阿叔) 
would start an argument in public without feeling shameful and embarrassed'^. 
For me, I would rather walk away if someone offends me. I don't need to have � 
direct conflicts with them." In the perceptions of many Hong Kong people，those 
who are less well-educated and mihn-pehi-hduh (面皮厚）are more likely to start 
fights in the publ ic^This links to Hong Kong people's middle class mentality, 
which will be described in detail in Chapter 4. Middle-aged people and 
mainlanders are seen as "less-educated" and belonging to the "lower class". 
To summarize, there are a number of indirect ways Hong Kong people use to 
deal with situations that irritate them. First, Hong Kong people walk away from 
offenders. Second, they stare back to give a warning signal to the offenders. 
Third, they make a tssk sound to convey complaint. To save one's face, one 
16 A-siik literally means uncles, generally used in addressing, with a negative sense, 
unfashionable, middle-aged men. It can be used to address both married and unmarried men. 
17 Mihn-pehi-hduh means shameless and cheeky, not afraid of losing face. 
should always solve conflicts silently. Arousing fights and arguments in public is 
viewed as losing face and "uneducated". 
Prejudice: Certain Demeanor as "Inferior" Stigma 
We become what we are through our 'incorporation ‘ of social structures, 
such as language, in the form of habit, but our actions, such as speech, are 
at the same time what gives life to those structures and facilitates their . 
reproduction (Crossley 2001: 4). 
The previous section revealed that certain demeanor is given prestigious 
values, and are claimed to be "Hong Kong people's demeanor". This section 
unravels Hong Kong people's prejudice against mainland Chinese people by 
imposing stigmatizing values on the conceived "mainlanders' demeanor". 
Mainland China has an area of more than nine million kilometer-square with a 
population of over one billion, so it is hard to determine whether squatting is 
actually common among all mainland Chinese people or if only some groups or 
individuals practice it. The heterogeneities of class and cultures are, thus, 
concealed by the imagined category of "mainlanders' demeanor". Therefore, it is 
. ； 
incorrect to stereotype certain forms of demeanor as "mainlanders' demeanor" 
though they may be practiced more frequently by some mainlanders. 
Stigma, in Greek, means bodily signs designed to expose something unusual 
and bad about moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the 
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body to show that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor - a blemished 
person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places (Goffman 
1963: 11). Goffman defines stigma as the situation of the individual who is 
disqualified from full social acceptance (1963: 9). Stigma and stigmatization has 
the power to designate some members of a community as dangerous "outsiders". 
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Gerhard Falk uses some historical anti-witch events in the seventeenth century to 
show that not everyone would be stigmatized; only those who were already 
outsiders in the community would be blamed as witches (Falk 2001: 18). 
Mainland Chinese in Hong Kong share the same social position- "outsiders" 一 as 
the witches described by Falk, and they are blamed for "making trouble" and 
"disrupting social order". Falk adds that stigma occurs whenever and wherever 
some people find behavior or characteristics of other people offensive and/or 
reprehensible (Falk 2001: 24). Again, it perfectly describes the case of mainland 
Chinese people in Hong Kong. Slightly different from Goffman's definition 
where the stigma is permanent, stigmatization on behavior is a temporary one. 
Now, I will turn to the stigmatization of certain forms of demeanor as 
"mainlanders' demeanor", which denotes "uncivilized" and "improper". 
THE STIGMA OF SQUATTING 
The stigma of squatting includes both the action of squatting and the � 
"improper" ways of sitting, such as sitting in a wrong place and sit "impolitely". 
Squatting is more commonly practiced by some mainland Chinese people in 
Hong Kong than Hong Kong Chinese people. It is a prejudice that Hong Kong 
people simply categorize and stereotype squatting as one of the "mainlanders' 
demeanor" and impose values of "inferiority" on the act: "uncivilized and dirty". 
Squatting then carries a stigma, and performers are stigmatized as "mainlanders". 
The following is a summary of the data I collected from interviews and 
observations. 
In Sitting Area 
Sitting areas include seats and benches in classrooms, malls, parks and 
toilets (seat-toilet). In Hong Kong, people perceive that seats and benches are for 
• 
4 8 
sitting instead of squatting. When I travelled with nine Hong Kong people to 
Chongqing, one of the provincial-level municipalities in mainland China, in April 
2009，we encountered a number of people squatting on seats or places that Hong 
Kong people considered as seats. 
Fieldnotes, Chongqing, mainland China, 12 April 2009, around 17:00 
We walked past a park with a few benches outside. The benches were 
almost fully occupied by people. Instead of sitting on the benches, they were 
all squatting on them. One of the Hong Kong Chinese asked, "Why do they 
squat on the bench? Why don't they sit on it? Isn't that supposed to be sat 
on instead of squatted on?" 
Squatting on benches is not that offensive to Hong Kong Chinese, but Hong 
Kong people would consider this as an "improper" way of using the benches. To 
them, the most "notorious" practice is squatting on a toilet seat. The perception 
that "mainlanders squat on seat-toilet" was shaped by the aforementioned famous 
TV soap opera，The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (網中人).This drama was 
broadcast in the late 1970s, portraying the daily lives of Hong Kong Chinese and 
their social situations with mainlanders at that time when mainland immigrants 
swarmed into Hong Kong. As briefly mentioned before, A-Chaan is the 
protagonist of this drama. He is an mainland immigrant in the late 1970s. The 
drama portrayed A-Chaan being "a country bumpkin" and "stupid", 
"uncivilized" and "dirty". The depiction has shaped the general image of 
mainlanders from Hong Kong people's point of view. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, the name A-Chaan was later used by Hong Kong people to 
• ； 
address mainlanders. Also, A-Chaan's demeanor was contrived by Hong Kong 
Chinese people as "mainlanders' demeanor" to distinguish，mock and 
discriminate against mainland Chinese people. Again, the heterogeneity of 
mainland Chinese was neglected. 
�� 
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Fig.2.9 shows a conversation about the ways of using seat-toilet between 
A-Chaan and his parents, who have migrated to Hong Kong over a decade. In the 
right-bottom captured scene, the father (on the left) shows an irritated face while 
A-Chaan's elder brother (on the right) laughs at him sneakily when A-Chaan tells 
them that he does not know how to use a seat-toilet. Up until now, many Hong 
Kong people have often made fun of mainlanders for squatting on seat-toilets, 
believing that they don't know how to use seat-toilet "properly". 
� E I ^ H 
Fig.2.9. (Top Left) A-Chaan: "Mum, your toilet is very beautiful!" 
(Top Right) A-Chaan: "So tall and narrow. How to squat on it?" 
(Bottom Left) A-Chaan: "[Toilets] in our village are all squat ones" 
(Bottom Right) A-Chaan: "How should I know how to sit." 
In recent news, mainlanders are continuously being blamed for making the 
toilets in Hong Kong dirty. On 26 February 2010, a student shared her experience 
with Takmgpao (大公報),a local Hong Kong newspaper, 
There is an expensive restaurant in Repulse Bay. They have a clean and 
elegant toilet. Last time I was there for meal, oh my god! Not only did the 
toilet smell stinky, the floor was also full of toilet paper and urine, and feces 
were left in the toilet, which scared me away. I complained about this to the 
manger, and he said, "There's nothing I can do about it. One mainland tour 
i 
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group had been here, cleaning staffs are also angered by the increase of 





The perception that "mainlanders do not know how to use seat-toilet" still 
remains in the minds of Hong Kong people. I was told by Ah-Fung, my . 
informant, 27 years old, 
When I was living at the student hostel, many times I woke up and went to 
the shared toilet, I saw some dirty shoeprints on the edge of a white toilet. I 
know it must be done by the mainlanders, they use squat toilets. Yet 
sometimes they were really too disgusting. They squatted on the seat-toilet, 
and left some feces on the edge of the toilet. I have no idea how could they 
do so, the toilet hole is already so large that it is almost impossible to leave 
the feces on it. 
Ah-Fung, in the above case, did not witness who stepped on the toilet edge, 
but he has already presumed and assured the shoeprints on the toilet edge were 
made by mainlanders. Why? The answer is simple. Ah-Fung, like most Hong 
Kong people, believes many mainlanders do not know how to use seat-toilet, and 
that they would squat on it, leaving shoeprints and wastes on the edge of the 
toilets. I told the above story to a friend, who is a student from Guangzhou, 
mainland China. She told me she had seen a notice in her dormitory in Hong 
Kong, written in simplified Chinese, warning students not to squat on 
seat-toilets ^^  . She told me, "Simplified Chinese symbolically puts the 
I. 
responsibility on mainland students. It is clearly out of discrimination against 
mainlanders. Did they see it's done by mainlanders? No! The notice was later 
removed after some students complained." 
Fig.2.10 demonstrates how to squat on seat toilet. Fig.2.11 is a notice posted 
18 Simplified Chinese is used in mainland China and traditional Chinese is used in Hong Kong, 
so simplified Chinese symbolically represents mainlanders. 
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in the toilets of The University of Hong Kong. The poster uses humor to warn 
people not to squat on seat-toilets. The woman on the right, in red clothes, gets 
her foot stuck in the toilet because she squats on the toilet-seat. The women 
outside the cubicle laugh at her. The warning itself does not constitute problems, 
yet it conveys a message that squatting on toilet would be jeered by others. 
Although comparatively speaking, more mainlanders are found squatting on 
seat toilets, there is no evidence that the toilets are made dirty by them. I believe, 
some Hong Kong people also do not use the seat toilet "properly". 
, , • 、 舊 • • hm t ^ 
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Fig.2.10: Two pictures demonstrating how to squat on seat toilet (Captured from the Oriental Net 
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, � . ON THE.TOILET SWT, THEY MAKE IT 
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: � • OR ey LOSING T^^FOOTIj^^p^^ 
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Fig.2.11:A notice in the toilet of The University of Hong Kong (Photography provided by an 
informant, December 2009) 
In Private Areas 
From the perspective of many Hong Kong people, business areas are a kind 
of "private area". In these places, Hong Kong people are more conscious of 
maintaining their good manners. They usually avoid doing things that may cause 
damage to the private areas. For instance, squatting right in front of the entrances 
of shops not only blocks the way and affects the shops' operation, and it also 
affects Hong Kong's public image. Again, "an eyesore in public space，，(影響市 
容）is used by Hong Kong Chinese to describe this behavior. On an ordinary day, 
I was wandering around in a shopping mall in Tsim Sha Tsui, I happened to see 
this: . 
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Fieldnotes, Hong Kong, 20 September 2009’ around 14:00 
Two middle-aged women, carrying some bags, were squatting right in front 
of the entrance of a boutique, Zara, at Harbour City. A sales staff spotted this, 
came over and requested the two women not to squat. The two women 
explained, "We have friends shopping inside, we want to wait for them 
here." The staff replied politely "squatting is not allowed here" and walked 
away. 
Most of my informants were not surprised by the above incident. One of my 
informants commented, "They must be mainlanders. Only mainlanders squat 
everywhere." The following example demonstrates that my informants indeed 
are incorrect - some Hong Kong people also squat. I happened to read an article 
from an online public forum, written by Siu-sai (小西),titled "Lai Kin-keung^^: 
Can't [I] squat?(黎健強:踏吓都唔得?)，，. It is about a Hong Kong Chinese 
squatting in the MTR. It says 10 July, 2006, 
This morning (10 July) [I] was waiting for a friend/ friends and reading at 
Sham Shui Po MTR station. I read something interesting and wanted to 
mark it down. [So I] picked a pencil from my backpack and squatted down 
to balance, ready to draw lines and write. Meanwhile, a MTR staff wearing 
uniform came over and politely explained that no squatting is allowed 





Not many Hong Kong Chinese people would squat in public, but some do. 
Also, people in other countries also squat sometimes (I will illustrate this with 
examples in the Chapter 5). However, in most cases, Hong Kong people 
： stereotype squatting as "mainlanders' behavior", and I will discuss this in the 
ensuing chapters. The above case also shows that a large corporation like MTR 
also condones discrimination against the action of squatting. Fig.2.12 shows a 
maximum penalty of HK$2000 for sitting on the floor of MTR. 




Fig.2.12. A notice forbidding the action of sitting on the floor on MTR, with a maximum penalty 
$2,000 (photography by the author in April 2010). 
In Crowded Areas 
In Hong Kong, people easily get annoyed with someone blocking their ways 
when they are in a hurry. Many of them swear in their hearts, and a few even 
insult the people blocking their way, which may lead to arguments and fights in 
public. Mainlanders, as told by many of my informants, tend to stand in the 
middle of the roads and block the ways as if they are "the owners of the road". 
One day, I was walking with June, my informant, in the transfer concourse in 
Kowloon Tong during peak hours, around 18:30. Two Chinese people, speaking 
some kind of Chinese dialect, stood in the middle of the way. June, 28 years o ld , , 
made a tssk sound and said, "I really hate these mainlanders, they always stand in 
the middle of the way. Don't they think that they are disturbing others? Do they 
own the road? Or do they think they are the 'boss'(佢地大哂架哮)”. ； 
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Fig. 2.13: Captured from a video clip on youtube named 大陸人座(坐)巴士 Mainlander Takes 
Bus. 
On youtube, one can easily search for clips about "mainlanders squatting in 
Hong Kong". These video clips further enforce Hong Kong people's stereotyping 
squatting as typical "mainlanders' behavior". Fig. 2.13 demonstrates another 
example of Hong Kong people's presumed connection between squatting and � 
mainlanders. Is squatting only practiced by mainlanders? Is it really an act 
• showing "inferiority"? 
THE STIGMA OF PUBLIC EXCRETION 
Public excretion is one of the supposed distinctions between Hong Kong 
people and Mainlanders. When I traveled with a group of Hong Kong people to 
Chongqing, we happened to see a number of kids urinating in the streets over a 
four-day trip. 
Fieldnotes, Chongqing, mainland China, 12 April 2009，around 19.30 
Today, we were walking around, searching for a suitable dining place, we 
happened to see a little boy urinating publicly. He walked to the side of a 
pedestrian road, pulled down his pants and urinated. 
Fieldnotes, Chongqing, mainland China, 13 April 2009, around 14.30 
The next day, we saw another kid excreting publicly. A kid, with a pair of 
spilt-bottom pants, was running around in his parents' restaurant. The kid 
^ 
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then ran to his mother and said something to her. She then squatted down 
and let her boy sit on her lap. The boy, with his legs open, started excreting 
onto the street. We were surprised, one of us said, "Urinating in streets is not 
surprising because that fits the image of mainland Chinese, but it is hard to 
imagine that one would excrete publicly, and they even did it right in front 
of their own restaurant". 
The two incidents remind me of a piece of news that happened a few years 
ago when Disneyland opened in Hong Kong. In 2005，Sun Daily, a local 
newspaper wrote, 
A clean, orderly and perfect Hong Kong Disneyland... one third of the 
tourists was from mainland China... They brought us not only a huge 
revenue, but also a 'culture shock': a Guangzhou boy with a naked bottom 
urinated in front of the romantic Sleeping Beauty's castle, and ran around 
with his penis exposed; a middle-aged man smoked in a non-smoking area, 
someone took their shoes off and lay on a bench, or squatted on the floor, 






Fig.2.14 Apple Daily showed mainland tourists climbing over the gate entrance (Pictures 
captured from Golden Discussion Forum, titled: In Retrospect: Hong Kong Disneyland's ；� 
Opening). 
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Fig.2.15 Pictures demonstrating "Mainlanders' behaviors" in Disneyland (capture from internet, 
丨 titled: "Mainland tourists muck up Disneyland (大陸遊客玩臭迪士尼)"). 
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Fig.2.14 and Fig.2.15 demonstrate the portrayals of "mainlanders' 
behaviors" by Hong Kong mass media. These behaviors are considered as 
"uncivilized", "uneducated" and "dirty". These reports further enforce Hong 
Kong people's negative perceptions of mainlanders. 
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Fig. 2.16: A picture cut from a video clip on youtube named Mainland Compatriots Urinated on 
. MTRI (內地同胞 0 贫 、 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Fig. 2J7- Pictures cut from a clip on youtube named, Mainland Compatriots Urinated on MTR II 
(內地同胞0 i f 糸 地 鐵 小 便 2 ) . 
Fig.2.16 and Fig.2.17 are cut from two video clips taken and posted on 
youtube by Hong Kong people. The first clip has been watched over eighty 
thousand times. The two videos were named "mainland compatriots" in an ironic 
way. Some people commented after watching the video, "We are Hong Kong 
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people and we have no relationship with you mainlanders! Leave Hong Kong, 
don't leave this bad impression on foreigners [Caucasians] ！(一句講晒，我地係香 
港人同你大陸哩一 d關係都打! ！死反出香港，唔好搞到香港人比外國人以為打 
品!!)，，and "Fuck all Mainlanders! We are Hong Kong People, and We don't 
belong to those Chinese pigs across the river! Fuck Basic Law in HK which your 
mother fucker had given us! We want to be free from this Stupid country! HK is 
a country! [Copied from original, written in English]" As mentioned before, 
Hong Kong people concern very much about how certain forms of demeanor 
affect the city image. Since Hong Kong often promotes itself as a cosmopolitan 
city and a shopping paradise for tourists, so it's not uncommon to see foreign 
tourists in famous areas such as Tsim Sha Tsui and Causeway bay. Some of my 
informants, who friends from overseas and/or who work with foreigners, also 
mentioned about their concerns of Hong Kong's image in front of foreigners, and 
also their concerns of distinguishing Hong Kong people from mainlanders. 
Comments listed above are rather extreme as very few Hong Kong people 
would say the same thing even if they feel distinct from mainlanders and dislike 
them. However, the action of public excretion really irritating Hong Kong people, 
especially when it happens in Hong Kong. Such actions often arouse arguments 
between Hong Kong people and mainlanders on the internet. 
Today, urinating on the streets in Hong Kong is seen as "dirty", 
"unhygienic" and socially unacceptable. Back in the century, people in Hong 
Kong often urinated and excreted publicly (Ng 1999: 135; Cheung 1981: 9). 
Sanitary reforms were launched by the colonial government. Public toilets were 
hardly found in Hong Kong in the late 19(卜 century. Many people urinated in 
back alleys even though it was prohibited by the British Hong Kong Government 
(Ng 1999: 135; Cheung 1981: 9). In 1941，the British government passed a law 
regulating all chahlauh (茶樓)，restaurants, to build toilets for customers to 
prevent citizens from urinating in back alleys, but it was terminated during World 
War Two (WWII). After WWII, the British government passed another law to 
• ： 
regulate the behavior of urinating in streets. Any violation would result in a fine 
of $250 as penalty (Ng 1999: 136). The idea of Hong Kong as a homeland . 
gradually developed among the people in the 1970s，with the launching of 
“Festival of Hong Kong", “Hong Kong Week" (Turner 2003: 26). In the 1980s, 
the British government had already introduced a series of advertisements, 
educating Hong Kong citizens not to litter, and to keep a clean and hygienic 
Hong Kong. They have slogans like "Hong Kong is our home, let's clean [Hong 
Kong] together (香港是我家，清潔齊參加)，’.With these regulations and other 
factors, the social perception of excretion in public was gradually transformed. 
Sanitary reforms and penalty fee have been effective in changing Hong 
Kong people' attitudes and perception towards public excretion. Like other 
behaviors such as squatting, the idea of keeping Hong Kong clean is connected to 
the aforementioned ideas oigungdaksam and protection of personal image and as-
well the city's image. • 
Apart from sanitary reform, the newly emerged middle-class in the late 
1970s was influenced by the mass media's new sense of proper public behaviors i. 
(Mathews et al. 2008: 64). The 1970s also brought the first locally bom Hong 
Kong generation, with children learning to "match their posture, dress and 
behavior to images projected by school textbooks and advertising" (Turner 2003: :: 
33). The relationship between Hong Kong identity and demeanor will be further 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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In sum，public toilets are easily found in Hong Kong today, and public 
excretion has long been socially unacceptable even for children. Therefore, by 
being portrayed as frequently excreting in public，mainlanders are considered 
"uneducated", "uncivilized" and "dirty" whether or not all of them are really 
guilty of excreting in public. 
THE STIGMA OF NOSE PICKING 
Fig.2.18 The man on the left was picking nose (photography by the author in April 2009). 
Nose picking is also conceived as "mainlanders' behavior" and it is attached 
: to the stigma of "dirty and uncivilized". Nose picking is more commonly seen in 
mainland China, yet again it is incorrect to say all mainlanders do this. The 
aforesaid informant, Ah-ching, who walked away from a nose picker to avoid an 
argument in public, demonstrate that Hong Kong people often link nose-picking 
with mainlanders. When Ah-ching encountered a middle-aged man picking his 
nose on the MTR, she immediately presumed the man was a mainlander. Priscilla, 
my informant, holds similar views. She told me, 
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I usually won't choose to sit next to mainlanders. They often pick their 
noses publicly, that is so disgusting. Some even flip the mucus away. Once I 
was taking a mini-bus home. A middle-aged mainlander sat next to me and 
picked his nose the whole way back. I felt so sick but there was no other 
seat. ； 
Ah-Ching and Priscilla's opinions reveal they have assumed that only 
mainlanders pick their noses in public. The above two stories, both describing 
middle-aged mainlanders, would fit into Hong Kong people's perception of a 
"typical nose picker". Stories of these individual incidents circulate among Hong 
Kong people, thus reinforcing the linkage between nose picking and mainlanders. 
THE STIGMA OF SPITTING 
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Fig. 2.19: Mainlanders were depicted as spitting everywhere in a famous movie Her Fatal Ways. 
The Man said: "Spit on the floor, otherwise what is the floor used for?" The woman 
said: "Spit outside of the window!" ‘ 
Spitting is another action that many of my informants would regard as 
"mainlanders' behavior", which is "uneducated" and "unhygienic". The 
aforementioned famous movie series, Her Fatal Ways (表姐你好 o 野)from the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s played a role in shaping a connection of 
mainlanders and spitting (Chang 2001). Fig.2.19 captures a scene from the movie. 
The two mainland characters in the captured scene are the protagonists in the 
movie. In this scene，they are talking about the issue of spitting. Someone spits 
on the man's shoes and angers him. He asks that guy to spit on the floor, "that's 
why the floor exist!". His cousin, the woman on the right, thinks it is better to 
spit outside of the window. 
Simon, my informant, aged 27, told me sneeringly, "I think they 
[mainlanders] are biologically different from us [Hong Kong people]. Not only 
do they spit everywhere, they even make a disgusting awful sound before spitting. 
Once I saw them [mainlanders] spit on the carpet in our airport. It is a carpet! Do � 
you ever expect people to spit on it? How would the cleaning staffs clean the 
sputum? It usually dries and sticks on the carpet quickly." When I described the 
above incident to my other informants, many of them reacted to it in similar 
ways and told me other stories of mainland Chinese spitting. One of them told 
me, "I even saw a mainlander spit on plane. Shit, it is so disgusting! Can you 
imagine people spitting on the floor of planes? That's horrible!" Many Hong 
Kong people have seen mainland Chinese spitting on floors，so they have 
gradually built a link between mainlanders and spitting. However，by inventing 
this stereotype, Hong Kong people have neglected the class and age differences 
among mainlanders. 
One afternoon，I had lunch with two Hong Kong Chinese in a restaurant 
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inside a shopping mall in Mong Kok. Andrew, one of them, aged 26，was 
chewing gum, so he spat it out onto a small paper and wrapped it up. I asked him 
why he wrapped it up instead of spitting it on floor. He answered, "It's disgusting 
to spit out on the table or to show others what you've put into your mouth, it's 
like when you're eating, you should not talk otherwise you will show others the 
food inside your mouth, which is indecent and disgusting. Also, it is unhygienic • 
to expose the chewing food." Ah yi, another informant, aged 25, commented on 
this, "spitting the food out without a paper wrapping it up is a boorish behavior, it 
also indicates that you are less well-educated." 
In Gothenburg, the second largest city in Sweden, I often encountered 
Swedes who spit on floors, especially the younger generations. I asked a Swede 
about this, and he answered, “I rarely spit, but after you asked me this question, 
I really notice quite many young Swedes do so. I guess it's because they have 
phlegm in their throats. They can't swallow it so they spit it out." What do 
Hong Kong people do when they have phlegm in their throats? Many Hong 
Kong people carry packs of tissues with them, and they usually spit on a tissue 
paper instead of the floors. However, according to my informants, a-suk and 
si-ndaih spit on the floor more often than the younger generations. 
In the 1940s, the Hong Kong Government launched "The Clean Hong 
Kong" campaign (清潔香港運動）which carries on today. Spitting was depicted • ； 
as an action that others would despise. Slogans such as "People Despise Spitting" 
(隨地吐痰，受人鄙視）and "Spitting is an Unpleasant Habit"(隨地吐痰是討厭 
的習慣）were popular. "Cleaning Hong Kong is every Hong Kong person's 
responsibility", and the slogan is often linked with the idea of giingdaksam (公 
t恵心、)，which actually is a kind of social restraint and pressure. Today, spitting on 
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the floor is forbidden. The law on public cleanliness offenses was enforced in 
2002 with a penalty HK$600, which was increased to HK$ 1,500 in 2003. 
Spitting in Hong Kong is therefore both illegal and socially unacceptable. 
Since spitting is both illegal and socially unacceptable in Hong Kong, there 
are not many Hong Kong people who would spit on floors. The action of spitting 
is also strongly associated with the stigma of "dirty" and "uncivilized". However, 
As mentioned before, many Swedes spit on the floors, yet other people rarely say 
that they are "uncivilized". In contrast, due to the media's portrayals of 
mainlanders as frequently spitting on the floor, mainlanders are linked with the 
action of spitting that carries stigma of "dirty" and "uncivilized". 
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Fig. 2.20 (Left): "Spitting is an Unpleasant Habit" in the late 1960s (Food and Environmental 
Hygiene Department 2010). 
Fig. 2.21 (Right): "Don't Litter" in the late 1960s (ibid.). 
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Fig. 2.22 (Left)'. "People Despise Spitting" in the 1960s (ibid.). 
Fie. 2.23 (Right): "You can be Fined" in the 1970s (ibid.) 
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Fig. 2.24 (Left)'. “Clean Hong Kong" in the 1970s (ibid.) 
Fig. 2.25 (Middle): "Don't Live Like the Litterbug" (ibid.) 
Fig.2.26 (Right): "Don't Litter Others are Watching" (ibid.) 
Conclusion ； 
This chapter shed light on the social hierarchy that is established by 
imposing values upon different forms of demeanor. "Hong Kong people's 
behaviors" are shaped by various social institutions' inculcated teachings and 
punishment. Also, "Hong Kong people's behaviors" are constrained by sets of 
social values: gungdaksam, and responsibility in maintaining public image and 
： 6 7 
appearance of space. At the same time, the homogenous and static image of 
"mainlanders' behaviors" is constructed. The construction of the homogenous 
"mainland Chinese behaviors" will be further elaborated on in subsequent 
chapters. 
This chapter also showed that "privileged" values are attached to "Hong 
Kong people's behaviors" while values of "inferiority" are imposed on the 
conceived "mainlanders' behaviors". "Mainlanders' behaviors" include squatting, 
public excretion, nose picking and spitting, and these behaviors are considered 
"dirty and uncivilized”，"inferior", and they all carry stigma. In the ensuing 
chapters, I will further discuss how this linkage between certain forms of 
demeanor and the identity of daaihlohkyahn is built up and how Hong Kong 





My Informants' Everyday Life 
Fig, 3.1： Took on a bus, written on the back of a seat: "Die daaihlohkyahn (死大陸人)”• 
(Photography by the author, Oct 2009) 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the conceived differences in demeanor 
between the two discursive categories daaihlohkyahn and heunggongyahn. In 
this chapter, I will demonstrate how the social hierarchy between the two groups 
is shaped and will explore how my informants expressed their cultural identity in 
their everyday practices. This chapter is divided into two parts: The first part 
shows the linear "path to civilization" that is imagined and shared by many Hong 
Kong people. I will illustrate this through two examples: the practices of using 
seat-toilet "properly" and lining up. I will then elucidate how demeanor plays as 
capitals by the theory drawn from Bourdieu to understand the power and politics 
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of demeanor in Hong Kong. The second part demonstrates with ethnographic 
examples on: 1) how my informants articulate their cultural identity and how 
they carry their bodies differently in order to distinguish themselves from 
mainlanders，and; 2) how cultural identity is embodied in demeanor during my 
informants' daily practices. 
The Civilizing Process: Demeanor as a "Linear Evolution" 
The idea of invisible social hierarchy is partly constituted by the imagined 
"path to civilization" that is shared by Hong Kong people. Forms of demeanor 
are often distinguished between "civilized" and "uncivilized". Lewis Morgan and 
Edward Tylor in the late nineteenth century proposed a linear path for cultural 
evolution, which was criticized by many scholars. Yet to a certain extent, their 
models of evolution still hold true in the minds of many Hong Kong people today. 
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Although the path does not concretely exist in society, its ideas are manifested in 
the daily practices of Hong Kong people. 
Demeanor, argued by Bourdieu, is embodied as habitus. It exists only 
‘inside the heads' of actors, through the practices of actors and their interaction 
with each other, and is rooted in the body (Jenkins 1992: 74). 
Body hexis is political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a 
permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and 
thereby of feeling and thinking (Bourdieu 1990: 69 - 70). 
People of different social classes and origins, who hold different beliefs， 
would have different bodily dispositions. Bourdieu (1984) argues that those in 
the upper hierarchy use aesthetic concepts, which are used to establish social 
class and distinguish themselves from the lower. Hong Kong people, being the 
majority in Hong Kong, share a sense of superiority and evaluate others' 
demeanor in terms of their own definition of "civilization". They define aesthetic 
^ 
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concepts and impose negative values on "mainlanders' demeanor". "Hong Kong 
people's demeanor" is perceived as "good taste", therefore they ought to hold a 
higher and superior social status, while mainlanders' demeanor is perceived as 
"bad taste" and hence they belong to a lower and inferior social class. To be 
precise, social hierarchies are reinforced by defining degrees of civilization 
which puts different bodily dispositions into classes. Such evaluation is just 
another "Morgan-Tylor" model of imagined linear evolution, which is very much 
ethnocentric and untrue. The value judgment, though ethnocentric, has brought a 
devastating consequence by strengthening the social boundaries between Hong 
Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese people. Not only has it hindered 
social harmony between the two groups, it has also diminished Hong Kong 
people's sense of belonging to the country. 
From my ethnographic data, I noticed that Hong Kong people have a 
conscious awareness of the "path to civilization" for bodily dispositions. Here, I 
； 
illustrate the imagined "path to civilization" through two forms of demeanor: 
using seat-toilet "properly" and lining up. 
LINEAR EVOLUTION FOR A "CIVILIZED" PERSON: USING , 
SEAT-TOILETS "PROPERLY" 
The use of different kinds of toilets is one of the conceived differences in 
distinguishing the "civilization" levels between Hong Kong people and 
mainlanders. Toilets are often categorized into "first world seat-toilet" and "third 
world squat-toilet" (Moore 2009: 105). The "first world" seat-toilet is assumed to 
be more “advanced，，，"hygienic" and of "better taste，，，while the "third world" 
squat toilet is "backward", "dirty" and of "pariah's taste". There is an assumption 
that toilet technology follows a simple linear development from squatting and 
.、 ！ 
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washing, to sitting and wiping (Moore 2009: 116). 
Hong Kong people generally hold the same "evolution path", believing that 
using seat toilet is "more civilized" and "clean" while using squat one is 
"uncivilized" and "dirty". Therefore, one has to learn using seat toilet "properly" 
in order to "evolve" from the "uncivilized" to the "civilized". In other words, 
toilets carry symbolic representation for different "civilization" status. 
Furthermore, squatting on seat-toilet is an "improper" way of using it, so the 
action is considered as "uneducated". Fig.3.2 shows a notice in a commercial 
firm in Hong Kong. The notice shows a picture of an elephant sitting on a seat 
toilet, and it says, "You should know better how to use the toilet properly than 
I Her (如何正確地使用坐廁，你應該比牠更清楚 ) . ” The notice gives an 
implication that those who do not know how to use seat toilet properly are worse 
than animals. Indeed, it reflects many Hong Kong people's view that using 
seat-toilet "improperly" indicates "uneducated" and "dirty". � 
Many Hong Kong people disdain mainlanders for their excretory habits. I 
interviewed my informants about their preference in the types of toilets and their 
feelings towards squat toilet. Priscilla, 25, told me, 
I don't like squat toilet, it's dirty. Urine easily splashes everywhere and I 
step on it, which dirties my shoes. Sometimes the urine even splashes on my 
foot, which is so disgusting. The situation in mainland China has now 
improved, many large cities has already started replacing squat toilets with 
seat toilets. But I heard that many people in mainland China do not get used 
to seat toilets, so they squat on it. It's really hard to imagine someone squat 
on seat toilets, it should be quite funny if I happen to see one. 
I rarely sit on it because thousands of people have sat or stepped on it. 
Usually I would crouch (紮>馬）to urinate, but it is impossible to do for a 
long time, so I only shit in the toilets at home or office. Although seat toilet 
is not that clean, it is still better than squat toilet since the urine won't splash 
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Fig. 3.2: A notice telling people not to squat on seat toilet (photography by the author in 
November 2009). 
Ah-Fung, 26，also commented, 
I have seen a squat toilet in China that was covered and filled up with a 
dune of feces, which was so disgusting. But I know toilets in China are all 
like this, dirty and smelly. If you want to travel to China, or places like this 
["developing" countries] you got to accept it-as a fact. Basically many 
mainlanders do not know how to use a seat toilet properly. If you live in a 
student hostel, you would notice mainlanders squat on the seat toilet and 
shit on the edge of the toilet. 
- t -
Priscilla and Ah-Fung, like many Hong Kong people, have a negative 
perception on squat toilets, thinking that is "dirty and undeveloped". Many 
scholars have argued that the mass media has a great influence on general public 
in shaping the negative impression on mainlanders (Ma 1996; Ma 2002; 
Mathews et al. 2008). The mass media, most of the times, depicts squat toilet as 
"dirty，，and "old-styled". Mingpao, a local Hong Kong newspaper, wrote an 
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article titled, "Manage Hygiene before Olympics, Reform is called for Beijing 
Public Toilets" (2000), 
Beijing attracts more than two millions foreign tourists and hundred 
millions local tourists every year, but public toilets are mostly squat one, 
extremely unhygienic, charge $0.2 RMB with no toilet paper supply. (In 
Chinese original:北京每年吸引二百多萬外地遊客和數以千萬的本地遊 
客，但由於公嫁多為/•�，凝不衛_^，收取兩毛錢’卻無廁紙供應。）[Italic 
is added as emphasis]. 
Another local newspaper, Sangpao, wrote an article named "The Wisdom of 
Squatting" (2002), 
In 2008 Beijing is going to be the host of Olympics. They have to consider 
their toilet problem, many tourists will not get used to use squat toilets, so 
[they] should improve the toilets [from squat to seat toilet] for the tourists， 
or else the toilet problem will damage the image [of China]. In Chinese 
original:二oo八年北京主辦奧運，都得考慮一下廁所問題，沒可能叫遊 
客都適應踏廁，那便須適應一下遊客改虔廉，不然光讓廁所問題搞壞 
了开乡象便不好了 ° [Italic is added as emphasis]. 
These journalists give an impression that public toilets in Beijing were in an 
"extremely unhygienic" condition due to the type of toilet - squat toilet - that 
was adopted, other factors such as cleaning frequency and users' manner were 
not considered. Hitherto, squat toilet is continuously being shaped a symbol of 
f 
"undeveloped" and "dirtiness". Takungpao (大公報）published an article about 
toilets (2010), 
When Hong Kong people travel to Japan and mainland China, they are 
afraid of going to squat toilet the most, and I had ended my "pager" life in 
these toilets [meaning that he lost his pager in a squat toilet]. If one travels to 
mainland China, one even has to learn how to hold one's breath. Luckily the 
'civilized toilet' has become more popular, so the situation has improved 
rapidly. Toilet is a concrete indicator of the civilization index. I've heard 
that some parents, in choosing a suitable school for their children, would 





In this passage, the author clearly expresses his imagined linkage between 
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toilets and civilization. Mandy recalled her experience, "Somebody in my office 
also squat on the seat-toilet. She has no gungdaksam (the idea mentioned in the 
previous chapter), and I am sure she is not well-educated. No educated person 
would squat on it." 
Mainlanders are often stereotyped as "the only squat-toilet users". When 
Disneyland opened in Hong Kong in 2005, squat toilets were built for mainland 
tourists since Disneyland forecasted that over one-third of the visitors would be 
from the Mainland {Hong Kong Economic Journal 2005). It was even claimed 
that the squat toilet is one of the uniqueness of Hong Kong Disneyland, 
representing "Chineseness" (Hong Kong Economic Journal 2005). Unlike what 
Disneyland's spokesperson said, many heunggongyahn disliked the idea and 
thought that it would make Hong Kong "dirty" and "backward". Some 
heunggongyahn called it "mainlandization"(大陸化). 
According to a news report in Infotimes (資訊時報）{Oriental Net 2005), a 
mainland China newspaper, the general mainlanders thought that seat toilet was 
"dirty", and thus would choose to squat on it. The article cited an online survey 
that questioned over ten thousand mainlanders in 2005, showing that more than 
90 percent of mainland females preferred to use squat toilet in public. As 
mentioned earlier, "squatting on seat toilet" is one of the stigmatized images that 
Hong Kong Chinese people hold for mainland Chinese people. Squat toilet, as j 
shown by ethnographic data and the media's depictions, is seen as "dirty" and 
"uncivilized" in Hong Kong. Since many Hong Kong people still link 
mainlanders with squat toilets, mainlanders are thus labeled as "dirty" and 
"uncivilized". 
Therefore, toilets are manipulated as an indicator of the "civilization" levels. 
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Using squat toilet is seen as "inferior", and those who "do not use seat toilet 
properly" are perceived as "inferior". Hence, mainlanders, depicted as preferring 
to use squat toilet, are perceived by Hong Kong people as "inferior". More 
importantly, the assumption that "mainlanders" do not know how to use seat 
toilet "properly" (squat on it) further degrades them as "dirty" and "uncivilized" 
people. Hong Kong people, in contrast, use seat toilet "properly", and are 
therefore more "civilized". With this imagination of "path to civilization", Hong 
Kong people's sense of superiority is thus strengthened, and the invisible social 
hierarchy fortified. 
LINEAR EVOLUTION FOR A "CIVILIZED" PERSON: LINING UP 
Fig. 3.3: Hong Kong people waiting for mini-bus (photograph by the author, November 2008). 
Lining up is part of the daily practices of most Hong Kong people. Queues 
can be found almost everywhere; at banks, cinemas, bus stops, schools, public 
toilets. This is also one of the perceived differences between Hong Kong Chinese 
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people and mainland Chinese people. 
According to my informants, Hong Kong people are taught to line up since 
they reach the age of kindergarten: three year-old. Every student starts learning 
the skill of lining up from three years old, and has to keep on practicing this skill 
until graduating from high school. One of my informants Ah-mo，25, recalled, 
I don't remember much about my kindergarten life, but the picture of lining 
up is still in my head. I was the class representative who was responsible to 
go to a storage room and get biscuits for my classmates. The storage room 
was quite small, and I had to line up before I could get a plate of biscuits. 
And we also needed to line up before going to toilet. We were told not to 
touch the person lining in front, and not to stand too close. 
On the very first day of school, teachers ask students to line up according to 
their height, and then the teachers arrange students to line up two or three in a 
row, depending on the number of students in the class. Each student stands at the 
same place of the queue for that year. 
Fieldnotes, Hong Kong, 25 October, 2009, around 17:30 
Today is the anniversary of my elementary school. I went back for 
celebration. When I was touring around the school and walking past some 
classrooms, I saw a group of alumni. They were lining up and pretending to 
enter a classroom. They were having fun and talking about where their 
lining places were during those years. They still remembered how they were 
asked to line up before entering the classroom. 
The bell is often used by schools as a signal to instruct students to behave. 
Fat-wai, 28 years old, shared his experience, 
I am a person who grew up with bells. In my elementary school, we had-
three bells. The first bell instructed students to stop all motions, so we froze \ 
ourselves, even if we were running or tying up shoelaces; the second bell 
instructed students to go and line up according to our class, and teachers 
would come and lead us to our classrooms after the third bell rang. 
Most Hong Kong people grew up under this ringing bell system and started 
learning to line up at schools, so the practice of lining up is linked with 
"education level". Lining up is also a daily practice that keeps Hong Kong 
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society running smoothly. It is an action that represents one's personal conduct 
and educational level. People who do not line up are considered "rude" for 
disrupting social order. They are "uneducated" because they've broken the 
cultural rule. "Mainlanders" are depicted as "rule-breakers" and 
"trouble-makers" since they "jump the queue". My informant, June, 28，told me, 
"Mainlanders are really different from us [Hong Kong people]. They really like 
jumping queues. It's like they don't know how to behave properly." Janice, 27， 
shared her experience with me, 
Once I went to Ocean Park with my boyfriend. While we were lining up to 
go into the panda room, a few mainlanders tried to jump queue. We stared at 
them, trying to tell them that it's not proper to jump the queue, but they still 
tried to push their bodies to the front. So my boyfriend, who is tall and 
strong, stood in the mid-way to block them. Mainlanders are really 
shameless and have no sense of culture. 
In June and Janice's cases, both involved a few mainlanders jump the 
queues, but they put the blame on all mainlanders in general. This is, to a large 
extent, due to mass media's malignant portrayals. The most recent news about 
mainlanders "jumping queues" at the World Exposition 2010 in Shanghai is 
extensively broadcasted by newspaper, magazines, radio, and TV news. 
Reading news about mainlanders at the World Exposition, one of my 
informants Paul, 28 years old, said, 
I feel ashamed of these mainlanders. Everyone in the world is watching this 
World Exposition yet embarrassing news like this happen all the time. 
Before the opening, the theme music was already accused of being 
plagiarized. Now they are jumping queues, shouting out loud, arguing and 
using counterfeit tickets. I really don't understand why mainlanders can't 
behave better in some big events like this. This is not the first time already. 
Mainlanders should really do a self-reflection. 
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Fig. 3.4: Media's portrayal of mainlanders jumping queues at World Exposition 2010 in Shanghai 
(photography taken from internet: left-top and left-bottom pictures from an online public 
forum, Hong Kong People Reporter, and right-top and right-bottom pictures from 
Oriental Week Journal) 
Lining up, like the use of toilet, is believed to be an indicator of one's 
"civilization" level. A writer shared his viewpoints in a free local newspaper, 
Hong Kong Headline (2009), 
Today, whenever mainland China hold any "international events", such as 
Beijing Olympics and Shanghai World Exposition, they would definitely 
launch "education for civilization", and the first lesson of this education is 
to teach Chinese to line up... a country with five thousand years of 
civilization has to teach its citizens to line up in the so-called "education for 
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His viewpoint reflects the linkage of lining up as being "civilized" that 
many Hong Kong people have. Mainlanders, often depicted as people "jumping 
queues", are criticized for being "uncivilized" and "rude", and thus are "inferior". 
Many Hong Kong people have internalized lining up as a daily practice and are 
proud to be more "civilized". ‘ 
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Lining up, however, is clearly not a definite indicator of one's "civilization" 
level. Indicators vary according to different cultures. For example, in Gothenburg, 
people rarely queue up in tram stations. Some may argue that the population 
density in Gothenburg is much lower than that of Hong Kong, so Swedes do not 
need to line u p � � . Yet if the principle of the lining up is an indicator of 
"civilization" is applied to everywhere, Swedes should also be considered as 
"uncivilized" as well. However, due to popularized images of Swedes being 
"advanced", "clean" and "civilized", their "occasional uncivilized" behaviors are 
tolerated. In contrast to Swedes, mainlanders are believed to be "uncivilized", so 
jumping queues only becomes another evidence of their "uncivilized" image. 
None of my informants has thought of making "excuses" for these "mainlanders' 
behavior". Queuing up may be an efficient and effective way to maintain public 
order in Hong Kong, but this may not be the same in mainland China, where the 
population is huge and socio-cultural practices are different. � 
The examples about lining up and toileting practices demonstrate that 
people often use, wittingly or unwittingly, their own cultural schemas to 
,1 
construct an imagined "path to civilization". 
To recapitulate, Hong Kong people have a conscious assumption of a "path 
to civilization" for manners. Exploring the cases of toilet preference, toilet 
practice and queuing practice, I have illustrated an imagined "path to 
civilization" is shared by Hong Kong people. 
20 According to Gothenburg Statistics, the population of Gothenburg is only five hundred 
thousand, with 450km^ and the tram company, the Gothenburg Tram Network (Goteborgs 
spSrvagar), supplies steady and sufficient tram services to meet daily demand, so Swedes do not 
need to rush onto the trams. 
21 When a person breaks a cultural rule, such as a mainlander tries to jump the line, one is easily 
tempted to label that person as "uneducated" and "uncivilized". We leam our cultural schemas 
from social institutions such as schools and families. These cultural schemas tell us what to do 
and shape our perceptions. In most cases, cultural schemas vary among societies. Yet differences 
in cultural schemas do not necessarily make one behavior more "educated" or "civilized" than 
others. 
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Demeanor as Capital 
This part unveils the interwoven relationship between the senses of 
superiority and inferiority and demeanor according to Bourdieu's concept of 
capital. Bourdieu broadens Marx's idea of capital to include symbolic and 
non-material pursuits as well as material ones (Swartz 1997: 66). These capital 
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are accumulated, invested and converted into various kinds of capital under 
different conditions (Swartz 1997: 75). "Proper" demeanor, it is believed, reflects 
"cultural capital" (educational level and qualifications), which enhances both 
"symbolic capital" (being recognized and respected), and "social capital" (social 
connections and networks). Mainlanders, perceived and depicted as not 
possessing any cultural capital, are not recognized as members of Hong Kong 
society, so they are isolated in the local community. 
CULTURAL CAPITAL 
In his concept of cultural capital, Bourdieu covers things such as social class 
attributes, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, informal academic 
standards, and educational credentials (Swartz 1997: 75). Undeniably, demeanor 
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is linked with the above factors since it reflects one's social tastes and cultural 
knowledge. Foucault (1977) argues that through inculcating of training and 
education, the human body is inscribed with sets of cultural knowledge. Cultural 
rules are thus embedded as habitus that have become almost innate-like under the � [ 
long process of inculcation. Cultural knowledge is only available to the members 
of society. The human body is one of the crucial distinctions to indicate one's 
membership. 
In Hong Kong, it is generally believed that education has a direct linkage 
with "proper" behavior. Behaving "properly" is seen as "better educated" while 
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behaving "improperly" is considered "uneducated". Demeanor, therefore, as 
Goffman (1963) argues, conveys both privileged symbols and stigmatized 
symbols. Both "proper" and "improper" demeanor are listed in the previous 
chapter as "Hong Kong people's behavior" and "mainlanders' behavior" 
respectively. In this section, I will explain the unconscious accumulation of 
cultural capital among Hong Kong Chinese people and their conscious awareness 
of the cultural difference between themselves and mainland Chinese people, who 
do not possess the same cultural capital as they do. 
The accumulation of cultural capital on demeanor, such as sitting "properly" 
and spitting on a tissue paper, begins at early childhood. As mentioned earlier, 
schools in Hong Kong are sometimes compared to "prisons" for their strict 
time-tables and disciplines, enclosed space, and standardized uniforms. Everyone, 
including both students and teachers, has to follow strict time-tables and their 
behaviors are often tightly controlled and regulated. For example, students have � 
to wear uniforms and teachers have certain dressing codes, and the schools are 
often surrounded by iron doors and wire nettings so that no one can leave or 
enter the school without permission. Every student is trained according to the 
"standard" set by the school, and no one is supposed to stand out among the 
crowd. Students who behave "improperly" (with less amount of incorporated 
cultural capital), such as smoking and fighting, are often punished. The 
punishment is mainly carried out in two forms: corporal punishment, such as 
A 
slapping, and a demerit system . The demerit system will affect students' 
personal records and may affect their future prospects. In contrast, students who 
22 Corporal punishment is defined as the use of physical force with the intention of causing a 
child to experience pain, for the purpose of "correcting" and controlling the child's behavior (The 
University of Hong Kong Press Release 2006). Hitherto, there has been no law forbidding 
corporal punishment in Hong Kong, though some organizations are requesting such legislation. 
_____ 
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behave "well" (with large amounts of incorporated cultural capital) may be 
selected as prefects and monitors/monitress，and be assigned with responsibilities 
and limited authorities. 
To reiterate, accumulated cultural capital is embodied in demeanor. Hong 
Kong people, as claimed by my informants, could distinguish people who 
possess or do not possess cultural capital by their demeanor. Thereupon 
"mainlanders" are distinguished by their "uncivilized" demeanor. 
SYMBOLIC CAPITAL 
This section exemplifies how cultural capital could affect the symbolic 
capital in daily practices. As mentioned earlier, the symbolic capital is the status, 
recognition and fame that one receives. By performing the inherited cultural 
knowledge, one gains status, fame, recognition and respect. By possessing 
cultural capital, one learns to distinguish between "good" and "bad"; "proper" 
and "improper". Behaving "properly" not only brings merits, but also fame, 
respect and recognition, which accumulate as symbolic capital. On the contrary, 
behaving "improperly" brings damages to the symbolic capital that one has 
accumulated. "Improper" demeanor, is believed, to be the result of a lack of 
education and nurture. In Cantonese, mduhgagaau (舞家教)or mduhgaauyeuhng 
(無教養）both mean that families or schools have not taught the children well. 
Schools and parents, thus，bear responsibilities for a child's behavior. Failure in �： 
"educating" and "correcting" a child's behaviors brings shame to both the 
schools and parents. Here, I demonstrate how mainlanders, who possess no or 
little cultural knowledge of behaving "properly", have limited symbolic capital. 
Before turning into the case of mainlanders, I will elucidate the linkage of 
demeanor and symbolic capital. 
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University students, who are "well-educated", are imagined to be 
"behaving well", but news about university students stealing is not lacking. To 
explain the behaviors of these law-breaking university students, mental illness 
such as kleptomania is often used as an excuse for defense • A local newspaper 
{Hong Kong Economic Post 2009) writes, 
A Hong Kong University year-two student stole goods worth almost 
HK$1000 from five stores in less than 45 minutes because of exam stress 
and kleptomania. •. Acting principal magistrate sighed，"you've got a bright 
future, but you did something like this to destroy if, and urge him to heal his 





As shown above, the name of the university was identified, and the student's 
stealing has brought shame to the university. Also, many Hong Kong people 
simply link one's demeanor directly to the student's academic results. Two of my 
informants commented after I had described the above news to them, 
Priscilla: A few days ago I read a piece of news about a son who murdered 
his father; the son studies very well. 
Chris: I've read that news too. The son suffers from mental illness, so he 
quit university two years ago. 
Priscilla: But he has always got good [academic] results in his secondary 
school and university. 
Chris: Yes, but he is now suffering from mental illness. 
Priscilla emphasized the murderer's academic result and was surprised that 
he murdered his father. To illustrate the connection between demeanor and the 
fame of schools, my informants' experiences are good demonstrations. Ah-mo, 
25, told me, 
My secondary school organized a school sports day. I travelled to Wan-Chai 
by the MTR. I was playing and running with friends on the platform, and 
my class teacher happened to be there and saw us. She caught us and asked 
us to meet her the next day in school. We were punished for not behaving 
23 Kleptomania is mental illness that has a strong desire to steal. 
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properly in public. She said we were wearing school uniforms, and thus we 
represented the school. Running on the platform damaged the fame of our 
school. 
Yoyo, my informant, 26 years old, also shared her school experience, 
I studied in a band-one secondary schooP"^, which had really strict control 
on our behavior and dressing. I remember once the school teachers found 
out there were some students stealing other students' properties. The school 
did not call for police. The school headmaster warned us in an assembly not 
to do things that harm the reputation of the school. It's often like this. The 
school would rather protect their reputation than finding out the "truth" of 
the stealing. I remember my school uniform got stolen after physical 
education lesson once, I told and complained to my school teachers, but 
they did nothing. 
Teachers of these two schools protect the fame and the reputation of their 
schools. A secondary school headmaster told me, "We ask our students to go 
back home immediately, and not to wear school uniforms and wander around. 
Some teachers patrol to check if any student breaks the rules. We do not wish our 
students to do something bad, such as smoking, which will leave other people a 
bad impression on our school." Students, thus, represent not only themselves but 
their schools as well. To be precise, their behavior brings either fame or shame to 
both themselves and their schools. 
From the cases above, we can see that Hong Kong people perceive a strong 
connection between education and one's behavior. Behaviors such as giving 
one's seat to the elderly or needy, lining up and sitting "properly" carry symbols 
of the "privileged". It indicates that one possesses self-cultivation. Therefore 
when some people do things that are recognized as "deviant" and "improper", 
Hong Kong people would think they are either "uneducated" or "suffering from 
mental illness". The excuse of "suffering from mental illness", however, is rarely 
applied to mainland Chinese. This is because many Hong Kong people, who 
24 Schools in Hong Kong were divided into five bandings according to their students' academic 
performances. I will discuss in detail in the next section of the chapter. 
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share the middle class mentality, believe mainlanders are "peasants" and 
"uneducated". Possessing limited cultural capital, mainlanders are not respected 
i 
nor recognized as compatriots by Hong Kong people. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
This part illustrates how demeanor acts as cultural and symbolic capital that 
affects one's social capital (social network). School reputations and personal 
conducts affect one's social network. 
Schools in Hong Kong are categorized based on a banding system, which is 
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briefly mentioned before. Students of different academic results are put into 
different bandings, yet people often heavily associate the banding system also to 
students' behavior and conducts (Pang 1999: 81). Schools, especially band one 
schools, emphasize both academic results and students' conducts, they train 
students to be "gentlemen" and "ladies" with strict control on their demeanor, 
such as the ways of sitting and other manners. The image of a "good" student is � 
to perform "well" academically and behave "well": walk, sit and talk in "decent" 
and "polite" ways. 
The bandings of schools，it is believed，reflect the conduct and behavior of 
students. Students who behave "badly" or have poor conduct are seen as "bad" 
students, and are considered lazy. In extreme cases, students with either bad 
academic results or/and poor behavioral conducts would be kicked out of schools. 
Students behaving "properly" would gain a mark of "merit" on their academic 
report while those behaving "improperly" would mean a mark of "demerit". The 
merit system in Hong Kong can influence a student's prospect. Students with 
more merits can be admitted to band-one schools more easily. At the meantime, it 
is believed that band-one schools are able to provide more efficient resources for 
86 . 
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students to develop "superior" skills. Therefore it is known that many employers 
would also prefer students graduating from good banding schools and famous 
universities. 
Ah-Mak, my informant, 27 years old, told me, "The company I am working 
for mainly employs university graduates. They believe that university graduates 
possess more self-cultivation. They are better-behaved and would not damage the 
fame of the company. Unlike university graduates, the working attitudes of many 
non-university graduates are problematic." Yanny's experience demonstrated that 
the reputation of high schools also affect one's prospect. Yanny, my informant, 
28 years old, also shared her experience, "Last time when I had my job interview, 
the boss was really interested in knowing which secondary school I was from. I 
was from a band-one school and she told me that she preferred to employ people 
who graduated from good schools." 
Those who behave "decently", like ladies and gentlemen, and act according 
to the local cultural rules, are often seen as "better" and "smarter". Those who 
graduate from good banding schools, therefore, are also believed to behave 
"better", and get a better chance from being employed. The bandings and fames 
of the schools, thus, do not only affect one's status, but also his/her prospect. In 
other words, it is a kind of social capital with ready-built network and rapport. 
By perceiving mainlanders as "dirty" and "uneducated", Hong Kong people 
also limit mainlanders' social capital. With limited social capital, most 
mainlanders feel it is difficult to make friends with Hong Kong people. Apart 
from affecting mainlanders，social life, limited social capital also hinders 
mainlanders in finding jobs in Hong Kong. Mainland certificates are usually not 
recognized in Hong Kong, except from the few renowned universities such as 
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Beijing University and Tsinghua University. As a result, mainlanders are more 
frequently rejected by employers when they seek jobs. More importantly, they 
； i 
are rejected by Hong Kong people to be "compatriots" and to be part of the 
community (Siu 1999: 187; Sautman and Kneehans 2002; Siu 2009). 
In sum, cultural capital is embodied in demeanor and it affects one's 
i 1 
symbolic capital and social capital. Since mainlanders possess limited cultural 
capital: the cultural rules of behaving "properly", they are perceived to be 
i I 
"uneducated" and "dirty" people who are "unreliable". Individual mainlanders' 
； I 
"uncivilized" behaviors further damage mainlanders' reputation as a whole. 
Mainlanders, as a result, are despised and disrespected by Hong Kong people as 
"outsiders", "deviants" and "trouble-makers", and thus are socially isolated from 
the local community. 
My Informants' sense of “Shame，， 
This section examines how my informants perceive the identity of 
daaihlohkyahn with intertwined events that happen in their "motherland" 
mainland China. To a certain extent, how Hong Kong people see daaihlohkyahn 
and mainland China sheds light on how cultural identity plays a role in Hong 
Kong society and thus helps to explain why Hong Kong people are still reluctant 
to accept mainland Chinese as "compatriots". 
In 2005，the Hong Kong government's Committee on the Promotion of Civic 
Education did a survey and found that 73 percent of Hong Kong respondents felt 
"proud of being Chinese," and 72 percent felt that "some affairs happening in China 
make me feel ashamed" (Mathews et al. 2008: 81; see also Connolly 2005). 
Mathews et al. show results of another survey done among university students: half 
of them feel love for their country, while half of them do not; 70 percent of this half 
88 
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of the respondents said they loved Chinese culture, and 68 percent the Chinese 
people; only 14 percent claimed love for the Chinese government, and just 3 percent 
for the Communist Party (Mathews et al. 2008: 81; see also Au and Cheung 2004). 
Mathews et al. interpret this data like this: 
[T]he pride that the large majority in Hong Kong feel about being Chinese 
involves belonging to a land and people and civilization; the shame that many 
feel refers to the Chinese state today, a dictatorship that has made China much 
wealthier but that represses personal freedoms and is plagued by corruption 
(Mathews et al. 2008: 81). 
They argue that many Hong Kong people identify themselves with cultural and 
historical icons of China but remain reluctant to accept the political and military 
symbols of the nation (Mathews et al. 2008: 106). The following data obtained from 
interviews and fieldnotes demonstrate and echo Mathews et al.'s arguments. 
“WE ARE FROM HONG KONG ” 
The answer "We are from Hong Kong" is often heard when Hong Kong 
Chinese are questioned their origins. My informant, Ah-mo, 25 years old, recalled 
her experience: 
I went to Sweden as an exchange student in 2007. Swedes had parties 
almost every Friday and Saturday. I attended a few parties with two other 
Hong Kong students. "Where are you from?" was like a standard way 'of 
starting a conversation with three black-hair Asians in a blond-hair 
Caucasian world. Once a Swede who asked us, "Are you guys from 
China?"One of us replied, "No, we are from Hong Kong." She emphasized 
the word Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong is a part of China today, we still 
want to distinguish Hong Kong from China. Hong Kong is still better than 
mainland China in most aspects. I feel downgraded if I am mistaken for a ^ ； 
mainland Chinese. I really feel proud of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is just a 
small dot on the world map, but every time I tell gwdilou that I am from 
Hong Kong, they all know a little bit about us [Hong Kong]. 
Another informant, Mace, 25, feels angry if others misidentified her as a 
mainlander. She recalled, 
A few years ago, I attended a party with students from different countries. 
Two Hong Kong students came over, and spoke to me and my friends in 
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Mandarin. Can you imagine that? I don't think I looked like a mainland 
Chinese. I know they're also heunggongyahn because their Mandarin sucks. 
My friends and I were so angry, how could they identify us as mainlanders! 
My informant Priscilla also had some experiences of being misidentified as 
a mainlander, but she was less agitated than Ah-mo and Mace. She told me, 
It usually depends on how people look at me, if they say in a despised or an 
angry tone, I would seriously correct them by saying that I am from Hong 
Kong. If they aren't that negative to mainlanders，I would be less agitated. 
But many people carry a very negative attitude towards mainlanders. They 
think that all rich mainlanders are parvenus and arrogant. And usually 
mainlanders carry negative images in many others' perceptions, such as 
Singaporeans and Europeans. I am not parvenus nor arrogant, so I don't 
want to be identified as a mainlander. 
When Hong Kong people are misidentified as mainlanders, many of them 
would correct the person who made that comment immediately. I joined a tour to 
the Philippines, with thirty Hong Kong people, aged around twenty-five to 
thirty-five. 
Fieldnotes, 3 October 2009, the Philippines, around 8:30pm 
The group has thirty Hong Kong Chinese, including me, seated along a long � 
L-shaped table in a restaurant. Our long table is located right next to the 
performance stage, with a local band singing romantic love songs. After 
finishing all dishes, the singer said, "The following song is bestowed to 
Helen who is from China to celebrate her birthday." One of the thirty Hong 
Kong Chinese immediately screamed out and corrected the singer, "We are 
from Hong Kong, not China." The singer corrected accordingly. 
Why do the majority of Hong Kong people insist on clarifying their "Hong 
Kong identity" even after the handover? It could be explored through their 
attitudes towards the identity of daaihlohkyahn. Mace, 25，recalled her 
experience, 
: I was discussing some political and environmental issues with some foreign 
students in a class. Those foreign students suggested that each country 
should provide data on the pollutants that it has emitted. I told them that I 
thought the suggestion was not helpful because every country could make 
up some fake data by giving the public some counterfeits. A German student 
then mocked me, saying that only mainland China gives counterfeit 
documents and data. Although I think they are naive because no government 
could be trusted totally, the connection he made between me and mainland 
! 
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China upset me. First, I feel myself different from mainlanders because I am 
from Hong Kong. Second, the humiliating things that the PRC has done so 
far make me feel ashamed, such as how she's torturing her own citizens who 
strive for democracy. Third, most mainlanders are "rude" and "uncivilized", 
so never identify me as "from China" or a "mainlander". I am from Hong 
Kong and a heunggongyahn. 
Another informant, Kenneth, 25 years old, echoed Mace's sentiments, and 
told me, "Those who are like me, bom before 1997, have the right to hold BNO 
[British National Overseas], and thus have the right to choose to be British 
instead of a Chinese】，. Why should I choose to be a Chinese when mainlanders 
are doing all these unethical, disgusting and shameful things? I always identify 
myself as heunggongyahn in front of my gwdilou friends." 
To Mace and Kenneth, the identity of "mainland Chinese" carries shameful 
connotations. Unlike Kenneth, however, many heunggongyahn would not deny 
the identity of "Chinese". Priscilla, 25 years old, said, “I have no choice, I was 
born to be a Chinese. I didn't pick this choice and there is nothing that I can do 
about it. Of course, I am not saying that I want to deny my identity as a Chinese, 
I like Chinese culture and history. I studied Chinese literature in secondary 
school, and I like it very much." Steven, 30, said, "We are Chinese, we are bom 
to be Chinese. We have the same history, same ethnic background and same 
origin as Chinese. If China is going to launch a war on Taiwan, I will join the 
army. However, I am still different from daaihlohkyahn'' These comments echo 
the interpretation of Mathews et al. mentioned earlier, my informants feel ‘； 
{ 
ashamed of some affairs happening in mainland China, but not "Chinese 
history". 
Many of my informants are indeed proud of "Chinese culture and history" 
25 Although the number of Hong Kong people holding BNO is jess than the number of that 
holding SAR passport, this does not reflect their emotional attachment to mainland China. 
Many of them hold SAR passport due to its comparatively more visa-free countries and its 
cheaper application fee. 
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that they have studied from textbooks about ancient China. In contrast, recent 
affairs have brought more intricate emotions to Hong Kong people. After reading 
news about the Shanghai World Exposition theme song, which was reported to be 
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plagiarized from an old Japanese song, my informant Paul laughed and said , 
This is so humiliating. Not only did they plagiarize a song, they even picked 
Japan. You know, many mainlanders claim they hate Japanese for what they 
have done in China during the WWII, but now they are copying things from 
them. It's so shameful. Again, it uncovers the "ugly face" of mainland 
China 一 copy cat. We use saan-jaaih ( LUH) to describe the plagiarizing 
action, we could find saan-jaaih facebook，saan-jaaih products, saan-jaaih 
brands and many other things^^. Now that the news [the theme song of the 
World Expo is plagiarized from Japan] is widespread to the outside world, 
how could I ever admit to be a "Chinese"? Other people would 
misunderstand me as a daaihlohkyahn. Therefore I always tell others that I 
am from Hong Kong. 
In short, many Hong Kong Chinese emphasize "Hong Kong" when they are 
introducing themselves to others so as to avoid being mistaken for "mainlanders". 
This does not mean that they reject their identity as "Chinese". Quite the opposite, 
most of them would not deny themselves as "Chinese" and believe that they were � 
bom to be Chinese. However, many of them make a clear demarcation from 
"mainlanders" to distance themselves from affairs happening in mainland China 
and "mainlanders' uncivilized behaviors", which make them feel ashamed. 
In the next section, I will further discuss how Hong Kong people's cultural 
identity plays a role in their daily life to convey their reluctance. 
Cultural Identity is Presented: Conscious Performance 
As discussed earlier, Hong Kong Chinese people have a conscious 
26 In April 2010, the Shanghai World Exposition theme song was found to have been plagiarized 
from a Japanese song, "Stay away you are from" by Maya Okamoto. The theme song was 
suspended later. The Shanghai World Expo would pay 300 million Japanese yen (approximately 
US $3.2 million) to the Japanese singer {The Epoch Times 2010). 
27 Saan-jaaih literally means a mountain fortress, but symbolically means plagiarism. Mountain 
fortresses, in Chinese ancient histories, were like pirates who steal and rob others' properties. 
Plagiarism in mainland China is endemic, it is especially common in brand logos, patents, 
trademarks, and industrial design rights. 
i —^^^  
92 
insistence on their "Hong Kong identity" to avoid being mistaken for mainland 
Chinese. However, the physical similarity between Hong Kong people and 
mainlanders makes it hard to distinguish between their cultural identities just by 
looking at their physical appearance. This part of the thesis unveils Hong Kong 
people's presentation of their cultural identity through demeanor: avoid 
performing the stigmatized demeanor. 
Goffman (1959) examines how a person presents himself/herself in 
everyday life via various signs and argues that each person manipulates the 
"front" - "setting", "appearance" and "manners" 一 to convey messages, and to 
influence how others comprehend and think of him/her. Presenting cultural 
identity is the same as presenting oneself. One person maneuvers a variety of 
factors to present and build up an image that he/she wants to portray. 
In order to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese, Hong Kong 
Chinese avoid, wittingly or unwittingly, doing the stigmatized behaviors. In the 
previous chapter, I illustrated in detail how certain forms of demeanor are 
stigmatized and are regarded as "mainlanders' behavior", such as squatting and 
queue jumping, while certain forms of demeanor are privileged as "decent" and 
are attributed to "Hong Kong people's behavior". In this section, I focus mainly 
on how Hong Kong people consciously avoid being misidentified as 
"mainlanders" through demeanor. Before turning to my informants' experiences, 
- I. 
I would like to point out that "others" (non-Chinese people) may not notice the 
differences in demeanor between Hong Kong people and mainlanders, but marks 
a huge difference to Hong Kong Chinese people themselves. 
Sally, a foreign friend of mine, has been living in Hong Kong for a few 
years. She told me， 
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Before my Hong Kong friends told me about the corporeal differences 
between Hong Kong people and mainlanders, I really didn't notice. Once I 
went to Tsim Sha Tsui with them and we saw some Chinese squatting on 
floors. Then they told me that only mainlanders squat on floors, Hong Kong 
people won't do so. I think that's very interesting because I often squat on 
floors in my own country. 
Sally's experience indeed shows that the corporeal differences between 
Hong Kong people and mainlanders may not register much on a foreigner. 
However, many Hong Kong people consciously separate themselves from 
mainlanders.. In the following, I will demonstrate how my informants perform 
their cultural identity as opposed to mainlanders. 
My informant, Ah-mo, 25 years old, told me how to perform as a 
"mainlander", 
When I was still a secondary student [high school], I went to an art 
exhibition with three other friends [Hong Kong people]. Same as many 
Hong Kong teenagers, we liked to make different poses while taking 
photographs. In one of the pictures, we pretended to be daaihlohkyahn and 
i squatted on a street. We were mocking daaihlohkyahn because squatting is a 
disgusting and low-class action. We never squat in streets other than making � 
fun. We Imow that it's a mainlanders' action. 
Race, 25 years old, my informant, consciously avoids being misidentified as 
a "mainlander". She told me, "Sometimes when I am really tired, I'd want to 
squat down and get a rest, especially if I have stood for a long time waiting for 
someone. But I won't squat because I don't want to be seen as a mainlander. 
Only mainlanders squat." 
Ah-ka, 27 years old, similar to Ah-mo and Race, holds a negative attitude 
towards squatting and mainland Chinese people. He claimed that he has never 
squatted even when he felt tired. At first he explained that it was not safe and not 
good-looking to do so, "It's easy to fall down if one's balance is not good and 
vehicles may crash onto road sides." Then I asked him if the action of squatting 
connects to mainlanders? Then he replied, "Exactly. It is a mainlanders' 
. 一 7 
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behavior." Ah-ka also chooses not to squat in the public to avoid being 
misidentified as a mainlander. 
Many Hong Kong people like Race and Ah-ka choose not to squat to 
distinguish themselves from mainlanders, which reconfirms the stigmatization of 
squatting as "mainlanders' behavior". Peter's example can further demonstrate 
how one person presents his/her cultural identity in the public. Peter, 27 years old, 
was born in Guangzhou, mainland China. In August 2009, Peter and his friends 
went to Guangzhou for a two-day trip. He distinguished himself from the general 
Guangzhou population. He mocked and made fun of the behavior of Guangzhou 
people and laughed at them with his friends, who were bom in Hong Kong. Peter 
seems to hold a stronger negative attitude towards the bodily disposition of 
mainland Chinese people than his friends. 
Fieldnotes, 8 August, 2009, Guangzhou, China, around 15.30 
Waiting for the subway, Peter and his friends talked about mainlanders' 
behaviors. They described mainland China mockingly as a "strong nation". 
Peter said, "Their citizens are also ‘strong’，They don't need to queue up. 
All they need to do is to push others away when they get on or off the 
vehicles. They are not concerned with manners, nor do they respect others." 
During the trip to Guangzhou, Peter was often the leader who brought up 
issues about mainlanders, especially their manners. He always emphasized that 
he is now a Hong Kong person. He left Guangzhou when he was five. Indeed, he 
still visits his relatives at least twice a year. He was, or appeared to be, the leader 
I. 
of the Guangzhou trip, because he is still a "Guangzhou representative". It is 
understandable that he has grown up under Hong Kong's cultural schema. 
Therefore, like many Hong Kong people, he dislikes "mainlanders' behaviors". . 
Yet during the trip his reactions towards mainlanders were stronger than many 
Hong Kong people's reactions. Later, I interviewed him about his attitudes 
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towards mainlanders, and he showed a different attitude, 
I go back to .Guangzhou quite often，at least twice a year apart from work, 
so I am still quite familiar with Guangzhou. I was born in Guangzhou, but I 
am a Hong Kong person. In the past, not many Hong Kong people went to 
Guangzhou, so Guangzhou people thought that Hong Kong people were 
smart, rich and attractive. Now the economic situation of Guangzhou has 
improved a lot, and more and more Hong Kong people go there, so they 
don't treat Hong Kong people as VIP [very important person] anymore. 
Hong Kong people and mainlanders are really different. Even if Guangzhou 
people speak Cantonese everyday, they speak in a very different tone. They 
throw rubbish everywhere, and they push others when they get on trains and 
buses. Some even spit, but the situation has improved a lot. I hold a neutral 
attitude towards mainland Chinese. I don't have a negative attitude towards 
them. 
Peter claimed he held a neutral attitude, but the Guangzhou trip revealed his 
negative attitude towards mainlanders. During the two-day Guangzhou trip, he 
I 
mocked mainland China as a "strong nation”, and made fun of mainland Chinese 
people for their "uncivilized" behaviors. He even acted like a mainlander pushing 
his friends out of his way to make them laugh. Most of his friends who went to 
\ -
the trip with him dislike mainland Chinese people. Some even hate them. I 
believe he had exaggerated his negative attitude towards mainlanders during the 
trip to convey a message to his friends that "he is the same as them; he is a Hong 
Kong person". 
Peter's case uncovers that how Hong Kong Chinese think and perceive are 
also influenced by their peers. The following example further demonstrates how 
some Hong Kong people put pressure on their friends not to squat or perform 
other stigmatized "mainlanders' behaviors". 
Fieldnotes, 28 November2008, Hong Kong, around 15:45 
I was waiting for my friends in Tsim Sha Tsui. A group of teenagers, aged 
around eighteen，stood next to me. It seemed to me that they were also 
waiting for someone. One of them felt tired and squatted, then her friends 
immediately asked her not to squat, saying it was very "mainlander" [using 
'mainlander' as an adjective]. The girl said，"I am just tired", but the others 
told her that she should not squat no matter how tired she is. They even 
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joked that they won't recognise her as their friend if she squats. 
Jokes, in Hong Kong, are quite commonly used when a person does some 
minor "dishonoring" things, such as jumping queues and arguing loud in the 
public, others joke about not recognising or denying any relationships with 
him/her. Lena's example further illustrates how jokes are used. Lena's mother 
migrated to Hong Kong about twenty years ago and Lena was born in Hong 
Kong. Lena always feels ashamed by her mothers' behaviors, so she hopes to 
"correct" her mother. Lena, 26, told me, "Sometimes I don't want to go out with 
my mum. She often talks so loud, and sometimes even jump the queues. I feel so 
ashamed by her actions. You know, these actions are considered as rude and 
mainlandish. So, I often tell her not to do them, or else I will not go out with her 
or not recognise her [as her mum or simply pretend not to know her] in public." 
In both cases, Tsim Sha Tsui's tennagers as well as Lena's case, jokes are 
used as a warning to regulate others' behaviors in public to save one's own face. 
In other words, the presentation of one's cultural identity is also affected by 
his/her friends and family members. From the cases I mentioned, cultural identity 
is often about how one presents himself/herself in public, and more importantly, 
it is presented through demenaor. 
In short, the Hong Kong identity is presented by avoiding the stigmatized 
demeanor, such as squatting and jumping queues, and thus to prevent being 
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misidentified as daaihlohkyahn. Moreover, sometimes cultural identity is 
presented to the performers themselves instead of to others who do not notice the 
importance of the cultural identity. Like Sally, who did not notice the 
"difference" between Hong Kong people and mainlanders until her friends told 
her, and she did not think the difference was important to her. In the next section, 
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I am going to explore Hong Kong people's unconscious presentation of their 
cultural identity. • 
Cultural Identity is Embodied: the Practice of Eye Contacts 
In the previous section, I discussed that cultural identity can be presented 
consciously. In this section, I examine how cultural identity is embodied 
unconsciously in daily practices in the practice of eye contact. 
In the pervious chapter, I illustrated one of Hong Kong people's unspoken 
cultural rules: Hong Kong people in general tend to avoid conflicts and disputes 
in public. When they encounter something that they dislike，they rarely speak out, 
and they would rather use other methods, such as eye contact or poking. In this 
section, the practice of eye contact is explored as one of the distinct ways to 
convey messages and complaints without creating conflicts in everyday life. 
Based on the data collected from interviews, daily observation and reports by the 
mass media, I conclude the following points. 
GENERAL RULE： AVOID EYE CONTACT 
Avoiding eye contact with strangers is one of the ways to prevent conflict in 
Hong Kong. Walking around in Hong Kong, I notice that many Hong Kong 
people rarely look into others' eyes, and they avoid eye contact if possible. It is 
considered inappropriate to look at someone for a long time (more than two 
seconds). The offender tries not to arouse any attention from the offended, the 
} 
ones who are observed. Once the attention of the offended is aroused, most 
offenders immediately shift their gaze or pretend that they are looking at 
something else. 
Paul, 29 years old, told me "It's normal to look when there are pretty girls 
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around, but I will not arouse their attention. I will just take a glimpse at them for 
one to two seconds." Ah sang, 27 years old, shares similar views with Paul, "If 
there are pretty girls, it's hard not to look at them. Everyone likes pretty things. 
However, I would not stare at them for a long time." John, 34 years old, is 
working as an overseas sales representative who often travels to different places. 
He feels uncomfortable when others stare at him firmly. He recalled his 
experience in Turkey, "Hong Kong people like to avoid others' eye contact, but 
people from other places don't. I remember when I first went to Turkey for a 
business trip. The men there looked at me fiercely. I guess that's because there 
were not many Chinese, unlike Germany, France and Britain, where there are 
well-developed China towns. Anyway, I still don't feel like being stared at; I feel 
like under surveillance." 
Hong Kong people thus tend to avoid having any unnecessary eye contact, 
and they feel uncomfortable when they are being stared at. Two years ago, when 
I traveled to Belgium with two other Hong Kong girls, we often felt 
uncomfortable at being stared at. I still remember one girl asked, "Why do these 
people stare at us all the time?" Then another girl replied, "We need to be careful, 
these people don't look nice. We are only tourists, so it would be very difficult 
for us to report to the police even if we got robbed." This is not an unusual case, 
and indeed, similar cases also happen in Hong Kong. � ； 
Many Hong Kong people are very suspicious; they tend not to trust 
strangers. Even if others are just looking at them, they would often think, "Why 
is he/she staring at us? Is he/she planning to do something bad to me?" James 
Watson mentions the suspiciousness of Hong Kong people, saying the display of 
a smile does not necessarily mean friendliness，congeniality or familiarity, 
、， 
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instead it may be interpreted as cunning (1997: 90). Watson illustrates this with ‘ 
an example of buying fruit from a hawker. If the hawker smiles at a person, Hong 
Kong people believe this means that person has been cheated. Many Hong Kong 
people would immediately connect somebody's stare with the idea that strangers 
are not expected to smile or stare unless they are planning something evil. There 
； I 
is a Chinese proverb, "people who are overly friendly or give you unsolicited 
hospitality usually have evil intentions in mind (無事獻態憩，非奸即盜)”. 
i 
Staring at a stranger therefore carries a similar effect as smiling at a stranger. 
！ 
Mainland Chinese people, it is believed, are different from Hong Kong 
Chinese people because the former often look at other people attentively and ： 
steadily. Ah-Ga, 29, told me his experience in mainland China. Since most of the 
relatives of Ah-Ga's parents are living in Hong Kong, Ah-Ga rarely goes to 
China.,, Ah Ga recalled his past experiences in visiting relatives in mainland � 
China, 
I 
I still remember when I was a kid, we [parents and I] went there from time 
to time. Every time the people there looked at me curiously, I felt very 
uncomfortable. Now I rarely visit them, but sometimes I have business trip ! 
to Dongguan [a place in Guangdong] with my colleagues. The factory 
workers there stared at us [his colleagues and him]. The female ones stared 
and chitchatted together while the male ones stared at us fiercely. I felt like 
an animal in a zoo. 
Apart from staring steadily at them，many of my informants have other 
experiences in having their own personal belongings being stared at. 
Fieldnotes, 16 August 2009, Guangzhou, around 15.30 
； 1 
Seven Hong Kong Chinese, including me, took the local train in Guangzhou. 
As tourists, we took pictures everywhere, even when we were on the train. 
When we were taking photos of themselves on the train, two passengers sat 
beside leaned forward and looked at our camera. My informants noticed and 
stared at them, but the passengers continued to look at our camera. Finally, 
the one who carried the camera moved away to stop them from looking at 
our photos. 
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My informants later reflected that they disliked the two mainlanders' action. 
Like many of my informants, they believe that many mainlanders are still curious 
about Hong Kong people. It is often reported that many Chinese cities want to 
emulate Hong Kong's achievement. To my informants, even if a person is 
curious about other people's things, he/she should not look at it without the 
owners' permission. For most Hong Kong people, it is inappropriate to take a 
glance at other people's personal belongings (although in some situations, Hong 
Kong people also take a peep at others' belongings, such as newspaper, but they 
rarely stare at others' personal things for long). Peeping, in this way, could 
distinguish mainland Chinese people from Hong Kong Chinese people. 
COMPLAINTS CONVEYED： BE (脾)，STARE 
Be (目卑）is another word used in describing the action of looking. It means 
looking with disdain and anger^s. The action of be, indeed, is a distinction 
between Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese people. Be is one of 
Hong Kong people's most commonly used methods to complain in a silent and 
indirect way in daily life. Hong Kong people have a tendency to keep quiet or 
endure when they encounter something that annoys them. Unlike Hong Kong 
people, it is believed that mainlanders who "always argue loudly in the public", 
which Hong Kong Chinese people would see as disgraceful. There are many 
situations that Hong Kong people would use be to as a signal of warning and ‘ 
complaint. The following situations demonstrate when and how be is employed. 
As told by my informants, many Hong Kong men dislike their girlfriends 
being stared at, but the reasons behind this will not be detailed here. Rather, I 
28 The official pronunciation for the character “脾” should be pdih, but most Hong Kong people 
pronounce this character as be. 
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will focus on the ways they express their loathing. Louis, one of my informants, ' 
34 years old, dislikes his girlfriend being stared at by other men. For him，his 
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girlfriend is like a possession that belongs to him, so other men who stare at "his 
woman" is a sign of invasion. 
Fieldnotes, 2 September 2009’ Hong Kong, around 22.00 
I went to a pub with Louis and "his woman". While drinking red wine and , 
chatting, a group of seven men on the next table stared at "his woman". 
Next to these men's table, there was a dartboard and they took turns to play. 
While they were playing, they stared at Louis's girlfriend and chitchatted. 
After a few drinks, when "Louis woman" was heading towards the i 
washroom next to the dartboard, these men，again, stared at her from head to 
toes, which arouse the attention of Louis. Louis be (stared at) these men to ! 
convey a message to these men that "this woman belong to him." Soon after 
"his woman" returned to the seat, Louis suggested leaving. Once he stepped 
out the shop, he started cursing the men who stared at "his woman". 
Louis, like many Hong Kong men, would stare back instead of arousing a 
fight even if they dislike their girlfriends being stared at. Starting a fight is 
considered as an act of losing face, which I explained in Chapter 2. Be, stares 
[back], gives a warning and signal to the other men that they are invading other's � 
"possession". Peter, 27，explains, "She [his girlfriend] belongs to me, which is 
like my property, so don't touch. Don't even try to take a peek." 
I notice there are differences about the practice of staring and be between 
Hong Kong people and mainlanders. I talked to a mainland Chinese about this 
and she told me, 
In mainland, people usually speak out directly when they face situations that 
they dislike or disapprove. There are some people who would stare to 
convey a disapproving message，but it is not common and not very useful. 
People won't feel embarrassed even if you stare at them, although the stare 
may indicate that they have done something wrong or bad. 
Last time my mum traveled to Hong Kong to visit me. She sometimes 
talked something interested her, so she spoke in a loud voice on the train. 
Two Hong Kong Chinese nearby stared at her. Since I have been in Hong 
Kong for a long time, almost three years, I know that Hong Kong people 
dislike people who speak so loud and I sensed their stares, so I asked my 
mum to speak softer. My mum is a teacher, but it's a habit to speak that loud, 
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she didn't mean to break the rule of Hong Kong people. 
In sum, the practice of staring is one of the behavioral distinctions between 
Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese people. Since be is not a 
common way of expressing complaints in mainland China，some mainland 
Chinese who are less observant may not know they have broken cultural rules in 
Hong Kong. As a result, the incidents of "mainland Chinese breaking rules" are 
widespread in Hong Kong, and these incidents are always associated with the 
image of "uncivilized" and "rudeness". In addition, the subtle and indirect ways 
of Hong Kong people in expressing complaints and disapproval help us to 
understand the pivotal theme of this thesis: demeanor as the subtle resistance 
towards mainland China. The ensuing chapters will further elucidate Hong Kong 
people's silent grievances towards mainland China. 
Conclusion 
The previous gave an overall picture of the conceived differences in 
demeanor between Hong Kong people and mainlanders. In this chapter, I further 
explored in detail the social hierarchy that polarizes the social status of Hong 
Kong people and mainlanders and how Hong Kong cultural identity is presented 
and embodied. My informants' everyday experiences and practices were 
employed as empirical data. 
. � 
In the first part of this chapter, I first demonstrated that the social hierarchy . 
is established by differences in demeanor and by Hong Kong people's 
imagination of "path to civilization" in order to distinguish "civilized" Hong 
Kong people from "uncivilized" mainlanders. They presumed that certain 
demeanor has an "evolution" path, which leads to "civilization". This "path to 
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civilization" distinguishes “mainlanders，demeanor" as "uneducated" and 
"uncivilized" while "Hong Kong people's demeanor" as "civilized". Bourdieu's 1 
capital theory is then employed to comprehend the impacts and power of this 
"path to civilization". "Mainlanders", since possessing limited cultural capital, 
and less cultural knowledge in behaving "properly", violate cultural rules more 
: i 
frequently, shaping an image as "uneducated". Furthermore, "uneducated" 
people usually fail to gain respect from Hong Kong people. Hence，carrying the 
stigmatized image of being "uneducated", many mainlanders face difficulties in 
‘ i 
building their social network. 
In the second part of this chapter, I focused on how demeanor is linked to 
Hong Kong people's cultural identity in their everyday life. I first unpacked how 
my informants viewed the identities of "Chinese", "mainland Chinese" and 
"Hong, Kong Chinese". I then demonstrated my informants' persistence in 
claiming their distinct cultural identity and in distinguishing themselves from � 
mainland Chinese. Finally, I elucidated how cultural identity is consciously 
presented and unwittingly embodied in Hong Kong people's daily life. 
In the ensuing chapters, I will unpack why many Hong Kong people persist 
in their cultural identity and the larger issues behind the scene. 
i _ _ _ 
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Chapter 4. 
Hong Kong Cultural Identity 
...self-identity is always the expression and manifestation of our 
incorporation of how we are positioned and responded to by others. 
(Blackman 2008: 25) 
Introduction 
Despite the return of Hong Kong's political sovereignty to China, many 
Hong Kong Chinese people still retain a clear boundary between themselves and 
their "compatriots" - mainland Chinese people. This chapter exposes and 
analyzes how and why the cultural identities of heunggongyahn and 
daaihlohkyahn are often in opposite positions. It also gives clues to the source of 
Hong Kong people's antagonism towards mainlanders' behavior, and brings in 
the theme of the ensuing chapter: demeanor, emotions and resistance. 
I begin by exploring the changing relationships between Hong Kong and 
mainland China in political, economic and social respects. The relationships 
provide social contexts in which the cultural identity of heunggongyahn is 
shaped. I then track the on-going shaping and changing of the sense of 
heunggongyahn from the 1950s to the 2000s. I also unpack and expose how the 
identity of heunggongyahn is linked with a middle-class mentality that is 
explicitly conveyed in Hong Kong people's daily life. I also explore factors that 
contribute to the construction of the cultural identity of heunggongyahn as 
"superior" and the molding of the identity of daaihlohkyahn as "inferior". 
Borrowing the case of Berlin, finally I illustrate that the distinct cultural identity 
of Hong Kongers consists of a border in many Hong Kong people's heads, in 





This section explores the changing relationships between Hong Kong and 
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mainland China in three respects: political, economic and social. The cultural 
identity as heunggongyahn, to a large extent, is connected and influenced by , 
Hong Kong's relationships with mainland China. This section thus provides 
background information and explores social contexts in which the Hong Kong ！ 
identity is shaped and altered. 丨 
POLITICAL SITUATION 
The political situation of Hong Kong can be explored through two periods: 
before and after the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. 
Prior to the Handover 
During the whole transition process from negotiations to the actual 
handover of Hong Kong, heunggongyahn had no say. Politicians from both 
Britain and China could legitimately partake in the deal, but Hong Kong citizens 
were not informed until the news was leaked. Still, they were not invited to take 
part in the process (Scott 1989: 207). The negotiations started in 1982 and ended 
in 1984. In his Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, Ian 
Scott analyzed the response made by the Hong Kong public to the negotiations 
between Britain and China in the initial stage, in 1982, 
To the extent that their views were reflected, they reached the British and 
Chinese governments in muted form through the filters of the local press, 
appointed representatives and the barometers of economic confidence, the 
stock market and the strength of the local currency... there was no tradition 
of political participation... Both the British and Chinese governments made 
use of this during the negotiations, asserting that the appointed 
representatives had no right to make statements purporting to express local 
sentiment and that only the respective governments had such a right... [T]he 
British - and, formally, the Chinese government - were committed to 
1 0 6 
keeping the discussions confidential... This meant that it was difficult to 
mobilize popular support behind a particular position because there was no 
information available except for the repeated Chinese statements on their 
plans for the future (Scott 1989: 206 - 207). 
It was reflected by surveys and letters that most Hong Kong people hoped to 
maintain the status quo, yet neither the Chinese nor the British governments paid 
much heed to their views (Scott 1989: 208). When the agreement was finally 
drafted, public opinion in Hong Kong was neglected and most of the public 
"seemed to feel that they were powerless and that the agreement would be 
imposed upon them anyway, whatever their views" (Scott 1989: 213). Beyond, a 
local band, wrote a song - "Papa, Mama" - in 1993，describing the situation 
mentioned above with metaphors of father, mother and a child^^. The father 
represents Britain, the mother represents mainland China, and the child is Hong 
Kong. The song portrays the impotent feeling of Hong Kong Chinese in having 
no control over their political future, though Hong Kong was supposed to be the 
major player in the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 
With a strong and distinct cultural identity and the unstable situations in 
mainland China which were mentioned in the previous chapter, many Hong 
� 
Kong people were distrustful of the Communist Party, and some were even 
scared of the handover. Also, Hong Kong was going to transfer its sovereignty 
from a capitalist regime to a communist regime. Many Hong Kong citizens 
worried about their properties and freedom. Many of them migrated to overseas. ‘ 
My informant shared with me his parents' reasons for staying in Hong Kong. 
Michael, 34 years old, recalled, 
• 
In 1984, when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, my parents 
were afraid of being ruled by the Communists. At that time, I was around 
eight years old and my family was quite wealthy; we had our own car and 
29 Please refer to Appendix I for the lyrics of this song. 
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apartment. We were worried that might be confiscated by the Communist 
after 1997. My parents had thought of migrating to other places, yet they 
worried about starting a life in a new environment, and that if might be 
difficult to make a living. My father doesn't have much education. He 1 
worked as a decoration worker when he was young, and he saved enough 
money to start his own decoration business. It was good enough to provide 
us a good living. Leaving Hong Kong meant that they would have to start i 
from zero, and that we might not be able to enjoy the same living standard 
in Hong Kong, so they stayed. 
j I 
Johnny, 35 years old, explained his fear and anger towards mainland China, 
Hong Kong is a capitalist democratic society, but China is a communist 
undemocratic society. Everyone was afraid of the handover. After the 
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, many of my friends and their 
families emigrated to Canada and the US. Also, many of those who stayed 
in Hong Kong applied for the Green Card [American Permanent Resident 
Card]. They would rather pay high taxes to the government in the US than 
maybe give all properties to the Communist. , 
When I worked [in 2002 or 2003] as a financial analyst for a company in 
Guangzhou, I was stopped by customs there because I was holding a report 
in English. They asked me to stay there, and to translate the whole file into 
Chinese. The file was as thick as a bible, and was almost impossible to 
translate within a short period of time. So I sought help from that company, 
which was a big firm with power and good guanxi with the local 
government officials. “ 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hong Kong people's migration rates 
went up in the late 1980s and 1990s. Migration was one of the methods many 
Hong Kong middle-class people used to escape from the handover of the territory 
to the PRC. Those who chose to stay in Hong Kong did so mostly because of 
financial constraints, so they considered themselves as not having any options 
(Mathews et al. 2008: 45). Studying Hong Kong's migrants and stayers, Salaff et 
al. put this way, "On the cusp of Hong Kong's reversion to China, many 
observers interpreted the emigration swell as a form of cultural resistance to 
protect a way of life”（2010: 11)30. 
Both Michael and Johnny have no fondness towards the PRC. Although 
30 Salaff et al. also point out that there are differences in attitudes towards the handover among 
the middle class people and working class people, but I will not detail in this thesis. 
"'ToT 
they did not emigrate, they have their ways to resist control by the PRC through 
venting their emotions on mainlanders, which will be discussed in the ensuing 
chapters. 
After the Handover 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration promised political and social practices in 
Hong Kong would remain unchanged for fifty years. Discontent directed against 
the Hong Kong government and grievances over the situation in Hong Kong 
intensified after the handover. However, the PRC, which was purportedly "the 
grandpa of Hong Kong" and "master of the puppet", - the puppet being the Hong 
Kong government, was rarely criticized directly^ ^  From arguments over the 
granting of permanent residence rights to mainland Chinese in 1999, to the 
opposition of the proposal of Article 23 in 2003，as well as the fight for universal 
suffrage that carries on at present, many Hong Kong Chinese were triggered to 
participate in public demonstrations and public discussions on online forums and 
daily conversations. These arguments further reinforced and highlighted the 
difference in the identities of heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn. Hong Kong 
people fight under the common interests as heunggongyahn. During the fights, 
however, only the Hong Kong government and mainlanders were criticized. 
On July 1 2003, over 50,000 people participated in a march for opposing 
Article 23 and expressing discontent for the Hong Kong government. This 
demonstration was the largest public demonstration since the handover. Article 
23 states: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own . 
to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the 
Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign 




political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the ！ 
Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from 
establishing .ties with foreign political organizations or bodies, 
i 1 
Ah-mo, 25 years old, recalled her experience in participating in the march, 
I was a high school student in 2003.1 studied liberal studies and my teacher i 
told us about universal suffrage, and that our rights that would be threatened 
and limited if the legislation of Article 23 was passed. He invited us to 
participate in the July 1 March in 2003，it was our choice to go or not. I , 
went with my friends. We didn't finish the whole march since it was too hot. 
I guess I was too young to understand the importance of protesting for my 
rights. At that time I didn't participate to fight for my rights, I just thought it 
was fun to j oin a march which I haven't tried that before. 
Now I understand the importance of marching, but I think it is impossible to 
have universal suffrage. I don't think the Central government will grant us 
this right, and the government officials in Hong Kong are only puppets of 
the Central government. So, if I have choice, I would definitely leave Hong 
Kong and migrate to a place with freedom. 
Michael, 34 years old, echoed Ah-mo's sentiments and commented on the 
fight for universal suffrage, “I don't think we will ever have universal suffrage, 
not even before we die. Don't be so naive, thinking the Central government will 
grant you the right to vote, it's impossible. Any government similar to the PRC 
will never give you such a power. Indeed it's not important to me whether the 
Central government will grant us voting rights or not, as long as the economy of 
Hong Kong is good and I can make my fortune. After earning enough, I will 
leave here." Fig.4.1 and 4.2 show the demonstrators in the 2005 July 1 March, 
who are fighting for democracy and universal suffrage. In the July 1 March in 
2009，many Hong Kong Chinese were still fighting for universal suffrage. 
"TTo^ 
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Fig. 4,1: Copied from Hong Kong Digital Vision, titled: July 1 March [2005]: Full Democracy. 
Protestors from Southern Democratic Alliance in 2005 made a tomb, and on it was 
written, “Tomb of Hong Kong democracy, died on Jul 1，1997". 
Fig. 4.2: Taken from Hong Kong Digital Vision, titled: July 1 March [2005]: Full Democracy； On 
banners, it's written, "One World, Same Dream. Fight for Freedom, Power to People". 
On the man, the card's written, "Can we have Universal Suffrage in 07?" 
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Fig, 4.3: Taken ^omfoto net, titled: 2009 July 1 March. The photo was taken on July 1，2009. On 
the banner it was written, "Oppose to 'small coterie' election Fight for universal suffrage in 
2012". 
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Fig. 4.4: Captured ^om facebook, the logo on the left says "Hong Kong is Hong Kong, Don't 
want Hong Kong to be Mainlandized (香港就是香港’不想香港大陸化)”. 
Both Michael and Ah-mo share a pessimistic view of the future of Hong 
Kong in terms of their political rights and freedom. Like many Hong Kong 
migrants, they would like to use migration as a way to escape from the "doomed" 
future. In the meantime, some Hong Kong people, unlike them, exercise their 
right and express their attitudes on facebook. As shown in Fig.4.4, some Hong 
Kong people launched a group on facebook named Say no to C.RC. in HK. In 
other words，"say no to the Communist Party of China in Hong Kong". They 
distinguish Hong Kong Chinese people from mainland Chinese people, and 
would like to stop the influx of mainlanders. 
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Economic development has always been the pivotal concern of Hong Kong 
Chinese. In this section, I will account for the changing economic situations in 
Hong Kong and will illustrate how the economy affects the relationship between 
Hong Kong people and mainland China. 
Prior to the Handover 
The economy of Hong Kong developed rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, 
people's living standard was significantly improved. Many mainlanders relied on 
their relatives in Hong Kong materially and financially. Johnny, 35 years old, my 
informant, told me, 
When I was small, we [my family] often gave my mainland relatives the old 
clothes that we did not want. It was because the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution had brought huge destruction to both the living 
standards of the mainlanders and the structures of the society. Many 
mainlanders had limited resources to live their lives. My mainland relatives 
felt so happy to receive those old clothes, as if they were some very 
valuable presents. 
Also, the circulation of Renminbi (RMB) was not as strong as today. At that 
time, a kind of foreign exchange certificate was more commonly used. 
Since mainland China practiced communism, most resources were allocated . 
by the Central government. Citizens could not buy any consumer product 
even if they had money, so we usually brought our old stuff to our relatives. 
Once I brought an electric watch to my village, and the whole villagers had 
come out to examine it. 
In the past, we did not treat mainland Chinese as tourist, serving them as 
well as we do today. In our eyes, they were rather like beggars begging for 
our money and resources. And I felt like offering help to them, but since the 
economy of China developed so fast in the last two decades, the situation 
now is the exact opposite of the past. Of course I dislike this and I feel 
upset. 
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Most of my informants had similar experiences as Michael. They were used * 
to giving old stuff to their mainland relatives. This practice has dwindled since 
the mainland Chinese economy has improved greatly. June, 28 years old, my 
informant, used to give old clothes to her mainland relatives. She told me, 
I have never seen my mainland relatives. It's always my grandma who took 
these clothes to mainland. I was once tidying my wardrobe and wanted to 
pack some old clothes for my mainland relatives. Then my grandma told me 
that our mainland relatives didn't want old clothes anymore. They were rich 
enough to buy new clothes. I felt a bit upset. I don't like the feeling that 
daaihlohkyahn are now so rich. Many of them are much richer than us 
[Hong Kong people]. 
Not only did mainlanders rely on their Hong Kong relatives, the economy of 
mainland China relied much on Hong Kong as well. Hong Kong served as a 
trade conduit for China in the 1960s and 1970s, connecting China with the global 
trading world (Huang 1997: 97). In the late 1980s，more than 50 per cent of 
China's imports and 37 per cent of its exports moved through Hong Kong. 
Four-fifths of Hong Kong manufacturing firms had relocated to Guangdong, 
China in the early 1990s (Huang 1997: 97; So 2003b: 482). Some scholars argue 
that the transition of the sovereignty from Britain to the PRC was rather smooth 
due to the economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China in the 
1980s. So (2003b) analyzes the relationship between business and politics in 
Hong Kong context, saying that the development of Hong Kong was always 
influenced by the interests of big businessmen. Before the 1980s，big 
businessmen were united the colonial government by a common goal: 
maintaining Hong Kong's political stability and Britain's dominance of its 
economy. So (2003b: 493) calls this alliance as "expatriate alliance". In the late 
1980s, Beijing and Hong Kong big businessmen formed an alliance due to 
businessmen's interest in mainland investments, and So refers this as an "unholy 
l l4 
alliance" (So 2003b: 493). 
After the Handover 
“It was envisioned that 1997 would be transition toward authoritarianism: 
from a British colony ruled by expatriates and big business to a communist 
Chinese colony ruled by Beijing and big business" (So 2003b: 490). To a certain 
extent, Hong Kong is still a "colony" yet it is now ruled by Beijing and big 
business instead of expatriates. Economy has always been the pivotal concern of 
many Hong Kong people, and since the economy of Hong Kong relies much on 
mainland China and big business, Beijing acts as the new "boss". 
In 1997，the Asian financial crisis struck precisely after the handover in July 
and hit the economy of Hong Kong badly. Thousands of Hong Kong people lost 
their jobs, the stock market was volatile and the Hong Kong currency was under 
great pressure to maintain its peg to the U.S. dollar. Before the crisis broke out, 
many Hong Kong people speculated on the stock market. After the stock market 
collapsed, many speculators lost their investments and became debtors. Some 
could not stand for the sudden change and thus committed suicide. After the 
financial crisis, the economy of Hong Kong was not as thriving as before, but the 
economy of mainland China developed rapidly. 
Today, the economy of mainland China is thriving, and Hong Kong's 
economy is dependent on it. The enormous changes - the reverse of reliance — in 
the last two decades have upset the pride of many heunggongyahn, and thus a 
sense of hatred has grown towards mainlanders. Vince，30 years old, recalled 
Before the handover, the Hong Kong dollar (HKD) had a higher exchange -
rate than Renminbi (RMB), and every mainlander competed to get HKD. In 
2005 or 2006, I don't remember the exact year, but I remember clearly the 
exchange rate changed suddenly. The Central government stated that the 
exchange rate as 1:1 in one day. From that day onwards, heunggongyahn's 
sense of superiority has been badly hurt. Once I went to the Mainland for 
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my research, I brought thousands of HKD with me, but none of the people 
there would take my money. 
Before the appreciation of the value of RMB, many Hong Kong people had 
commented that RMB was dirty. One of my informants said， 
Mainlanders put their money everywhere. Millions of people have touched 
it，that's why it is so dirty. In the past, Hong Kong people viewed RMB as 
pickled vegetables, not many people would like to hold RMB with their 
bare hands. We spent HKD even when we went back to mainland. Now that 
the value of RMB has risen higher than that of HKD, many Hong Kong 
people feel happy to receive RMB. You can see, many shops are eager to 
receive RMB as a payment. 
Many heunggongyahn feel discouraged about the change in exchange rates 
in the last decade. Many of them still talk about the past when the HKD was 
worth more than the RMB. At the same time, more mainlanders refuse to receive 
HKD as payment in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, where HKD was previously 
accepted. The currency, indeed, acts as a medium to express one's social position. 
Many Hong Kong Chinese people perceive it as a symbolic disparagement, and it 
hurt their sense of superiority. Therefore, the depreciation of HKD and 
mainlanders' refusal to accept HKD, as Vince described, damaged the pride of 
many Hong Kong people. 
To soothe Hong Kong people's discontents, the PRC government has 
launched a series of policies that would benefit the economy of Hong Kong. 
Examples of "economic goodies" from the PRC include the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA, a free-trade agreement giving Hong Kong 
companies preferential access to mainland market) signed in 2003 and other 
exclusive mandates for offshore yuan banking since 2007. Lo Kwai Cheung and 
Pang Lai Kwan analyze the situation of Hong Kong from 1997 to 2007, 
The economic goodies offered by Beijing are also a means to curb any 
public expressions of discontent in the more politically conscious Hong 
Kong. The pragmatic thinking of Chinese leaders is essentially to buy 
people off by moving the economy ahead and satisfying them materially, in 
hopes that people would not be easily aroused into mass activism on 
controversial issues (Lo and Pang 2007: 351). 
The giving out of these "economic goodies" was intended to repress the 
discontents of Hong Kong Chinese people, yet the opposite result has been 
achieved. Many Hong Kong Chinese people today feel that they are less 
respected by the mainland Chinese people, some even feel they are being looked 
down upon. A typhoon named Kammuri hit Hong Kong between 4 and 8 August 
2008. On August 6，2008，Typhoon signal number eight was issued and many 
flights were delayed. A mainland tourist was interviewed about the arrangement 
of the airlines and the Hong Kong airport, and the interview was publicly 
broadcasted in the evening TV news. He criticized the messy queuing 
arrangement and commented, "Hong Kong, without the care of the Central 
Government, is definitely finished!(香港如果不是中央政府照顧你們，香港完 
蛋了 ！ )，’. The interview was later uploaded on youtube as a video clip, and this 
exclamation has aroused Hong Kong people's vitriolic criticisms towards 
mainlanders on internet. One youtube user, lauchunting, replied to the above 
incident, ‘ 
The Central government has not "played with" Hong Kong for more than a 
hundred year, but we've not finished yet. It [The arrangement that the 
mainland Chinese was complaining] is only a problem of queuing, any 
school prefects could handle it easily. There's no need to seek help from the 
China's doggy officials. Don't waste their valuable time, which they spend � 
on corruption, or else they would be truly finished.(香港已經無比中央政 
府"玩弄".百多年=..=，但係都未完蛋呀你吹哮，排隊問題姐==學校風 ： 
紀都搞得据啦，我誌唔洗勞煩中國d狗官呀嘛，唔好浪費佢地d寶貴時 
間去貪污啦，如果唔係佢地就真係完蛋啦 [ C o p i e d directly from 
youtube, titled "Hong Kong is finished (香港完蛋了)”]) 
Lauchunting mocked the mainland tourist for his complaint on queuing up, 
which is one of the conceived differences between Hong Kong Chinese people 
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and mainland Chinese people^l Apart from Lauchunting, many of my informants 
also felt offended, by this mainland tourist's comment. 
SOCIAL SITUATION 
The changes in social respect after the handover can explored in two ways: 
the influence of mainland China over Hong Kong people's local life, and the 
Mainland's influence over local mass media. 
Hong Kong People's Local Life 
The right of abode for mainlanders after the handover in 1997 has always 
been controversial. Despite the fact that Hong Kong's sovereignty has been 
returned to the PRC, mainlanders are still considered, in a cultural sense, 
"immigrants". From the perceptive of many Hong Kong people, Hong Kong is 
still culturally separated and different from mainland China. Even after Hong 
Kong was returned to mainland China, many Hong Kong Chinese continue to 
believe that mainland Chinese should not be granted the right of abode in Hong 
Kong. According to the Basic Law Article 24, Chinese nationals may acquire the 
right of abode in Hong Kong by one of three ways: 
1. if they were bom in Hong Kong before or after the transfer of 
sovereignty (Article 24(2)(1)); 
2. if they have resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not 
less than seven years before or after the transfer of sovereignty 
(Article 24(2)(2)); or 
3. if they were born outside Hong Kong to persons covered by the 
above two categories (Article 24(2)(3)). 
In 1999，the Court of Final Appeal granted the right of abode to children 
whose parents have the right of abode in Hong Kong, which immediately granted 
an estimated 1.67 million of mainland Chinese eligibility for the right of abode 
(ROA) (Cheng and Wong 2004: 137). This huge number aroused many Hong 
32 In Chapter 4，I will further illustrate the issue on queuing, which Hong Kong Chinese are 
trained to perform since kindergarten. 
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Kong people's attention and there were fierce arguments over the granting of the 
ROA to mainland Chinese. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, many 
Hong Kong women were worried that it would indirectly encourage Hong Kong 
men to pursue mainland wives or mistresses. This also constitutes to a stereotype 
of mainland women in Hong Kong as "mistresses" or "loose women". One of my 
informants, Fat-wai, commented, "Mainlanders usually come to Hong Kong for 
our welfare benefits. I don't want to have millions of mainlanders come to Hong \ 
Kong. Hong Kong is just a tiny little place, it's impossible to carry so many 
people. These mainlanders in particular are usually not very educated." Another 
informant, June, 28 years old, told me, "Sometimes it's normal to think that 
mainland women are mostly mistresses or prostitutes. I bet most prostitutes in 
Hong Kong are from the Mainland, and I think it's also quite common for Hong 
Kong men to find mistresses from the Mainland." 
Most Hong Kong people were also concerned about the keen competition 
for resources within Hong Kong. Almost 87 per cent of Hong Kong Chinese 
worried that the influx of mainland Chinese would add pressure on social 
resources, and 64 per cent were against giving the migrants ROA (The Stan�d 
1999). Meanwhile, during the long argument over the ROA, some abode seekers 
took violent actions to protest against the rejection of their ROA. On 2 August 
2000，twenty-five abode seekers set fire to the immigration tower in Wan C h a i , � 
injuring and killing forty-six people. This incident further stirred up Hong Kong 
people's resistance and hatred towards the majority of mainlanders. Effects of the 
government's official discriminatory discourse will be further discussed in . 
Chapter 5. 
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Some Hong Kong people commented that Hong Kong was "invaded" by 
mainlanders. The term Veuhnhaahm (瑜陷）is often used by some Hong Kong 
people to describe both the situations of increasing number of mainland Chinese 
in Hong Kong and the handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty on July 1997. 
Leuhnhaahm means falling under the enemy's occupation and conquest. In this 
case, Hong Kong is described to be fallen under mainland Chines occupation. 
One of my informants said, "Bow-tie [the nickname of Donald Tsang, the present 
Hong Kong Chief Executive] always suggests "importing experts" from China to 
solve the problem of insufficient labor, but then Hong Kong would be 
overwhelmed by mainlanders once the policy is launched." Another informant, 
Wai-tsai, 28 years old, echoes his sentiments, "The unemployment problem in 
Hong Kong is already quite serious. Importing more mainlanders to Hong Kong 
would only aggravate this problem." Wai-tsai continued to describe his feeling 
towards Hong Kong's changes after the handover. He said, � 
Walking along the Avenue of Stars [a footpath along the Tsim Sha Tsui 
waterfront], I noticed some large Chinese advertisements on the opposite 
side of the [Victoria] harbour. I really like the large and bright banners of 
brand names written in English. The ones written in simplified Chinese are 
like flaws in the scene. The Victoria night scene looks better without them, 
the simplified Chinese characters "mainlandize" it. 
Apart from the increasing number of mainlanders and simplified Chinese 
characters used in Hong Kong, many Hong Kong people also criticized mainland 
Chinese's behaviors. Fig.4.5 is a scene captured from a video on youtube, the 
person who took this video says, "Mong Kok MTR station is occupied 
(leuhnhaahm),” commenting on the mainlanders' behave ors - sitting on stairs 
and handrails, blocking the pathways. 
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Fig. 4.5'. The above two pictures are captured from a video clip on youtube named, "The Ugliness 
of mainlanders in Mong Kok丨旺角大陸人的醜陋). 
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The Local Mass Media 
In her Media in Hong Kong, Carol Lai (2007) studies the relation between 
the media and the power structures from 1967 to 2005, focusing on press 
freedom and political changes. She mentions the Hong Kong Journalists 
Association had condemned the erosion of freedom of expression, and the 
political control，economic corruption and suppression of the media (Lai 2007: 
117). She gives some examples on how Chinese leaders and provincial officials 
criticize the Hong Kong press, how mainland Chinese people use economic 
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sanctions or benefits to control the media, and how the journalists adjust to the 
new political regime and start self-censoring (Lai 2007). 
Although freedom of speech has been significantly reduced, Hong Kong's 
mass media remain comparatively free. According to the Worldwide Press 
Freedom Index (see also Mathews et al. 2008: 61), Hong Kong ranked eighteen 
out of 139 countries in 2002, which dropped sharply to fifty-six out of 166 
countries in 2003. It rose back to thirty-four out of 167 countries in 2004, and 
thirty-nine in 2005. In 2006，Hong Kong dropped to fifty-eight out of 168 
countries. It ranked sixty-one out of 168 countries in 2007, fifty-one out of 173 
countries in 2008，and rose to forty-nine out of 175 countries in 2009，lower than 
Japan but higher than other East Asian countries. One of my informants shared 
his views towards the changes on the mass media that he had noticed, Ah-nap, 28 
years old, "It's easy to notice which newspaper is pro-Beijing or which one has a 
more neutral political standpoint. The pro-Beijing ones sometimes really distort � 
the truth, they're simply unreadable." Another informant, Chris, 25 years old， 
told me，“I feel uneasy with the national anthem that the TV broadcasts at 
6:30pm before the evening news. I also strongly dislike the video accompanying 
the anthem, portraying only the positive sides of mainland China." The changes 
in the vocabulary used by the mass media are also discussed sometimes, such as 
terms for mainlanders and terms for mainland China. This is one of the proof for 
the mass media's self-censoring. 
Mathews et al. (2008) also elucidate the market power over the media and 
demonstrate the potential profits of the large Chinese market which lures certain 
media producers to fit the market's needs. The rapid economic development in 
mainland China, its participation in large international events such as the 
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Olympics and World Expositions, and glorious results from international 
sporting events are often emphasized and reported by the mass media as reasons 
that one should be proud of being Chinese and a citizen under the rule of the 
Chinese government. 
‘ 
On the other hand, the mass media continues to depict mainlanders as 
"unethical" and their behaviors as "humiliating", although they are portrayed as 
less repugnant compared to portrayals in the 1980s. Examples from recent 
reports include poisonous food production, and chaotic pictures of mainlanders at 
the World Exposition in Shanghai. Therefore, how the mass media portrays the 
events that happened in the Mainland depends much on the journals' political 
standpoint. 
In sum, the changes in the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland 
China after the handover are manifested in political, economic and social 
respects. The political changes include the introduction of legislation about the 
national safety and the increasing political involvement among Hong Kong 
people. The economic changes involve the fall of the HKD's value in relation to 
RMB and the reversion of economic "reliance". The growing number of 
mainland Chinese in Hong Kong, the increasing use of simplified Chinese 
characters, and the mounting control over mass media account for the social 
changes. � 
The Cultural Identity of Heunggongyahn 
Squeezed between the British, which gave it its institutions, and China, with . 
which it shares rich history and culture, Hong Kong is trying to come to 
grips with the reality that it is neither one nor the other. (Sharma 1997) 
Abundant research has been done on the shaping of the distinct cultural 
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identity of heunggongyahn, including its formation process, meanings and 
functions. The introductory chapter gave a brief overview of this shaping process. 
This section tracks and summarizes the emergence and shaping of the cultural 
identity of heunggongyahn in chronological order. I examine the significant 
constituents in the shaping and reinforcing this distinct identity, including major 
historical events and governmental policies in both local and international 
contexts. The knotty relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China is 
also explored. 
Until 1949，the border between Hong Kong and mainland China was open; 
T 
people could move in and out of China to Hong Kong freely without regulation 
(Tsang 2004: 180-1). The Canton-Hong Kong Strike took place in 1925 and 1926; 
around 100,000 Hong Kong workers returned to mainland China until the strike 
ended (Fung 2003: 422; Cheng and Wong 2004: 7). In 1931, about two-thirds of 
the Chinese population in Hong Kong was migrants from mainland China � 
(Skeldon 1994: 22). In the late 1930s, it was estimated that around eight 
thousand people per day moved across the border between Hong Kong and 
mainland China (Skeldon 1994: 22). The Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 
1937. Until 1941, thousands of refugees from mainland China fled to Hong Kong, 
which doubled Hong Kong's population to 1,639,337 (ibid.; Cheng and Wong 
2004: 7)33. Hong Kong was then occupied by Japan between 1942 and 1945，and 
residents in Hong Kong returned or went to mainland China for shelter, and some 
were repatriated to neighboring districts (Cheng and Wong 2004: 7; Kwan 2003: 
615). The population decreased to around 650,000 (Skeldon 1994: 22). After 
Japan surrendered in 1945, the Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946. As a result, 
33 The influx of mainlanders to Hong Kong was not something new in the 1970s, yet the swarm 
of mainlanders entering Hong Kong was not considered a threat to Hong Kong people or Hong 
Kong society. 
• 1 2 4 
many refugees fled to Hong Kong (Cheng and Wong 2004: 7) and the population 
rose back to over one million (Skeldon 1994: 22) With a large population's 
frequent entry and exit, Hong Kong became known as a "rootless city" (Cheng 
and Wong 2004: 7). Many Chinese residents were short-term migrants who had 
no attachment to Hong Kong, and would return to China after making sufficient 
money (Skeldon 1994:22; Cheng and Wong 2004: 120). The identity as 
heunggongyahn did not exist. 
The Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 by the 
Communist Party. The resulting influx of political and economic refugees from 
mainland China rapidly increased Hong Kong's population to over two million 
(Skeldon 1994: 22). Concerned that the territory would be overwhelmed by both 
refugees fleeing and Communist spies assisting the new Communist regime, the 
British instituted formal checkpoints and cut direct rail links in 1950，and 
registered all Hong Kong people (Share 2007: 125). Many Hong Kong residents, 
however, still carried strong "Chinese identity" and were reluctant to register a 
"Hong Kong identity" under the colonial government (Cheng and Wong 2004: 
147). The PRC，in response to the British government's policies, closed their ,side 
of the border (Share 2007: 125)35. Cross-border movement was limited to Hong 
Kong residents returning for visits (Skeldon 1994: 23). Since then, all return 
visitors have had to apply for the "Mainland Travel Permit for Hong Kong and 
Macau R e s i d e n t s " (回証T h e mainland travel permit, as argued by Cheng 
34 The Chinese Civil War first broke out in 1927 between the Kuomintang (the Chinese 
Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist Party. The civil war was suspended due to Japan's 
invasion of China in 1937. 
35 Determining the year when the border was closed is controversial. According to Share (2007: 
125), the PRC closed their side of the border in 1951. According to Tsang (2007: 193), the 
Sino-British border was closed in 1950，and the Hong Kong government operated only on a fairly 
liberal basis towards illegal immigrants from mainland China..According to Carroll (2007: 140)， 
the colonial government in Hong Kong limited the number of Chinese people from the mainland 
in May 1950，and in February 1951，the Chinese government began to control migration to 
Guangzhou. However, Carroll did not mention the close of border. 
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and Wong (2004), socially and legally excluded mainland migrants in Hong 
Kong who planned to reside "temporarily" in Hong Kong and return to their 
homeland — mainland China - after making enough money. Thus the Mainland 
Travel Permit hindered Hong Kong people's sense of belonging to mainland 
China. 
The United Nations, pressured by the United States and its allied countries, 
imposed an embargo on mainland China in 1951, in reaction to China's 
intervention in the Korean War (Albinski 1965; Mark 2004: 150). Under this 
sanction, Hong Kong was unable to maintain itself as an entrepot connecting 
China with "Western" countries and thereby it shifted to the manufacture of 
labor-intensive consumer goods for export (Salaff et al. 2010: 19). This created 
conditions for Hong Kong's economy and society to develop apart from 
mainland China (Ku 2004，Cheng and Wong 2004; Salaff et al. 2010: 19). During 
that period, there was no distinct sense of cultural identity of heunggongyahn nor � 
was there a demarcation between heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn; refugees 
from mainland China were treated as compatriots. Discrimination against 
mainland Chinese at that time was almost unheard of. 
The Great Leap Forward was initiated in 1958 by Mao Zedong, with the aim 
of industrializing China by concentrating on the production of grain and steel, 
but it ended in 1961 and did not achieve its expected goal. Hit hard by natural 
disasters such as droughts, it resulted in severe starvation in China. It was 
estimated that 16.5 million to 30 million people starved to death (Peng 1987:649; 
Kung and Lin 2003: 51). Many mainland Chinese people fled and sought support 
from relatives in Hong Kong (Skeldon 1994: 23). A touch-base policy was 
adopted in 1962 by the Hong Kong government, only allowing illegal 
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immigrants to stay if they reached the urban areas and met their relatives (Ma 
2002: 205; Cheng and Wong 2004: 124) ^^ The Cultural Revolution broke out in 
mainland China in 1966 and lasted for ten years. Millions of mainland Chinese 
people were persecuted and tortured during this period (MacFarquhar and 
Schoenhals 2006: 258) Many mainland refugees fled to Hong Kong under the 
fear of being persecuted and were treated as compatriots. Some Hong Kong 
Chinese even waited for their mainland relatives in the New Territories (Cheng 
and Wong 2004: 149). Hong Kong, in the 1960s，was still an open refugee 
society (Ku 2004). 
The establishment of Hong Kong City Hall in 1962 was aimed at drawing 
Hong Kong people together into an integrated community. Yet, the aim was not 
achieved; the City Hall only gathered a small group of middle-class people whilst 
the majority of "refugees", "working class" and even the British themselves were 
indifferent to it (Turner 2003: 24). It was not until 1967 that the Hong Kong 
identity was more consciously identified and shared among Hong Kong people. 
Star Ferry's fee increase triggered some Hong Kong people to protest against the 
company and its policy, and this led to the 1967 riots^^. Tsang argues that the 
‘ 
36 "Urban areas" means the Kowloon Peninsula and Hong Kong Island. Hong Kong is basically 
divided into three main regions: Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula and the New 
Territories. Hong Kong Island consists of areas such as Central, Wan Chai and Admiralty, and is 
labeled as the historical, political and economic centre of Hong Kong, and thus is believed as 
"superior". The night view of the Hong Kong Island is also officially used as a representative ‘ ； 
icon of Hong Kong. The Kowloon Peninsula consists of areas such as Tsim Sha Tsui and Mong 
Kok, and is more a local residential and industrial region. The New Territories comprises the 
largest areas of land in Hong Kong, many areas in places such as Yuen Long and Sheung Shui are 
used as agricultural lands. The New Territories is thus often neglected in urban development and 
is comparatively isolated as "inferior". The New Territories geographically connects to the border 
of mainland China, and therefore most mainland migrants, both legal and illegal, first reached the 
New Territories before finding their relatives in "urban areas". 
37 Exact number of death varies in different research, but an article published in late 1967 in a 
Hong Kong magazine reports that 4,950 people were killed within two months in Daoxian 
County, Hunan Province (Yang 2006: 96). . 
38 Star Ferry is a local ferry service company that operates ferries across the Victoria Harbor, 
connecting Tsim Sha Tsui with Central and Wan Chai. It is a form of public transport used by '> 
many people in Hong Kong. 
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riots had tremendous impacts on identity formation and consciousness and 
marked the birth of a distinct Hong Kong identity (Tsang 2004: 183; see also 
Mathews et al. 2008: 33). 
To calm Hong Kong people's discontent after the 1967 riots, the former 
Hong Kong governor, Lord Murray MacLehose, launched a series of localization 
policies in the 1970s, such as providing public hosing，medical services and 
compulsory education (Salaff et al. 2010: 19)39. MacLehose's prompt and 
effective reactions to Hong Kong's social problems gained support from the local 
community, which intrinsically bound the British colonial government and the 
local Hong Kong Chinese (Mathews et al. 2008: 39). Six-year free compulsory 
education was introduced in 1971，and was extended to nine years in 1978 
(Salaff et al. 2010: 19)4�. The free education paved the way for Hong Kong's 
economic and political development. This civic education followed an apolitical 
and an anationalistic ideology, which molded students into residents of Hong � 
Kong rather than citizens (Tse 2004: 56). 
Furthermore, in 1972, the Hong Kong government distinguished Hong 
Kong permanent residents from immigrants and tightened the entry policy by 
issuing permanent residents identity card 4 � ( K u 2004: 344). The Hong Kong 
government also clarified permanent residents' rights and identity (Cheng and 
Wong 2004: 127). With this act, the Hong Kong government no longer treated 
39 Murray MacLehose was the 25出 Hong Kong governor, from 1971 to 1982. He was famous and 
popular among Hong Kong people, and some of my informants still remember him. 
40 Fee compulsory education was further extended to 12 years in 2008. 
41 The permanent residence identity card in the 1970s categorized people according to their 
resided years in Hong Kong. Permanent resident mean people who had resided in Hong Kong for 
over seven years. Their ID card had a black stamp, representing their right of abode. In contrast, 
the identity card for those who had not resided for over seven years had a green stamp, marking a 
"new immigrant" label on them. According to Cheng and Wong, Hong Kong people with the 
"black stamp" started to distinguish themselves from and discriminated against people with the 
"green stamp" (2004: 152). In other words, "permanent residents" began to position themselves 
in opposition to "new immigrants". 
mainland immigrants as Hong Kong Chinese people's equals (Cheng and Wong 
2004: 128). Also, Hong Kong people started to distinguish themselves from 
mainland Chinese during this era. Thus, the clarification of Hong Kong identity 
plus the use of the "Mainland Travel Permit" officially fortified the 
heunggongyahn identity. Ku (2004: 346) also argues that "the identity category 
of Hong Kong belonger was a by-product of the exclusionary immigration and 
citizenship policy of the British government". 
In the late 1970s，right before the abolition of the touch-base policy, 
approximately half a million mainland Chinese inmiigrated to Hong Kong 
(Skeldon 1994: 23). In the meantime, the economy of Hong Kong developed and 
the government started providing social services in education and housing in the 
1970s. Hong Kong Chinese people began adopting hostile views towards 
mainlanders, as they felt these new immigrants were taking away their social 
benefits and creating social problems (Mathews et al. 2008: 37; Cheng and Wong 
2004: 150). To defend themselves, the notion of heunggongyahn gradually 
emerged to distinguish "themselves" from these "newly immigrated 
daaihlohkyahn'' (Ma 2002)42. Ma argues that television programs in this era, had 
a significant role in shaping Hong Kong Chinese's cultural identity by 
contrasting Hong Kong Chinese with mainland Chinese and creating a sense of 
"us" and "them" (Ma 2002: 681). The effects of the mass media in constructing ^ 
the senses of superiority and inferiority will be illustrated in this chapter's 
following sections. 
In 1980，as mentioned earlier, the touch-base policy for illegal immigrants • 
from mainland China was abolished since this policy did not check the influx of 
42 The indigenous cultural identity of heunggongyahn emerged in the 1960s and 1970s involves 
no nationalist imperatives (Ma 2002: 84). The sense of heunggongyahn did not encourage Hong 
Kong people to view Hong Kong as a nation. 
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immigrants (Lui 2002: 670). Those who were intercepted at the boundary would 
be repatriated back to mainland China immediately. Legal immigration from 
mainland China remained limited. Under the quota system, around 27,000 
immigrants per annum were allowed to settle in Hong Kong (Skeldon 1994: 23). 
Mathews et al. argue that the abolishment of the touch-base policy firmly closed 
its doors to mainland migrants, creating a political and social boundary from 
mainland China (2008: 38). Moreover, immigrants who arrived before 23 
October 1980 were allowed to register for a Hong Kong identity card (HKID 
card). Those who had registered for a HKID card successfully began to adopt a 
legitimate Hong Kong identity as heunggongyahn, which legally separated them 
from mainland Chinese people (Cheng and Wong 2004: 147). 
In 1982，eighteen Districts Boards were set up, and a degree of 
representative government was introduced in the same year (Tai 1999: 50; Tse 
2004: 56). The return of Hong Kong's sovereignty from Britain to the PRC was � 
confirmed when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984. Many 
Hong Kong people were unprepared and unwilling to accept such changes. It was 
reflected in surveys and letters that many Hong Kong people hoped to maintain 
the status quo, yet neither the Chinese nor the British governments paid much 
heed to their views (Scott I. 1989: 208). In the meantime, the Hong Kong 
government quickened the pace of democratization. In 1985, the government 
introduced the first indirect election of the Legislative Councilors (LegCo) (Liu 
f 
and Yue 1996: 1). In 1989, the Tiananmen Square Protests broke out, with 
Beijing students' demands for democracy. The protests lasted for almost two 
months, and were finally suppressed by the PRC's troops and tanks from the 
People's Liberal Army (PLA). The forceful reaction by the PRC aroused 
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"anxieties", "anguish" and "frustration" among Hong Kong people towards the 
imminent return of Hong Kong to mainland China (Lau 2000: 273). Over a 
million Hong Kong Chinese demonstrated on the streets of Hong Kong to voice 
their support for the democracy movement, and to express opposition against 
reunification (Salaff et al. 2010: 24). The cultural identity of heunggongyahn was 
thus reinforced. The pace of democratic reform in Hong Kong was pushed 
forward in May 1989 with the suggestion that the directly elected seats in the 
Legislative Council be increase from 10 seats to 20 seats (one-third), and 30 seats 
in 1995 (half) and 60 seats in 2003 (the whole). Free civil education, launched in 
the 1970s, bore the responsibility of ensuring that Hong Kong's citizens 
exercised their right to vote (Tse 2004: 56)，which further fortified their distinct 
cultural identity of Hongkongers as opposed to mainlanders. 
Witnessing the Hong Kong government's success in facilitating economic 
development and enhancing social stability, the Hong Kong populace, especially 
those who grew up in the post-war decades, have strengthened their attachment 
towards Hong Kong and the Hong Kong government. New senses of pride and 
superiority gradually emerged, as a result (Mathews et al. 2008: 38). The sense of 
heunggongyahn grew even stronger. During this period, popular films continued 
with negative portrayals of mainland Chinese as "lethal invaders threatening the 
well-being and continuity of the colony" (Ma 2002: 84). � 
After the Tiananmen incident, the sense of heunggongyahn was reinforced. 
More Hong Kong Chinese asked for a faster paced towards democratization to 
avoid Beijing's "intrusion" (Thomas 1999: 207 — 208). In 1990, the Basic Law 
was adopted to quell fears and anxieties associated with the reversion. It grants 
Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy and guarantees "no change" in Hong 
i l31 
Kong's way of life for fifty years, although it also ensures the PRC's absolute 
sovereignty (Salaffet al. 2010: 24). The first direct LegCo election took place as 
scheduled in 1991. Many Hong Kong Chinese did not support the reversion to 
mainland China, and this was reflected in the election results. Political groups 
labeled "pro-Beijing forces" failed to win any seats (So 2000: 372). 
During this period, a series of movies called Her Fatal Ways (表姐，你好 
fl野！）were shown publicly. Similar to the aforementioned TV drama The Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly, mainlanders' behavior in this series was continued to be 
depicted as "stupid", "indecent" and "dirty"; though Ma (2002) argues that the 
protrayal of the mainland characters in this movie were more sympathetic. The 
distinct identity of heunggongyahn became apparent. On the cusp of the 
handover, while more mainlanders immigrated to Hong Kong, the number of 
Hong Kong overseas emigrants increased rapidly. In the early 1980s, the 
emigration figure was an average of 20,000 per annum, then rose to 30,000 in 
1987，45,800 in 1988，60,000 in 1990 and 66,000 in 1992 (Skeldon 1994:; see 
also57Mathews et al. 2008: 44). Most of the migrants feared that their way of life 
would be under strict control after 1997. After the handover, there was greater 
emphasis on the subject "Chinese history" in the school curriculum. Former 
Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa said in his Policy Address in 1997: 
We will incorporate the teaching of Chinese values in the school curriculum 
and provide more opportunities for students to leam about Chinese history 
and culture. This will foster a stronger sense of Chinese identity in our 
students... As we face the historic change of being reunited with China, for 
every individual there is a gradual process of getting to know Chinese 
history and culture, so as to achieve a sense of belonging. (Kan 2007: 1) 
The subject "Chinese history", which was then a "source of cultural revival 
and self-respect (ibid.)，is one of the political tools in enhancing the "sense of 
belonging" and "Chinese identity" among Hong Kong people. 
In the 2000s, most of my informants - the fourth generation, post-80s -
were growing up with a distinct identity as heunggongyahn or Hong Kong 
Chinese. In 2005, the government launched a campaign called "I love China" for 
kindergarten school students, which was aimed to "teach" them to love their 
country (Mathews et al. 2008: 86). 
The distinct identity of heunggongyahn or Hong Kong Chinese is also 
reflected in the 2009 East Asian Games. Many Hong Kong Chinese felt happy 
and proud that the Hong Kong team won the women's team championship in the 
ping pong competition against the national team from China. 
Many surveys have been done to show the attitudes of Hong Kong people 
towards their cultural identities. A survey done in 1985 showed that 59.5 percent 
of respondents identified themselves as Hongkongese，and 36.2 percent as 
Chinese (Mathews et al. 2008: 11; see also Lau and Kuan 1988: 178). However, 
this single survey does not tell much about Hong Kong people. Degolyer (2007: 
29) summarizes the changing trend in Hong Kong people's identities from 1993 
to 2003. From chart 4.1, the respondents identifying themselves as Hong Kong 
people (H) remained to be the largest group, around 40 percent to 45 percent, 
while the percentage of Hong Kong Chinese (J) diminished from 35 percent in 
Feb 1993 to 26 percent in November 2003. The percentage of Hong Kong people 
identifying themselves as Chinese (B) remained around 20 percent to 30 percent ^ 
between 1993 to 2003. The chart also shows that the percentage of respondents 
identifying themselves as Hong Kong British (F) dwindled. Degolyer (2007) 
only shows data till year 2003 which is not updated, so I include some surveys 
done from year 2005 to 2009. These surveys, however, are done by different 
social institutions with different target respondents, and thus these numbers can 
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only be references. 
In 2005, Hong Kong Transition Project conducted another survey, showing 
that 39 percent of respondents identified themselves as "Hongkongese”，29 
percent as "Chinese" and 27 percent as "Hong Kong Chinese" (Mathews et al. 
2008: 11). In 2006, Hong Kong University conducted a survey of 3,993 fifteen 
year-old secondary school students on how they saw themselves: 39.4 percent of 
respondents identified themselves as “Hongkongese, but also Chinese"; 28.7 
percent as "Hongkongese"; 22.3 percent as "Chinese, but also Hongkongese"; 
and 9.6 percent as "Chinese" (Wen Wei Pao 2006). The majority of Hong Kong 
people still identify themselves as "Hongkonger" yet compared to the 1990s，the 
percentage fell significantly. Meanwhile, the percentage identifying as "Hong 
Kong Chinese" increased significantly. In 2009，the University of Hong Kong 
conducted another survey of 1,007 Hong Kong citizens. The survey found out 
that the sense of "Hongkongese" had increased to its highest point since 2000. 38 � 
percent of the respondents identified themselves as "Hongkongese", 24 percent 
as "Chinese"; 14 percent as "China's Hongkongese"; and 13 percent as "Hong 
Kong's Chinese" (Sing Pao 2009). 
Nevertheless, the above surveys, including Degolyer's chart and other social 
institutions', show that many Hong Kong people still identified themselves as 
heunggongyahn even though some of them identified themselves as both. In the 
subsequent sections of this chapter and the ensuing chapter，I will explain how 
the distinct cultural identity affects the way they perceive mainland Chinese. 
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134 
50 I I I 丨 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
. . y .. .X u 
. / r t }• J B 
30 ——S^� _ • - T 
S V H A J . B . - J - J - ^ J ^ , J H 




Feb Aue ftb Aug Feb Aus Feb July Feb June Jan Apr July Oct Apr July Nov Apr Aut Nov Apr July Nov Apr Au j Nov Nov 
93 93 94 94 95 95 96 96 97 97 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 00 00 00 01 01 01 02 02 02 03 
M o n t h / Y e a r 
Chart 4.1: Hong Kong people's changing identities from Feb 93 to Nov 03 (Degolyer 2007: 29). 
B=Chinese，J=HK Chinese, H=HK people, F=HK British, N=Overseas Chinese, 
E=Others 
In conclusion, a number of factors including political, economic and 
historical were explored to account for the emergence of the distinct identity of 
heunggongyahn. In the next section, I turn to the middle-class mentality in the 
identity of heunggongyahn. To a large extent, this sheds light on the situations of 
mainlanders and their relations with Hong Kong people in Hong Kong. 
Senses of “Superiority，，and “Inferiority，， 
Colonialism was founded on the notion of the European colonizers ‘ cultural 
superiority. The introduction of European institutions gave the colonized a ‘ 
new sense of belonging. Their pride in the cosmopolitan culture that 
Colonialism created on their soil came at the expense of their traditional 
culture. (Salaff et al 2010:11) 
A distinct cultural identity does not necessarily constitute a social hierarchy. 
Rather, it is the senses of superiority and inferiority associated with cultural … 
identities that produce the hierarchy. The invisible social hierarchy in Hong Kong 
demonstrates this. This section turns to the sense of superiority shared by Hong 
•135 
Kong people and the sense of inferiority imposed upon mainlanders. "Rise in 
National Identity a 'Two Systems' Success ” {South China Morning Post [SCMP] 
2007) summarizes the reasons for feeling proud as a citizen of Hong Kong: "Our 
freedoms, economic success, good governance, strong rule of law, low levels of 
corruption and value of life mark us starkly from our mainland cousins." As 
Mathews et al. argue, "This new Hong Kong identity was built, in part, by 
suppressing any sense of loyalty to the Chinese nation, and by stigmatizing 
mainlanders as outsiders lacking the positive values Hong Kong people attributed 
to themselves" (2008: 63). Here, I explore the sense of superiority through 
various factors: economic differences, levels of corruption, mass media's 
portrayals, freedom and rights, and the long period of separations between 
mainland China and Hong Kong. 
ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES � 
Indirectly benefiting from the embargo imposed on mainland China by the 
US in the 1950s, Hong Kong's major economic activity shifted from re-export to 
manufacturing. The influx of mainland Chinese during the 1950s and 1960s 
provided cheap experienced labor. Meanwhile, Shanghai industrialists diverted 
their textile, machinery, capital, and skills to Hong Kong (Wong and Cheng 2004: 
141; Salaff et al. 2010: 19). The manufacturing sector thrived rapidly, and the 
economy of Hong Kong in the 1970s was prosperous. "Made in Hong Kong" 
was even granted a world-recognized label for good quality and cheap price 
(Cheng and Wong 2004: 141). Hong Kong had thus become a major center of 
manufacturing for Western countries (Skeldon 1994: 9). Furthermore, mainland 
China adopted an open door policy in the late 1970s. Taking the role as a 
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middleman in commodity and services trade, such as tourism, financial services 
and business consultancy, the economy of Hong Kong was further boosted and 
enhanced (Sung 1991: 26). Hong Kong is included as one of the "four little 
dragons" (Vogel 1991: Ezra Vogel adds, "As Hong Kong's success widened 
the gap with the other side of the border, the preference of the city state's 
residents for Hong Kong over China grew stronger, thus increasing de facto the 
support for local government" (1991: 70). 
In contrast, the economic development of mainland China was 
comparatively slower. The sanctions imposed on mainland China in the 1950s, 
the introduction of a planned economy, the PRC's Great Leap Forward, and the 
Cultural Revolution all encumbered its economic development. In 1978，270 
million mainland Chinese lived below the poverty line, accounting for 28 percent 
of the total population (Lardy 1998: 1). In the same year, Deng Xiaoping 
launched economic reforms that adopted radical initiatives to external economic 
relations, which increased foreign trade and foreign capital flows (Yeh 1993: 
124). By 1985，the number of people living below the poverty line fell sharply to 
97 million, less than 10 percent of the population (Lardy 1998: 1). Foreign direct 
investment rose on average by 30 percent p.a. from 1985 to 1990 (Ash and Kueh 
1996: 7). Although the economy of mainland China developed rapidly in the 
1980s and 1990s, Hong Kong was still comparatively better developed. 
Furthermore, while "made in Hong Kong" was considered a symbol of good 
quality，"made in China" was associated with poor quality. News about the 
United States recalling "made in China" products is often reported. Reasons for • 
recall, according to the US Consumer Product Safety Committee, include 
43 The "four little dragons", or "Asian tigers", is the term used to describe the strong economic 






products violating lead paint standards, products failing the fire and burn test, 
and products that are choking hazards. Although many argue that the US 
government is operating with a hidden political agenda by frequently reporting 
these recalls, this issue will not be discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, the label 
"made in China" is often linked with "poor quality" and many Hong Kong 
people see mainland products as unsafe. This hinders many Hong Kong people 
from developing a deeper sense of belonging to mainland China. 
In sum, the success of Hong Kong's economy in the 1980s and 1990s, to a 
large extent, has contributed to the shaping of the sense of superiority among 
Hong Kong Chinese people. 
LEVELS OF CORRUPTION 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was established 
in Hong Kong in 1974 and has successfully brought corruption under control � 
(Mathews et al. 2008: 39). This attracted foreign investors and boosted the local 
economy by providing a clean business environment. On the contrary, the 
endemic corruption in mainland China is notorious. Regardless of the rapid 
economic development that mainland China has achieved since the economic 
reform, He Li argues that corruption has hindered the growth of mainland China 
(2005: 205). Political reform lagged behind economic reform，and this has 
provided opportunities and motivations for corrupt pursuits in the loosened 
economy (Sun 1999:2). The most recent and catastrophic cases have been "tofu 
buildings” (poorly constructed buildings) in the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and 
the Chinese milk scandal (harmful chemicals like melamine were found in milk 
powder) in the same year. In a survey conducted in 2005，72 percent of Hong 
» 
Kong respondents felt that "some affairs happening in China make me feel 
ashamed" (Mathews et al. 2008: 81). Corruption is one of these "affairs". 
Reading about the recent Qinghai earthquake in April 2010, one of my 
informants, Paul, 28 years old, said, "In the same way, many students were killed 
and buried by the ruins of the collapsed buildings in Sichuan earthquake of 2008. 
Most incidents like this reveal the serious corruption problem in mainland China. 
I feel really ashamed." The connection between mainland China and a 
"shameful" feeling will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
In short, endemic corruption in mainland China has impeded the cultivation 
of sense of belonging among Hong Kong people towards mainland China. 
MASS MEDIA'S PORTRAYALS 
Popular media, as argued by Ma (1999) and Mathews et al. (2008)，is one of 
the crucial factors in shaping the distinct Hong Kong identity in the 1970s. As 
mentioned earlier, the TV soap opera, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (網中人)， 
stigmatized mainland Chinese people as being "stupid", "backward" and "lazy", 
in contrast to Hong Kong Chinese, who were depicted as being "smart", 
"knowledgeable" and "hard-working". Mathews, et al. believe that A Chaan's 
stigmatization also shows something particular about Hong Kong: "the newly 
emergent Hong Kong sense of proper public behavior, as linked to Hong Kong's ^ 
emergence as a society of affluent, sophisticated consumers in the 1970s and 
1980s" (2008: 64). The connection between the distinct Hong Kong cultural 
identity and behavior is discussed in the previous chapters. In an interview in the • 
program "Re-Discovering Hong Kong" on Radio Television Hong Kong One 
(RTHK 1)，Lawrence Wong Wang-Chi and Timothy Ka-ying Wong expressed 
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their concerns over Hong Kong people's sense of superiority that separates 
mainland Chinese people from “themselves，，44. This interview was summarized 
in an article, "Identify yourself; Several Surveys have attempted to determine 
shifts in Hong Kong people's sense of identity since 1997" {South China 
Morning Post [SCMPJ 2005), 
For Professor Lawrence Wong, the "we" and "they" distinction is worrying 
as some Hong Kong people may regard the identity description of 
"Chinese" as a substitute for "mainlanders", who they look down upon as 
country bumpkins'. He was particularly upset by local media's portrayal of 
the behavior of mainland tourists on the opening day of the Disney theme 
park. "The focus was on the adults smoking and squatting, and the children 
urinating in the street." He said Hong Kong people should not make a fuss 
over their differences with mainlanders, lest they develop a "greater Hong 
Kong mentality" of feeling superior to mainlanders. 
"[Timothy Wong] said that Hong Kong people's sense of superiority had 
severe beating after the Asian financial crisis plunged the city into a 
prolonged recession. Hong Kong people's sense of pride about their identity 
remains strong, but it has become more subdued than it was before the 
handover, when the economy was at its peak". 
Both Lawrence Wong and Timothy Wong mentioned the effects of the mass � 
media in contributing to the sense of superiority among Hong Kong people. In 
Chapter 5,1 will discuss in detail the effects of mass media and its portrayals of 
mainland Chinese. 
FREEDOM AND RIGHTS 
Freedom and rights are also one factor that constitutes the sense of 
superiority among Hong Kong Chinese. Anthony Fung and Anthony Cheung 
were interviewed by the Financial Times (2008)，and the reporter summarized 
the interview and wrote, 
44 Radio Television Hong Kong.(RTHK) is a public broadcasting organization in Hong Kong. It 
was set up in 1928 by the government under the Broadcasting Authority and gained independence 
in 1945. It changed names several times before becoming RTHK in 1976, as it started producing 
television programs in the 1970s. 
For the most part, Hong Kong residents and their forebears came to the city 
from the mainland last century because of the opportunities and protections 
it afforded while China was roiled by war and communist campaigns. Hong 
Kong's relative freedom and prosperity bred a sense of superiority. 
My informant, Paul, 28 years old, recalled his experience in mainland China 
as a tourist, "When I travelled to mainland [China], I was questioned a few times 
by mainlanders about the freedom in Hong Kong. Usually I told them that I 
could search for all sorts of information on the internet without being censored." 
Fat-wai，28 years old, also has a similar comment, "Friends in mainland China 
described an incident in which the censoring system in mainland China had 
collapsed for a few days, and many of them [mainland Chinese] spent hours 
searching and reading information that was blocked, such as June fourth45. We 
[Hong Kong Chinese], living in Hong Kong, are much luckier. We can leam 
about everything from the internet." 
Another informant, May, 26 years old, said, "I guess daaihlohkyahn are 
quite envious of us since we [Hong Kong Chinese] can vote. We have the right to 
vote. I know some of the mainland Chinese may not like the Communist party, 
but they have no way to express their discontent. You know, they use "Celestial 
Empire"(天草月）to describe mainland China's present situation - one party rules 
the whole country under authoritarian rule'^ .^ 
The recent cases of Liu Xiaobo and Tan Zuoren, which will be discussed 
V ； 
later, further accentuate the differences in freedoms and rights between Hong 
"June fourth" means the June Fourth Incident, which is also known as the Tiananmen Square 
Protest. It took place in mainland China in 1989. The coverage of the incident is banned in 
mainland China. This incident would be further discussed in the next chapter. 
46 The expression "Celestial Empire" is used to describe the Communist Party in China, with its 
absolute authoritarian rule. People in ancient China believe in son of God, thinking that the 
emperor and the king, under feudalism, must be chosen by God with royal blood, so people 
should not overthrow the king but obey the king as the supreme leader. "Celestial Empire", since 
dissidents in mainland China may be accused for treason and subversion, is used as a metaphor 
for the totalitarian rule in China. 
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Kong Chinese and mainland Chinese. 
THE LONG SEPARATION 
The long separation could be viewed from several angles: political, social, 
and cultural. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the political takeover of Hong 
Kong by Britain from mainland China did not stop communication between 
members of both societies before the 1950s. The closing of the border officially 
checked the flow of people. Differences between the two places started to emerge. 
Hans W. Y. Yeung recapitulated the history of the sense of superiority {SCMP 
2004), 
！ 
Even many ardent leftists in Hong Kong were disheartened after the 1967 
riots. Some of the wealthiest supporters of Beijing left Hong Kong for 
homes in North America and made sure their children were out of harm's 
way. Ironically, as the city shivered while watching the mainland degenerate 
into a welter of spite and terror, that latent sense of a Hong Kong identity 
started to take toot. There was a sense of superiority, which was the basis of 
the growing feeling of being a people apart. � 
The generation born in Hong Kong after 1950 had maintained no 
connections with the mainland. They were simply disinterested. If they had 
any feelings towards the mainland, as they saw it on television or at the 
movies, it was one of disdain. The media largely depicted mainlanders as 
impoverished, dumb, and bloodthirsty. In compensation, young people in 
the city began to feel a strong sense of local identity based on superiority. 
"We're not like that," was the obvious comparison. "We're different. We're 
better. We're from Hong Kong." 
The developing feeling of living in a sophisticated metropolitan society 
plugged into the world through global connections boosted that notion of 
superiority. Rich local cultures saw Hong Kong exporting popular films, 
music, fashions, style and ideas to other Chinese communities. 
Hong Kong took a different route from China in its economic and social 
development policies, and this produces and enlarges the social and cultural 
differences between Hong Kong and mainland China. Due to the closing of the 
border, generations born after the 1970s do not have much affection for or sense 
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of belonging to mainland China, and they mainly gain their knowledge about 
mainland China from the mass media, or family oral history. What they leam 
from history lessons and books are histories related to ancient China instead of 
recent history. The social and cultural separation hinders the sense of belonging 
to mainland China. As a result, Hong Kong people who were born after 1975 
grew up in an era with a strong sense of Hong Kong identity, and with a notion 
that Hong Kong Chinese people are superior to mainland Chinese people 
(Mathews et al. 2008: 34; Faure 1997: 103-4，115). 
To sum up, factors such as economic differences, levels of corruption, the 
mass media's portrayals, freedom and rights, and the long separations between 
Hong Kong and mainland China shape Hong Kong people's sense of superiority. 
The "Middle Class，，Mentality of Heunggongyahn 
The last section examined factors that contribute to the sense of superiority 
among Hong Kong people, and those factors, indeed, also include a middle class 
mentality in Hong Kong identity. To be precise, the identity of heunggongyahn is 
imagined as belonging to the "middle-class" whilst the identity of daaihlohkyahn 
belongs to the "lower class". In this section, I unpack and explore Hong Kong 
people's middle-class mentality, so as to understand their perception of the social \ 
positioning of heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn. 
Class was described as "absent" in Hong Kong before the mid-1980s (Chan ‘ 
2000: 99). Interviewing 1000 male household heads in 1989，Wong and Lui 
described the Hong Kong class structure as a "three-folded class scheme": 
"service", "intermediate" and "working". The "service" class included 
professionals, administrators and officials, managers and supervisors of 
non-manual employees; the "intermediate" class included non-manual employees 
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in commerce and administration, petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors, artisans, 
and contractors; .the "working" class included lower-grade technicians, manual 
workers, unskilled workers and agricultural workers. 19.9 percent of their 
respondents were listed as belonging to the "service" class; 39.5 percent were 
"intermediate" and 40.6 percent were "working" class (Wong and Lui 1992b: 
30). 
Annie Chan (2000) analyzes two of the major factors contributing to the 
growth of Hong Kong's middle class: expansion of education and economic 
restructing. Comparing the level of occupational and educational attainment 
between the 1980s and 1990s, Chan points out that members of Hong Kong's 
"new middle class" are mostly "second generation, locally born, upwardly 
mobile, have attained relatively high levels of education, are concerned about the 
future,,and are also seen as crucial to Hong Kong's economic as well as political 
development" (Chan 2000: 100; see also Cheung et al. 1988). As discussed in the � 
last section, the economy of Hong Kong developed rapidly in the 1980s and 
1990s，and many Hong Kong people grabbed opportunities in enterprise and 
became the "new rich". Drawing on Bourdieu's concept of taste in consumption 
as a form of social distinction and cultural capital, Chan argues that "Hong 
Kong's young "middle class" insist on showing their "good taste" through 
consumption. 
Eric Ma, using the specific example of alcohol consumption, argues that the 
"middle class" market has become wider to include more internal differentiation, 
and "middle class culture" became a highly regarded set of values for Hong 
Kong consumers in the 1990s (2001: 134). The "middle-class" mentality started 
to emerge and grow in the 1970s and gradually became the dominant set of 
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values in the 1990s. As Ma describes, 
During the 1970s，quite a number of Hong Kong residents had already 
experienced the first taste of becoming wealthy. But culturally speaking, the 
imagination of a middle-class life style was still less than popular in the 
Hong Kong of that time, and still only belonged to a narrow segment of this 
middle-class culture，though marginal, was growing. In the 1980s，the 
emergence of the middle-class lifestyle gradually displaced the cultural 
populism of the local working-class style. In the 1990s, an emphasis on 
sophistication, the 'tastefiil life，，and professionalism has generally evolved 
as the most high-valued norm in the consumption of luxury goods. It [the 
middle class imagination] has served to 'mainstream' Hong Kong culture in 
1990s... (2000: 132-134). 
People throughout the affluent world use taken-for-granted products such as 
alcohol to position themselves within the intricate class structures of their 
own societies (2000: 134). 
According to Lau，females, better-educated people with higher incomes; 
locally born and younger generations tended to identify themselves as 
heunggongyahn whilst male, less-educated with lower incomes, non-locally born 
and older tended to identify themselves as Chinese in the late 1980s and 1990s 
(2000: 259 - 260). Mathews et al. add another important attribute to the identity 
of heunggongyahn, and that is the close alignment with the market mentality 
(Mathews 2001; Mathews et al. 2008: 17). The "middle class" mentality thus 
embraces the sense of being "better educated", "wealthier" and of "closer 
alignment with the market mentality". 
As mentioned before, the new sense of "proper" public behavior also 
emerged during that period, when Hong Kong was becoming a more affluent 
society, with increasing sophistication and differentiation. The new "proper ‘ 
public behavior" indeed connotes the "middle class" mentality. For instance, it is 
generally believed that people who behave "properly" are "better educated" and 
are nurtured in "high class" families. However, the "middle class” mentality 
shared by the majority of Hong Kong people does.not necessarily link with their 
socio-economic status. This explains why the "new rich" from mainland China 
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are still looked down upon by many Hong Kong people, even though the rich 
mainlanders may be wealthier than them. In sum, the identity of heunggongyahn 
carries an intrinsic middle-class mentality that can be expressed through 
demeanor. 
The Return of Sovereignty: Double Colonization 
In this section, I examine how some Hong Kong people see the return of 
sovereignty to the PRC, which helps to explain why Hong Kong people are still 
reluctant to embrace mainland China emotionally. 
The mass media sometimes depict the return of sovereignty as a "joyful" 
event which Hong Kong people are "delighted" to celebrate on 1 July. The Hong 
Kong government also organizes some events like parades to commemorate the 
occasions. However, to most of my informants, the return of sovereignty only 
means a holiday. 1 July is listed as a public holiday and many of my informants � 
usually make use of this public holiday to travel. My informant, Ken, 29 years 
old, told me, "I won't celebrate the return of the sovereignty. To me, there is 
nothing worth celebrating." Another informant, Ah-nap, echoed, “1 July provides 
me with a good chance to travel. This year I am going to Cebu [the Philippines] 
with my friends. But even if I stay in Hong Kong on 1 July, I won't celebrate. 1 
July means a holiday only." One of my informants even mixed up 1 July (the 
date of handover), with 1 October (the national day of China) when I interviewed 
her. She said, "Oh, I thought 1 July is the national day of China." 
With limited affection for the handover of Hong Kong, it has even been 
described, by some people, as a double colonization, switching from a British 
colony to a Chinese colony. In her paper, Design Identity of Hong Kong: 
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Colonization, de-colonization, and re-colonization, Wendy Siuyi Wong also 
argues that 'Hong Kong is facing another form of "colonization" in PRC's way 
with both "de-colonization" and "re-colonization" taking place at the same 
time ... the new government wants to instill the people of Hong Kong with 
patriotic ideology towards PRC, the new boss of Hong Kong' (Wong n.d.:l - 2). 
Analyzing the ten years after colonialism, Lo and Pang also wrote: 
Before 1997，it was generally believed that Hong Kong, after the end of 
British Colonial rule of a hundred years, would enter a neo-colonial period 
under the authoritarian, if not authoritarian, regime of Communist China... 
the British colonial government structure - relying on not only the elitist 
rule of administrative officers but also the intimate collaboration of the 
polity and business sectors as well as the absence of universal suffrage - is 
still very much in place in post-1997 Hong Kong and is reinforced by the 
reappointed Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-Kuen, who himself was an 
administrative officer working for the ex-colonial government for more than 
thirty years (Lo and Pang 2007: 349). 
To a certain degree, Hong Kong is still ruled as a "colony", with the same 
old practices of an ex-colonial governing structure and similar groups of officers. 
As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong people use vocabularies such as leuhnhaahm, 
meaning "conquered" and "occupied", to describe the influx of mainland 
Chinese to Hong Kong, and also the handover of the sovereignty. An article 
named, “Hong Kong leuhnhaahm,(香港淪陷)(1941 - 1945, 1997written 
on January 2009，is posted on mysinablog, a free blog. Under the theme, 
"Hong Kong: ten years after the handover", one of the author's students' 
、 
compositions reminded the author about Japan's occupation of Hong Kong. To 
quote from the passage, 
After the handover to the motherland [mainland China], Hong Kong has 
launched mother tongue education. Mandarin has also become a compulsory 
subject for primary and secondary students. The aim is to allow Hong Kong 
people to get used to the fact that Hong Kong has returned to mainland 
China, and is a true part of it. We [Hong Kong people] naturally become 
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��Guomin" (national citizen), and the first priority is to speak fluent 





After the occupation by Japan, Hong Kong launched Japanese education. 
Japanese also became a compulsory subject for primary and secondary 
students. The aim was to allow Hong Kong people to get used to the fact 
that Hong Kong had been occupied and conquered by Japan, a true part of 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. We [Hong Kong people] naturally 
became�”Nipponese" (Japanese), and the first priority was to speak 




一口流利的日語——日本的國家語言° [emphasized by the author]� 
The author compares his student's composition with the Japanese 
occupation in an ironic tone and satirizes the handover of Hong Kong as an � 
occupation47. He adds，"Return for ten years is just like being occupied for ten 
years (回歸十年，彷彿输陷十年)”. 
Another article named “Hong Kong leuhnhaahm (香港滴陷)”,written on 
May 2010, is publicly posted on a free discussion forum, inmediahk.net (香港獨 
立媒體網)， 
In the last thirteen years, Hong Kong has deteriorated and worsened in 
various ways. Or to use a�Melicate" wording，is under the process of 
ongoing、、！nainlandization"... Today, should we still be obedient citizens 
who do nothing but wait to die，simply looking for adequate food for living? 
Or is it time to stand up and resist and fight back? We were born and grew 




i 47 As mentioned in Chapter 2，Hong Kong was occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945. 
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日後只求溫飽過日就算；還是係時候站起來，作出反抗，作出還擊？我 
們生於斯、長於斯的，願意看到香港論陷的一日嗎?！ [Bold in original]) 
The message of this passage is that Hong Kong would be occupied, 
leuhnhaahm, on the day Hong Kong is "mainlandized". I questioned my 
informants about the idea of "occupation" and "handover". One of my 
informants told me, "It [the handover] is pretty much the same as an occupation. 
We [Hong Kong people] didn't pick this path ourselves. In the past, the British 
set the future for us, and now, Beijing has taken their role." Another informant, 
Jordon, echoes, "The promise of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong people' 
is a lie. The Hong Kong government is under control of Beijing and the 
government officers, especially the Chief Executive, are only the puppets of the 
Beijing. Hong Kong is definitely capable of being independent and ruling itself 
without mainland China, yet we live under the threat and control of the PRC, so 
we surrender." 
In sum, this section showed that some Hong Kong people are indifferent to 
the return of sovereignty to mainland China, while some perceive it as an 
occupation by the PRC. Although the latter group may only constitute a small 
% • 
minority in the dominant discourse, their views towards the handover explain 
why they emotionally reject mainland China as their "nation", "motherland" and 
"homeland". Most of my informants, similar to the majority of Hong Kong 
people, have already accepted the handover, though they still do not emotionally 
attach themselves to mainland China, and thus they distinguish themselves from 
mainlanders. 
The Border in Our Heads: One Country, Two Castes 
They [east Germans] view themselves as outsiders in their own country, as 
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"colonized" by the West, and as "second-class citizens", while less than ten 
years ago they played central roles in their state, the German Democratic 
Republic. • 
(Smith 1998: 5) 
This section explores the "border in the heads" of Hong Kong Chinese 
people that impedes their "reunification" to mainland China and the embrace 
mainland Chinese people as part of Hong Kong society. It also examines how the 
middle-class mentality plays a part in shaping "one country, two castes". 
James Watson, in a talk on "Cold War Borders in a Post-Socialist World: 
Hong Kong/China" (2009), compared Hong Kong to Berlin, where East and 
West Berlin were separated by a physical wall. The wall was torn down on 9 
November 1989, two decades ago, yet their politics, economics and social 
differences continue to segregate and impede communication between people 
from East and West Berlin. East intellectuals use the expression "wall in the 
heads" to symbolize the communicative difficulties experienced between East 
and West Germans (McFalls 1998: 148-149). McFalls writes (1998: 147)， 
...the level of misunderstanding between East and West Germans quickly 
reached the point where the only point of agreement was that a "wall in the 
heads" continued to divide them. 
Hong Kong, like Berlin, had been politically separated from mainland China 
for over a century. Hong Kong people have gradually developed a distinct 
identity to distinguish themselves from the mainland Chinese people. Hong Kong 
was returned to mainland China in 1997 and its political sovereignty was 
transferred overnight from the British to the PRC. The border between Hong 
Kong and mainland China, however, is still present in the heads of many Hong 
1 
Kong people. To be precise, there is a "border in the heads" that separates Hong 
Kong Chinese from mainland Chinese. In the ensuing chapter, I will further 
discuss and explore how Hong Kong people's distinct cultural identity hampers ‘ 
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their sense of belonging to mainland China and fortifies their reluctance in 
accepting mainland Chinese. 
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, the issue of Hong Kong people's 
bigoted attitudes towards mainlander's behavior can not be simply understood by 
the concept of class. The problem is not concerned with resource distribution and 
allocation but rather with the sense of "superiority" shared by Hong Kong people. 
Similar to the case of East Berlin, where 74 percent of easterners had felt like 
"second-class citizens" after the reunification (DW-WORLD 2007). Even 
middle-class professional easterners had experienced the feeling of being 
"second-class citizens". Mainlanders in Hong Kong, regardless of their social 
class, are often discriminated by Hong Kong people. Some people may think that 
well-educated mainlanders are more easily to integrate into Hong Kong society 
as heunggongyahn, however newspaper and many university mainland students 
show different stories. Thirty-five mainland university students' experiences 
were collected and published as a book (Chan 2010); many of them shared their 
difficulties in joining the memberships and making friends in Hong Kong society. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3，a person's educational attainments are not shown on 
her/his face, so many Hong Kong people tend to use one's demeanor, and other 
visible signals such as language, to determine her/his cultural capital. In most of 
the cases, one has to be able to speak fluent Cantonese in order to be accepted as 
a heunggongyahn. Mainlanders, regardless of their educational attainments, are 
often perceived as "lower class" by many Hong Kong people. Therefore the 
social hierarchy between Hong Kong people and mainlanders are not built by , 
their differences in social class but their cultural identities. 
Rahul, a journalist, describes the social hierarchy between Hong Kong 
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people and mainlanders as "one country, two castes" (Financial Times 1999). 
The majority of mainlanders, regardless of their actual economic power and 
social status, are perceived as "inferior" and "uneducated". Mainland Chinese 
people, in their daily lives，are isolated as "outsiders" by many Hong Kong 
people as if they are "pollutants" and "untouchable" (I will further illustrate this 
in Chapter 5). In contrast, Hong Kong people are "superior" and "better". "One 
country, two castes" is thus used to describe the invisible social hierarchy 
between Hong Kong people and mainlanders. 
In short, the distinct and conscious border that was built in the heads of 
Hong Kong Chinese people separates them from mainlanders. The "polluting 
caste" label hinders mainland Chinese people's permeability into Hong Kong 
society. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly demonstrated the changing relationships between 
Hong Kong and mainland China in political, economic and social respects, which 
provides background information and social contexts for how the Hong Kong 
identity is shaped. 
This chapter also traces the shaping of Hong Kong identity chronologically. 
Factors such as political and historical events, government policies, education 
and the mass media all play a role in constructing senses of superiority and 
inferiority. The identity of heunggongyahn is portrayed as "superior" and carries 
a symbol of "pride" whilst the identity of daaihlohkyahn is positioned as 
"inferior" and is thought to be a symbol of "shame". From this, the middle-class 
mentality hidden in the identity of heunggongyahn becomes apparent, which 
helps to understand how Hong Kong people perceive mainlanders. The 
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contrasting social positions of Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese 
people are "one country, two castes", as argued. The distinct Hong Kong identity 
also acts as a "border in the mind" that hinders the reunification of Hong Kong 
with mainland China. Up to now, many Hong Kong Chinese people have still 
consciously defended their distinct identity and remain indifferent towards 
mainland Chinese people. 
In the next chapter, I further elucidate how Hong Kong people's distinct 




Demeanor, Emotions and Resistance 
Culture is about feelings, attachments and emotions as well as concepts and 
ideas. (Hall 1997: 2) 
Introduction 
The previous chapters illustrated how social hierarchies are built up by 
manipulating differences in demeanor between Hong Kong people and 
mainlanders. This chapter explores the theme of this thesis: the relationships 
between demeanor, emotions and resistance. In what ways do emotions 
constitute resistance among Hong Kong people? How is this resistance carried 
out? In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Hong Kong people's discourse on 
"mainlanders' demeanor" is directed by their emotions, which comprise a sense 
of resistance against mainlanders as "compatriots" and, to a certain extent, 
mainland China as "motherland". I will conclude by arguing that the construction 
and stigmatization of a homogenous "mainlander's behavior" is a form of 
symbolic violence. I will examine this process by analyzing the role played by 
the mass media, the Hong Kong populace, and the Hong Kong government. 
This chapter is structured in the following way: I first show 
heunggongyahn ’s double/multiple standards towards the same forms of demeanor 
that are performed by different groups. This highlights Hong Kong people's 
bigoted attitudes towards demeanor as performed by mainlanders. I then 
illustrate heunggongyahn 's complicated emotions towards daaihlohkyahn'. love, 
anxiety, hatred, and discontent. This is followed by the demonstration that 
mainlanders are segregated and socially isolated from Hong Kong society, in 
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which mainlanders are treated as scapegoats for heunggongyahn 's worries 
concerning their uncertain futures. These emotions bring out the theme of this 
chapter: heunggongyahn 's resistance. With the influence of these complicated 
emotions, many Hong Kong people still refuse to accept mainland Chinese as 
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"compatriots" and, to a certain extent, mainland China as their "homeland". I 
will also discuss the underlying fears and concerns for expressing their resistance 
in other forms, and thus introduce Scott's notion of "weapons of the weak" to 
illustrate why demeanor and discourse on demeanor is chosen as a means of 
expression. Finally drawing on Bourdieu I argue that the process of social 
marginalization of mainlanders in Hong Kong is a form of symbolic violence. 
Double/Multiple Standards 
In Chapter 3，I showed how demeanor is closely linked with Bourdieu's 
concept of capital, including cultural, symbolic and social capital. This section 
demonstrates how Hong Kong people manipulate "differences in demeanor" as 
an excuse to socially isolate mainlanders from the local community. However the 
blame works only on mainlanders. To be precise, Hong Kong people hold bias 
towards mainlanders. To unveil this prejudice, this section includes Hong Kong 
people's attitudes towards foreigners who do the same action. 
SQUATTING PRACTICED BY NON-MAINLANDERS 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Hong Kong people's notion of squatting includes 
both the action of squatting and the "improper" ways of sitting. Caucasians are 
indeed quite commonly found sitting on the floor in Hong Kong. They often . 
squat or sit on the floor on the MTR, stairs or the ground. 
Fieldnotes, 14 February 2010, Hong Kong, around 16.14 
Today is a public holiday, many people went out to celebrate lunar New 
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Year. I went to Grand Element, a shopping mall in Hong Kong. When I 
walked to HMV，I noticed a bunch of Caucasians sitting on the stairs. The 
stairs link lo the elevator of that mail，reaching to the car parks. Some of 
them their hair dyed red, some with a punk look. That stairs lead to the car 
park of Element, not many people would walk pass there, but still they 
blocked the way. No one seemed to be bothered by them. 
Fieldnotes, 5 October 2009, Hong Kong, around 17:15 
Three mainlanders were squatting next to the entrance of Mannings, a chain 
retailer. June，my informant, 28 years old, criticized, "Mainlanders again! 
They always squat here and there, blocking the way." 
The Caucasians mentioned in the first example above, are behaving almost 
the same as the mainlanders described in the second example. However，Hong 
Kong people hold different attitudes towards them. I described the first example 
to June, she replied, "It's just an exceptional case. Gwdilou are well-educated and 
won't squat like mainlanders, and it's more acceptable to sit instead of squat. 
Squatting is really annoying and disgusting." Many Hong Kong people make an 
assumption that most Caucasians are all "well-educated" and know how to 
"behave properly". Even when Caucasians block the way by standing or sitting � 
in the middle of a corridor, not many Hong Kong people would scold or curse 
them. I have not witnessed this, not even once, in my two-year research period. 
Some may argue that it is due to language barrier; Hong Kong people have to use 
English to communicate with Caucasians. Yet when they curse or scold 
mainlanders, they would use Cantonese instead of Mandarin. What's more, they 
would only curse in a low voice. They dare not scold loudly and let mainlanders 
hear it. The purpose of their insults has to be explored. As I mentioned in Chapter 
3，most Hong Kong people tend not to arouse conflicts in public. Thus they tend 
to insult others in Cantonese for expressing their angers and complaints; they do 
not intend to argue with the offenders. If Hong Kong people dislike the actions 
such as blocking the ways, both Caucasians and mainlanders should be treated in 
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the same way. However, mostly only mainlanders are insulted. Therefore, it's not 
the actions that annoy Hong Kong people, rather it's "mainlanders" that irritate 
them. Caucasians breaking a rule could be perceived as "exceptional" but not for 
mainlanders. To be precise, Hong Kong people indeed are not merely criticizing 
the actions but the "mainlanders" as a whole. 
NOSE PICKING PRACTICED BY NON-MAINLANDERS 
Hong Kong people often perceive mainlanders as "dirty" and "unhygienic" 
because they pick nose publicly. However, do Hong Kong people pick their noses 
too? This section compares and contrasts the data obtained from interviews, as 
well as data collected from my daily observation. 
Before I began this research, I have already heard Hong Kong people 
discussing about the issue of nose picking. One of them said，"I still remember 
when I was small, many people [classmates] picked their nose and stuck the 
mucus on the bottom of the desks. Some disgusting ones even eat it." Another 
replied, “Yes, that's really quite common. It was almost a consensus not to touch 
the bottom of a desk if one does not want to get dirty." Nicknames such as snivel 
monster ( 鼻 屎 a r e used to mock people who are caught picking their poses 
in public. 
Fieldnotes, Hong Kong, 8 October 2008, around 18:00 
A young Caucasian girl was waiting for the train on the platform when a 
middle-aged Chinese man caught her attention. This middle-aged man was , 
wearing a polo shirt, a pair of jeans, a pair of boots and a backpack, with 
dirty spots everywhere. He stood next to a rubbish bin, picking his nose 
with his dirty black finger as if nobody was there. The girl was stunned and 
stared at him with disgust, then moved away from that man. 
I described the above incident to my informants. Some of them think that 
the man must be from the Mainland. Some of them think that it is normal 
because the man is in his middle age, and usually people from that generation are 
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less educated, which is different from the younger generations. It is generally 
believed that the practice of nose picking is not common among grown ups. It 
happens more among children, yet it is not very frequent. Hong Kong people 
aged above forty years old, however, are said to be the most frequent violators of 
nose picking in Hong Kong. From the perspective of many Hong Kong people, 
only middle-aged Hong Kong people are likely to pick nose in the public. These 
people are called si-ndaih or a-siik. It is assumed that si-ndaih and a-suk are 
representatives of the "working class" in the socio-economic hierarchy, hence 
they are recognized as less "civilized" than those who are on top of the hierarchy. 
Overall, Hong Kong people also tend to believe that the general Hong Kong 
people, "unlike mainland Chinese", do not pick nose in public, si-ndaih and 
a-siik are exceptional cases. 
My daily observation, however, shows a slightly different situation than 
what my informants have described. The younger generations, those below 35 � 
year-old, also picked their noses in the public, though not very frequently. The 
main difference between the older and younger generations lies only in the way 
how they pick their noses. The older ones pick their noses directly with their 
fingers, while the younger ones usually use a tissue paper to cover their fingers 
before picking their noses. I asked my informants about this, and one of them 
replied, "It's more acceptable to use a tissue paper than to use fingers directly. If 
people pick nose directly with their fingers, they must find a place to 'handle' 
their mucus. They would stick it on somewhere, flick it away, or eat it." 
In sum, mainlanders, in contrast, are believed to be nose-pickers regardless 
of their age and class. In contrast, even though some Hong Kong people also pick 
their noses in public, my informants, same as many Hong Kong people, disregard 
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the possibility of "Hong Kong people picking nose". They would categorize that 
offender group as ''sl-ndaih and a-su1C\ creating a picture that "general Hong 
Kong people do not pick nose, and these "lower class" si-ndaih and a-suk are 
exceptional". 
JUMPING QUEUES PRACTICED BY NON-MAINLANDERS 
"Jumping queues" is another "reason" for Hong Kong people to criticize 
mainlanders for being "uneducated" and to reject their membership in Hong 
Kong. As a native Hong Kong people, before doing this research, I had believed 
that Hong Kong people always lined up. The fieldwork has awoken me from this 
"taken for granted" level of unconsciousness. The data obtained from daily 
observation indeed reveals that Hong Kong people's way of jumping queues. 
Fieldnotes, 3 March 2009, Lok Fu MTR Station, around 08.25 
Today, I took the MTR at around 8:25am at Lok Fu Station. In Hong Kong, 
the peak hour is from 8:15am to 9:15am. As usual, everyone pushed 
themselves onto the train once the train had arrived. People behind me 
jumped queue and got onto the train. The train looked cramped, but a 
middle-aged man squeezed onto the train. Queuing was useless and I was 
still standing on the platform. The train left. I was the first in the line, 
waiting for the second train. The second train arrived, it was less cramped, 
but when I was trying to get onto the train, a girl on my right rushed onto 
the train first, and used her elbows to prevent others from occupying her 
place. 
I described my experience to my informants. J.J., 35 years olds, told me, 
During peak hours, we are all afraid of getting to work late, so of course 
everyone rushes onto the train. But apart from this, Hong Kong people do 
line up. Unlike mainlanders, they jump the line all the times, even when ‘ 
lining up is called for and when they are not in a hurry. Those mainlanders 
don't even know how to line up. I've experienced this many times, 
especially when we travel to overseas. It's very easy to distinguish 
mainlanders from Hong Kong people. We Hong Kong people line up 
automatically when we see a line, but mainlanders don't, they still jump the . 
line. 
My informant JJ., like many Hong Kong people, believes that Hong Kong 
people line up automatically. The fieldnotes above describes that usually when 
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Hong Kong people are in a hurry, they jump queues. "In a hurry" is not an excuse 
for jumping queues. Again，it shows that Hong Kong people have a different 
standard for their own "jumping queues" behavior. Indeed, there are many cases 
that Hong Kong people do not line up. 
Fieldnotes, 12 October, Mong Kok, around 17.00 
I was trying to buy fish balls from a kiosk. I waited for over ten minutes. 
People cramped together and tried to be the first. None of them lined up. 
Basically, who shouted the loudest and act most aggressively "won the race" 
and got served first. 
The above fieldnotes reveals another situation where Hong Kong people 
rarely line up. I interviewed Paul, 28 years old, and he said, “Yes, it's true that 
Hong Kong people don't line up in this case. It's the same as going to the 
markets [wet market], and people never line up. But I think it depends on the 
rules or instructions of the shops. If the shop asks people to line up, I think Hong 
Kong people do line up." 
Apart from "not lining up in some situations", Hong Kong people have their 
ways of "jumping the queues". Ah-Nap, 28 years old, told me, 
I am very law-abiding, but sometimes when I'm afraid of not being able to 
get onto the train, I still jump the queue. I mean there are some situations 
when the train is almost full, and some people would not get onto the train. 
Actually this may not be the truths, there are always spaces left inside the 
carriage. In this case, I would jump the queue and get on the train. 
There is another situation that Hong Kong people would jump the line. 
During lunar New Year, many Hong Kong people visit their relatives in 
mainland China, so at the Lo Wu immigration control area, thousands of 
Hong Kong people gathered. People of the same group/ family usually line 
up at different queues. The person at the shortest queue will then ask the rest 
of his groups to join him. Although I think this can be considered a kind of 
jumping queues, most Hong Kong people still do this. 
I told another informant, Priscilla, 25 years old, about the kind of "jumping 
line" that Ah-nap has described, and she shared her opinions, 
I think it is definitely a form of jumping line. I still remember when I was 
: ： ^ 
160 
waiting for school shuttle bus at the Choi Hung MTR station. Since it was 
almost the only way for our schoolmates to get to the school, usually there 
was a long queue, especially when it was around 8:00am. We might have 
arrived school late if we couldn't get onto the bus on time. Some students 
saw their friends lining up in the front of the line, so they jumped the line by 
joining their friends. My secondary school was a band one school, and after 
receiving some complaints from parents, we [students] were asked not to do 
this again, and prefects were assigned to check. 
Ah-nap and Priscilla's experiences demonstrate Hong Kong people's way of 
"jumping queues": one person lining up for few others. This kind of queue 
jumping is commonly practiced in Hong Kong. Can "one person" really "line 
up" for others? Is this kind of "lining up" more civilized? What if mainlanders 
also do the same, would they still be not considered as "uncivilized" and "rude"? 
The ways that Hong Kong people and mainlanders jump queues are in fact very 
similar. This shows that Hong Kong people indeed hold a bigoted attitude 
towards mainland Chinese's bodily practices. 
In sum, the examples of "Caucasians squatting", "Hong Kong people's style 
of nose picking" and "Hong Kong people's way of jumping queues" reveal the 
prejudice Hong Kong people hold towards mainlanders' demeanor. Ahmed 
discusses a connection on between demeanor and emotions as below: 
% 
It is not difficult to see how emotions are bound up with the securing of 
social hierarchy: emotions become attributes of bodies as a way of 
transforming what is 'lower' or 'higher' into bodily traits... So emotionality 
as a claim about a subject or a collective is clearly dependent on relations of 
power，which endow 'others' with meaning and value... In order to do this, 
we need to consider how emotions operate to 'make' and ‘shape，bodies as 
forms of actions, which also involve orientations towards others... Hardness 
is not the absence of emotion, but a different emotional orientation towards 
'others'. (Ahmed 2004: 4) 
Hong Kong people's attitudes towards mainlanders, indeed, are very similar 
to what Ahmed describes. Their reactions and perceptions are highly influenced 
by their emotions. The complicated emotions that Hong Kong people hold are 
described and discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. They love mainlanders for the 
•161 
economic benefits they bring to Hong Kong, but they also hate and dislike the 
strong competitiveness of mainlanders. "Mainlanders' demeanor", as a result, 
becomes a target to attack. Demeanor, here, is a weapon and as well as an excuse, 
to express their anxiety, resistance and discontent. 
Complicated Emotions 
The previous section argued that demeanor is used as a subtle weapon by 
Hong Kong people to express their desperated resistance towards the vast 
changes in their social status and power. In this section, I demonstrate Hong 
Kong people's complicated emotions at mainlanders. I identify four kinds of 
emotions that shared by many Hong Kong people: love, anxiety, hatred and 
discontent. The contradictory feelings of Hong Kong people towards mainland 
China are often not spoken out in the dominant discourse, though some do 
express directly. Lo and Pang commented, "The return of Hong Kong to China 、， 
has brought the two parties closer together than ever, but it has also brought forth 
and exacerbated Hong Kong people's conflicting emotions of love for and fear of 
the Chinese state" (2007: 351). 
To understand Hong Kong Chinese people's vehemence towards mainland 
Chinese people's behaviors, we ought to comprehend the intricate feelings of 
Hong Kong Chinese people towards mainland China and mainland Chinese 
people. This section not only discusses the emotions that Hong Kong people hold 
at their "compatriots", it also helps to introduce one of my arguments in this 
research: mainlanders serve as the scapegoats for the PRC and for the anxieties 
and changes that many Hong Kong people refuse to face. 
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LOVE 
The expressions of love for mainlanders can be divided into two types: 
genuine and hypocritical. 
The genuine kind of "love" is used in visiting their relatives and friends. My 
informant, Ah-nap, 28，told me about his relatives in the mainland China, “I visit 
them quite often and we have good relationships. We often hug each other when 
we meet. You know, hugging is not a common practice among Chinese, so we're 
very close." Ah-mak, 27, holds a repugnant attitude towards mainlanders but he 
also has a few mainland friends. He told me, "My friends are different from other 
mainlanders. They are nice and they care more about other people, unlike the 
majority of mainlanders who are selfish and greedy." Both Ah-nap and Ah-mak 
hold similar attitudes towards mainlanders, thinking that they are not "very 
good" in terms of their behavior and personalities, yet they love, or at least have 
good relationships with, their mainland relatives and friends. 
The genuine kind of "love" could also be observed from the growing pride 
among Hong Kong people towards mainland China's economic success, and also 
from their concern about the natural disasters happened lately in mainland China. 
As mentioned before, mainland China's success includes holding international 
events, such as the Olympics in 2008 and the World Exposition in 2010, and 
rapid economic development and triumphs in sports competitions, such as Liu � 
Xiang's first gold metal in men's track and field for China in 2004 and Yao 
Ming's participation in National Basketball Association (NBA). Apart from these 
successes, natural disasters also aroused Hong Kong people's attachment towards 
mainland China, recent examples include the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and the 
Qinghai earthquake in 2010. 
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Different voices and opinions exist within Hong Kong society. Whereas 
some Hong Kong people are delighted to return to their motherland, many Hong 
Kong people are still reluctant to embrace mainland China as their "homeland" 
and mainlanders as their "compatriots". As Mathews et al. describe, "Hong Kong 
people in general have mixed feelings towards cultural, military, and national 
icons of China; they highly identify with cultural and historical symbols but 
remain somewhat reluctant to accept political and military symbols of the 
nation." (2008: 106). Mathews et al. demonstrate this by studying Hong Kong 
people's attitudes towards some icons of Chinese culture, Chinese nations, 
Chinese military and Hong Kong. The pride and affection towards Chinese 
nations and military are comparatively lower than that of Chinese cultures and 
Hong Kong. This, however, they argue, has been changing significantly in the 
last decade. 
； I. 
The hypocritical kind of "love" gradually developed since mainland China's � 
economy has grown rapidly and China has assumed political control over Hong 
Kong. With the economic benefits offered by Central Government, such as the 
Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
and exclusive mandates for offshore yuan banking (Lo and Pang 2007: 350), 
many Hong Kong people, especially businessmen, are glad to see the thriving 
economy of China. The closer economic connection has undeniably attached 
Hong Kong Chinese people with a new sense of belonging to mainland China; 
some people have even called this phenomenon "sudden patriotism" C忽然愛國). 
The term is often used in describing those who claim to be patriotic because of 
these economic benefits after 1997. 
Furthermore, rich mainland tourists spend a large sum of money shopping 
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products of famous brand names, skin care products and health food which bring 
Hong Kong huge revenue. The income received from tourism, as a result, assists 
the rebuilding of Hong Kong's economy after the financial crisis in 1997 and 
2008. Facing these rich mainlanders, many Hong Kong people, especially 
businessmen and sales persons, treat them with smiles and politeness. However, 
it is often heard that Hong Kong people are hypocritical since they actually hate 
these rich mainland tourists and look down on them. My informant, Ah-nap, 28, 
told me, "Salespeople are all deceitful. Don't think that they are nice to mainland 
tourists, the sales smile to them but make face stealthily behind their back." 
Another informant, June，28，"Mainland Chinese are rich, but they are only 
parvenu, who are not well-educated. These parvenus are rude. They don't know 
how to respect other people. They think their money is everything." Michael, 34, 
"You can see they [mainland Chinese] still squat everywhere and behave like 
peasants. I treat them well only because they are my customers." 
In sum, love for mainland Chinese can be separated between genuine and 
hypocritical. 
ANXIETY ， 
In 2006，Peter Lai Hing-ling，former security chief, reviewed the One-Way 
Permit (OWP) scheme, which allows entry to 150 mainland migrants a day. He 
commented, “ If we continue the current immigrant scheme that puts no limits on ^ 
age, education background and working ability, as suggested by an editorial, we 
will suffer from the profound impacts of these huge influx on our demographic 
structure" {The Standard 2006). As mentioned before in this chapter, Hong Kong 
people worried about the influx of mainlanders to Hong Kong for a number of 
reasons. First, the influx of mainlanders in every year puts housing problems in 
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jeopardy, where it has long been a challenge. Second, some Hong Kong people 
are concerned about the possible deterioration of education, hospital and public 
services. Third, Hong Kong women worry that this OWP scheme would 
encourage their husbands to find mistresses in mainland China. Fourth, the 
increase of labor force will push up the unemployment rate and the keen 
competition that these "new immigrants" will bring to the local population. Some 
of the new mainland immigrants are well-educated, and they have an advantage 
in speaking both fluent English and Mandarin, which are considered as the 
world's most important languages. In contrast, while many Hong Kong people 
can speak English and Cantonese fluently，they may only speak comprehensible 
Mandarin48. In terms of the use of language, Hong Kong Chinese people may be 
less competitive than the well-educated mainlanders. 
The competitiveness of Hong Kong is also challenged. The rising 
competitiveness of some larger cities in mainland China, such as Shanghai, also � 
pose a threat to Hong Kong, which would directly affect the lives of Hong Kong 
people. Furthermore, rapid development and good financial prospects in 
mainland China have attracted huge investment from foreign countries. This also 
lures investors in Hong Kong to retreat and invest in the mainland instead. The 
keen competitions for foreign investors threaten Hong Kong's economy and its 
position as an international financial centre. 
48 Verbal language is one of the factors distinguishing Hong Kong people from mainlanders. The 
majority of Hong Kong people speak Cantonese, although the older generations usually have 
different accents. Cantonese speaker comprises the majority of the population and Cantonese is 
the official language in Hong Kong. Unlike Hong Kong people, the official language for 
mainlanders is Mandarin, although many speak their own dialects in daily life. Guangzhou 
Province is located in the South of China where local people also speak Cantonese. However, 
？ according to my informants and some scholars, Guangzhou people and Hong Kong people can 
still be distinguished in terms of their vocabulary usage and tones. 
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HATRED 
Apart from anxiety, many Hong Kong people hold hatred towards the new 
mainland immigrants. The feeling of hatred can be examined in two ways: hatred 
towards low income mainlanders, and hatred towards high income mainlanders. 
For low income mainland Chinese, they are seen as being the "country 
bumpkins" who are "impolite and uneducated". They are also blamed and 
portrayed as "coming for welfare handouts", and named as "trouble-makers" and 
"parasites (駐米大蟲），’.These perceptions, conversely, are proved to be 
inaccurate. A survey found that 69.2 per cent of over-15 mainland immigrants 
that arriving Hong Kong in 2006 had completed secondary school {Ming Pao ： 
Daily News 2009). In a government study in 2000，7.6 per cent of mainland 
immigrants hold university degrees (Sautman and Kennhans 2002: 35). Besides, 
a government study in 1999 found that 15 per cent migrants were "quite rich" 
and over 25 per cent are middle class (ibid.). Regardless of the findings found 
from the surveys, many Hong Kong Chinese still regard mainland Chinese as 
"parasites", who are taking advantage of the "hard-working" Hong Kong 
Chinese. For instance, the increasing number of mainland pregnant women 
giving birth in Hong Kong public hospitals, is seen as a way to gain benefits 
from the Hong Kong welfare system, and that they are living on Hong Kong tax 
payers' money. The Hong Kong government imposed a law, from February 2007 ‘ 
onwards, starting to charge mainland pregnant women who give births in Hong 
Kong public hospitals. Whether or not the husbands of mainland women hold 
permanent ID card, they all have to pay that newly imposed fee. 
For high income middle class mainlanders, they are also blamed as 
"trouble-makers". Hong Kong people argue that the property price of Hong Kong 
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skyrocketed because increasing numbers of rich mainland Chinese are coming to 
Hong Kong to.invest in property {Sing Pao Daily News 2010). The huge 
investment is aroused by the Investment Migrant Scheme. Under this scheme, 
mainland Chinese are granted the right of abode by spending a one-off 
investment of HK$6.5million in Hong Kong {SCMP 2009). The increment of 
property price hinders many Hong Kong people's ability to purchase their own 
apartments, and thus they blame the mainlanders as "trouble-makers". 
DISCONTENT 
After the handover, discontent towards the Hong Kong government has 
intensified. First, the Asian Financial Crisis occurred in 1997 hit the economy of 
Hong Kong badly. Discontent and depression were widespread among Hong 
Kong people. Middle class suffered since the property price fell sharply, the price 
of some properties even fell below the market price of their initial purchase, 
resulted in negative net worth. Also, many Hong Kong people lost money by 
speculating in the stock market. Furthermore, many workers were laid off due to 
business and corporation failures. The unemployment rate increased from 2.2 
percent in 1997 to 6.2 percent in 1999 (Sim Finance). The economy of Hong 
Kong slightly recovered and the harsh financial situation lessened in 2002, yet 
the government released the proposal of Article 23, the anti-subversion law, 
which provoked a huge opposition among Hong Kong people. In the meantime, 
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) broke out and crushed the 
economy of Hong Kong again. The unemployment rate climbed up to an 
alarming rate to 7.9 per cent (2006 First Season Financial Report). Discontents 
among Hong Kong Chinese were again widespread. 
On ist July 2003，over half a million of Hong Kong citizens participated in a 
march opposing the Article 23 to express their discontents. The march finally 
forced the previous Chief Executive Tung Cheehwa to resign. With his 
resignation, the discontent among Hong Kong Chinese was soothed. Another 
world financial crisis hit Hong Kong in 2008 and swine flu broke out in 2009, 
which further increased the tensions between Hong Kong people and their 
government. This has not yet include Hong Kong people's long cry for universal 
suffrage since 1997. 
In sum, Hong Kong Chinese have intricate emotions — love, worry, hatred 
and discontent - towards mainland China and mainl即ders. On one hand, Hong 
Kong Chinese rely on mainland China economically. On the other, social 
tensions increased as a result of the PRC's attempts to restrain Hong Kong 
people's freedom. The enormous changes in the relationship between Hong Kong 
and China that took place in the last decade have confused Hong Kong people. 
Many still cannot emotionally accept the fact that they now rely so much on the 
Mainland, since they has always used to China counting on Hong Kong, and not 
vice versa. The sense of superiority of Hong Kong Chinese was deeply hurt by 
the unforeseen reversion of reliance. » 
More importantly, this section unveils that mainlanders serve as the 
scapegoats for the PRC and anxieties and changes that Hong Kong people refuse 
to face. As mentioned before, Hong Kong people are afraid to criticize the PRC � 
directly with the fear of angering the new master. Also, the changes in Hong 
Kong people's daily life in the last decade were extensive and sudden, in which 
Hong Kong people try to deny. The mainlanders who live in Hong Kong have not • 
done odious things on Hong Kong people, yet mainlanders often face vitriolic 
criticism and discrimination. In the late 1980s，Helen Siu had already argued that 
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the "new" immigrants in the 1980s were the scapegoats, 
[T]he recent immigrants had become the scapegoats for social ills connected 
by political uncertainty and economic panic faced by a population defensive 
of what it had gained. The media played up the image of "Ah-Chan," the 
ignorant and vulnerable "mainland boy." Social gossip generated a 
prejudiced view that most of the young aliens were lazy because they were 
fed with "socialist" education (1987: 12). 
In the ensuing section, I will further unpack and discuss why and how 
mainlanders serve as scapegoats through my informants' daily life and 
experience. 
Demeanor as Social Marginalization: 
Mainlanders as Scapegoats 
Social marginalization of mainlanders could be divided into three parts: 1) 
the government's official discrimination through policy making; 2) the mass 
media's malignant depictions; and 3) Hong Kong people's vitriolic criticisms. 
This section briefly discusses the government's official discrimination and the 
depictions of the mass media, and then focuses on the local and micro level - the 
daily discourse among Hong Kong people. 
THE OFFICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MAINLAND CHINESE 
Starting from the late 1950s onwards, the Hong Kong government has 
already described and depicted mainlanders as a "problem of people", who add 
burdens on housing, social services and political relations in Hong Kong (Mark 
2007: 1145). Studying Hong Kong people's discrimination against new mainland 
immigrants, Sautman and Kneehans (2002: 3 4 - 3 6 ) say, 
Anti-mainland migrant discrimination has been found in education, housing, 
social security, and the immigration process...They are ineligible for social 
security for a year after arrival and for public housing or a civil service 
position for seven years. Their school credentials are often not recognized in 
Hong Kong... Not surprisingly, Mainland migrants are subject to 
； 
employment discrimination that includes being paid less than Hong Kong 
people for the same work. Some Hong Kong parents refused to send their 
children to schools that enroll many "newly-arrived children". 
Sautman and Kneehans disclose the official discrimination that mainland 
Chinese suffer under the policy of the Hong Kong government: education, 
housing, social security, and immigration process. As shown, the government 
holds a leading position in discriminating against mainlanders through its policy 
decisions. First, as mentioned in Chapter 2，the issue of permanent Hong Kong 
Identity Card in 1972 fortified a distinct identity for Hong Kong people, which 
differentiates them from mainland immigrants (Cheng and Wong 2004: 151). The 
Hong Kong government held responsibility in spreading the fear of mainlanders. 
Anson Chan Fang On-san, the Acting Chief Executive at that time, commented 
that the ruling of the Court of Final would create a huge burden to the Hong : 
Kong government (SCMP 1999a). The Hong Kong government even reported to 
United Nations that new migrants from the mainland were partly responsible for 
family and social discord in the SAR (Special Administrative Region) (SCMP 
1999b). In other words，the Hong Kong government created an image that 
"mainlanders" are "burdens" and "troubles" to Hong Kong. In the meantime, 
mainland immigrants, who are also called as "new immigrants", under a different 
set of government policy, are separated as an entirely different group than other 
immigrants. At face level, they are being "specially" taken care by the 
government, but they are indeed isolated from the community as "new 
immigrants". 
Let me give an example on the government's "special" policies towards 
mainlanders. Many working class mainland immigrants are geographically 
isolated. Most of them live in far-away new towns. Many people argue that this 
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is caused by poor allocation in housing. Under the present system, all public 
housing applicants are allocated by a computer system. However, flats in far 
away new towns such as Tin Shui Wai (天水圍)often have a lower rent under 
the Rent Reduction Period scheme because many of them have been vacant for 
years49. The low rent often lures mainland immigrants to choose to live there. As 
a result, these far away new towns are usually found to have a higher percentage 
of mainland immigrated residents. Unfortunately, the transportation and facilities 
of these new towns are not well planned. Tin Shui Wai has one of the most 
serious cases of "community imbalance", with over 50 per cent mainland 
immigrated residents (Scenario 2008). In 2004, Paul Tang Kwok-wai, the former 
head of Social Welfare Department, admitted the erroneous planning of Tin Shui 
Wai. In 2006, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, the former Permanent Secretary for 
Home Affairs，labeled Tin Shui Wai as "the tragic community" (Hung 2007). 
As a result of the poor urban town planning, mainland immigrants in Tin � 
Shui Wai are isolated geographically and physically, and the negative label of 
"the tragic community" has fortified this isolation. Today, facilities such as 
hospital, recreation area and community services are still lacking in Tin Shui Wai 
{Ming Pao Daily News 2004; Wen Wei Po 2005; Scenario 2008). In other words, 
mainlanders are officially demarcated from Hong Kong people under the Hong 
Kong government's authoritative policies and discourse. 
THE MALIGNANT PORTRAYAL OF MAINLAND CHINESE 
The mass media takes a crucial role in shaping the negative public image of 
49 The Rent Reduction Period scheme is launched in 2007 by the Housing Authority. It offers 
"four to six months rent-free incentives in the form of rent reduction to tenants taking up long 
vacant period to improve their letting rate" (Hong Kong Housing Authority 2007). These flats are 
usually located at less favorable locations and in older estates. 
； "T T T 
mainlanders: "greedy" but "lazy"; "corrupt", "violent" and "uneducated". A local 
Hong Kong newspaper wrote, {Hong Kong Daily News 2003)， 
According to the Social Welfare Department, the latest figures show that 
there are a total of 440,000 applications for Comprehensive Social Security 
Assistance (CSSA). Among which, 70,000 applications are immigrants who 
have been living in Hong Kong for less than 7 years. In other words, "new 
immigrants" account for 17 per cent of all CSSA recipients in Hong Kong. 
The root of this phenomenon is indeed the government's responsibility. 
Compared with other countries, no government has been so generous to new 
immigrants. No government would allocate so many resources on 
immigrants. In fact, this is the government's strategy in attracting new 
immigrants. The problematic ways of allocating new immigrants have long 
been under criticisms. The crux of the problem is that the approving 
authority is not included in the CSSA scheme so that even people of no 
economic done at Hong Kong's expense^®. After one year of successful 
application, these recipients will take the benefits as granted. The social 









Mainland Chinese people are often depicted as the source of the "problems" 
in Hong Kong. I will illustrate this with a few headlines. 
•, 
"Around 50 percent New Immigrant Families [mainland immigrant] 
Practice Corporal Punishment on Their Children (近半數新移民家庭體罰 
教導子女)，，{SingPao 201 Oa). 
"Chaotic World Exposition Scared People, a Foreigner said, 'This is 
China.'(世博亂象嚇怕人洋客：這就是中國)” {Oriental Daily 2010). � 
"Influx of Mainland Pregnant Women, Tighter Provisions of Beds in 
Maternity Departments (內地孕婦勢續湧港豬年將至產科床位更緊 
張）(Headline Daify2QQ6). 
50 The approving authority of the One Way Permit (OWP) scheme for mainland immigrants rests 
on mainland ministries. According to some figures released by the Security Bureau, the 
Immigration Department and the Census and Statistics Department’ over 17.1% of those who 
settled in Hong Kong in 2007 under the OWP scheme aged 40 or above. And in the first half of 
2008，nearly 13% of the settlers had received at most primary education while 13% had 
graduated from tertiary institutions. (Sina news 2010). 
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"New Immigrant is 'Used to the Practice of Giving Gifts' Red Packet to 
Driving Test Examiner, [he/she was] Convicted (新移民「慣送禮考牌俾利 
是罪成)，,(Hong Kong Economic Journal 2003b)^i. 
"New Immigrant Has not Yet Rectified [His/Her]'Culture' Extort Classmate 
Twenty Dollar (新移民未改「文化」勒索同學 2 0 元） i ^ o ^ i g 
Economic Journal 2003a). 
The above headlines are copied from several local Chinese newspapers. The 
translations of these headlines are slightly different from the Chinese original. In 
English, there is a clear distinction between single or plural forms, but not in of 
Chinese. For instance, "new immigrant" means one immigrant, in Chinese, "new 
immigrant" literally translates as ''sanylhmahn (新移民)，，，but “sdnyihmdhn” can 
be both one immigrant or many immigrants, or even all immigrants. Therefore, 
one would be easily misled and convinced that "all/most mainland immigrants" 
are similar to what the mass media describes by reading these headlines. To 
avoid misleading readers, the mass media should write clearly with a quantifier, 
such as "one sanyihmahrf\ but the mass media rarely do so when describing 
mainland Chinese's behaviors. As a result, Hong Kong people are often swayed 
to believe "mainlanders" are homogenous. Thus, mainland Chinese people are 
believed to be "uneducated, rude, lazy and greedy." 
VITRIOLIC CRITICISMS TOWARDS MAINLANDERS 
! 
Acrimonious criticisms and rumors about mainlanders are often heard in 
Hong Kong. Kwan Lai San, a Hong Kong Chinese, shared her experience on Sun 
Daily (2009), a local newspaper, 
. i 
Once I stood in a crowded train，I saw a man sitting with crossed feet, and 
many passengers' pants grazed his shoes, including me. I stared at him, but 
51 Giving red packet traditionally means bringing luck to the receiver. It is mostly given during 
Chinese lunar new year and during some joyous events such as wedding. However, it is also a 
common practice to bribe in mainland China. 
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he did not apologize nor put his legs away. He wore an unfitted and dirty 
suit, with black shoes and white socks, and his attitude is loathsome. He 




Many Hong Kong people, like Kwan, not only hold a prejudiced attitude, 
but also spread individual incidents that they have encountered as a complaint to 
all mainlanders. Gossip about mainlanders is often circulated as warnings to 
Hong Kong people. I heard the following gossip from my informants, which 
demonstrates the "bad" behavior of mainlanders. 
Gossip 1 
A Hong Kong girl who was living in a student hall in Hong Kong, shared a 
room with a mainland girl. She found out that some of the mainlander girl's 
behaviors were strange; The mainland girl never went to the shared toilet, 
instead she excreted both feces and urines in plastic bags. She did not throw 
away her bags of human waste and usually kept them inside the room for a 
few days. The Hong Kong girl could not stand it, so she requested a change. 
Gossip 2 
Never go to toilets alone in mainland China. Mainlanders are very skillful in 
taking away your kidneys. When you squat, someone from the next toilet 
cubicle will skillfully cut your kidney, you won't notice and won't feel 
anything until you stand up and see the cuts. Also, when mainlanders talk to 
you with a paper in his/her hand and ask you for help，never help them. 
There is some powder on the paper which makes you dizzy. Then they 
would steal all your money or kidnap you. 
Gossip 3 
Don't say anything bad about mainland Communists or the PRC, they 
would catch you and lock you up in a small dark room with nothing but . 
walls. You will be forced to listen to how good they are, and there's no one 
you can talk to. After some time you will get hallucination and believe that 
they are really good, this is brainwashing. 
I heard the first gossip three years ago when a group of Hong Kong students 
was discussing the issue of sharing rooms with mainlanders. The second gossip 
52 According to the Tourism Commission of Hong Kong, residents in four Guangdong cities 
(Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangraen, Foshan) from 28 July 2003 onwards can apply for individual 
visit under the Individual Visit Scheme. The Scheme was introduced as a liberalization measure 
under the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement. 
“ 
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is often heard during my research period when Hong Kong people are discussing 
issues of travelling in mainland China. The third gossip is often heard when 
people talk about the communist party in mainland China. Mainlanders, in the 
above three examples, are depicted as "unethical", "violent", "dangerous", 
"dirty", and "selfish". Many Hong Kong people are swayed to believe in the 
descriptions. My informant, Leo, 26 years old, told me, 
I lived at school dorms for three years, and I'd never live with mainlanders. 
I know mainlanders are not good roommates, so I usually asked my friends 
to be my roommates. I heard from my friends that living with mainland 
students is really troublesome. They don't allow us [Hong Kong students] to 
talk on phones, switch on air-conditioners, turn the lights on after 21:00. Not 
only this, they are dirty and unhygienic. They are "shit monsters". They shit 
everywhere: bathrooms, toilet floors，corridor and pantries. That's why they 
are named "shit monsters". But that's not surprising, because they shit and 
pee on the streets, on trains, and we often see them. 
Leo did not have any personal experience of living with mainlanders, but 
having heard negative stories about the negative aspects of living with mainland 
students, he is convinced that living with mainlanders is not good. Therefore � 
when he was living at student hostels, he chose not to live with mainland 
students. Another informant, Ah-Mak, 27, who had experience of living at 
student hall, echoes Leo, "I have not shared a room with mainlanders, but there 
were some at my floor. Sometimes when I use the shared toilets in the morning, I 
saw feces not in the toilet but on the edge of the toilets, or on the floor. It must 
have been done by the mainlanders." Ah-mak did not witness the offenders yet 
he made a firm judgment, believing the offenders must be mainlanders. As seen 
from these diffused gossip and my informants' bigoted judgment, mainland 
Chinese are being depicted as "uneducated" and "dirty". 
； . ‘-
CONSEQUENCE: SOCIAL MARGINALIZATION OF MAINLANDERS 
With the government's official discrimination, the mass media's malignant 
portrayals and Hong Kong people's vitriolic criticisms, mainlanders are socially 
isolated and marginalized from the Hong Kong community. Mainlanders are 
treated as if they are "pollutants", "deviances", and "outsiders". 
My informants recalled some of their witnessed discrimination against 
mainland immigrants. Amanda, 26 years old, my informant, told me, 
I studied in a girl's secondary school. There was a mainland immigrant in 
my class. Actually she immigrated to Hong Kong when she was very small, 
so she spoke fluent Cantonese. Maybe it's because she is from the mainland, 
people looked down on her. She didn't have many friends, and my 
classmates made fun of her quite often. She was always alone. I remember I 
heard some stories about her weird behavior. I was told that her mother 
wanted to make her nose straighter and taller, so she used a clothespin to 
peg on her nose. Since she had no friends, I did not dare to be her friend. If I 
were her friend, I would be a victim and be bullied by others as well. And I 
don't think I could really be her friend because she was weird. 
Cases of mainland immigrants being bullied by Hong Kong people are not 
uncommon, although the situation has improved. On 19 April 2006, a mainlander 
was battered to death. Easy Finder, a local magazine, reported the news, 
...[They have] been in Hong Kong for five years, these siblings had lived 
together. The sister can't speak fluent Cantonese, so she was always been 




Other headlines also reflect the situations of mainlanders being bullied in 
Hong Kong. 
"A Girl was Battered for 3.5 Hours by a Group of Higher Form Students ‘I 
am Scared of Being Battered Again, I Want to Go Back to the Mainland'(女‘ 
生遭高班童黨虐打31/2小時「我好驚再俾人打寧願返大陸」r(4_ 
Daily 2002). 
53 Daaihlohklei (大陸醒）is a derogated nickname for mainlanders created by Hong Kong 
people. It is less frequently used among Hong Kong people after the handover in 1997. 
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"New Witness Said He was Battered and Named Daaihlohkjdi (大陸仔)，a 
Mainland Immigrant appealed Successfully in a Case of Assaulting a 
Passenger cm the Bus (新証人指乘客圍殿罵「大陸仔」新移民巴士咬傷 
人上訴得直)，，(Ming Pao 2008)54. 
Apart from being bullied, mainlanders are often isolated by Hong Kong 
people. The following thoughts are quoted from three Hong Kong people. 
“I don't want to share a room [dorm] with mainlanders. They are dirty and 
unhygienic. I heard that they just shit in the room, using a plastic bag. How 
could I possibly accept this kind of situation? No!" 
“I saw a notice in school toilets, written in simplified Chinese characters, 
'Do not squat on the toilet'. It is definitely a prejudice against mainlanders 
who use simplified characters," 
“I usually won't pick to sit next to mainlanders. They often pick their nose 
publicly, that is so disgusting. Some even flip the mucus away. I was once 
taking a mini-bus back. A middle-aged mainlander sat next to me and 
picked nose during the whole ride. I felt so sick but there were no other 
seats," 
The voices of these three heunggongyahn reveal how mainlanders are 
socially isolated and discriminated against for their "uncivilized" behaviors. To 
maintain their superior social status, most "civilized and superior" Hong Kong 
people would not like to be friends with "uncivilized and inferior" mainlanders. 
They also believe that being friends with mainlanders would "downgrade" their 
social status. 
To conclude, the Hong Kong government, wittingly or unwittingly, has 
officially created a disadvantaged social position for mainlanders through its 
policies, and the mass media exaggerates certain social issues and reinforces the 
malignant portrayals of mainlanders. Finally, through the daily dominant 
discourse among Hong Kong people，the image of "country bumpkins and the 
impoverished spongers coming primarily for welfare handouts" is imposed upon 
54 Daaihlohkjdi has a similar meaning with daaihlohklei and a derogated name too. Jai (仔) 
means boys in Chinese, so daaihlohkjdi could only be used to call male. 
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mainlanders. (Sautman and Keenhans 2002: 35). Mainlanders, viewed as 
"trouble makers", are isolated and marginalized. 
Fears and Concerns 
In this section, I illustrate, through my informants' experience and 
knowledge, the underlying fears and concerns that drive Hong Kong people not 
to expression their resistance directly in verbal. 
Events before 1949 - 1976 
The People's Republic of China was established in 1949 by the Communist 
party. During that period, Chinese society was still filled with uprisings and 
dissidence. The Great Leap Forward, launched from 1958 - 1961, put villagers 
living in the countryside under tight surveillance by armed military (Friedman et 
al. 2006: 4). The hukou system was launched in 1958 to lock villagers in the 
countryside to ensure no rebellion would break out (Friedman et al. 2006: 51). 
During the Cultural Revolution in 1966 -1976，under the influence of Mao 
Zedong's personality cult (Yan et el. 1996: 60), people were forbidden to criticize 
Mao Zedong or the Communist Party. Over three millions mainland Chinese 
were killed (Chang and Halliday 2005). This terrifying period remains in the 
minds of many Hong Kong Chinese of the older generation, who migrated to 
Hong Kong from mainland China. Some of them had told their offspring a b o u t � 
their trauma, which will be discussed later. 
Ddbd (打IE) means execution by shooting. As a native Hong Kong person, I 
remember I was often told not to speak anything bad about the Communists, or 
otherwise I would be dragged, and shot and executed (唔好亂講野呀，拉去打IE 
架).Steve, my informant, 30 years old, shared with me his own experience, 
which is similar to that of mine. He told me his knowledge on some history about 
the Cultural Revolution and his idea of dab a: 
The idea of ddbd relates to the Cultural Revolution in China during 
1966-1976, when millions of Chinese were killed and shot by the Red 
Guards. During that period, those who were perceived as rebels against the 
Communist Party were subjected to violent attack, imprisonment, torture, 
murder and execution. My father told me that my grandma was killed by the 
Red Guards. Anxiety and fear were intense among the Chinese in Hong 
Kong, and that's why we were told not to say anything bad about Mao 
[Zedong] and the Communist, otherwise we would be caught by the Red 
Guards. 
Johnny, my informant, 35 years old, further elaborates the idea of ddbd 
based on his knowledge: 
There was the idea of ddbd because of two reasons. First, it was the 
hegemonic style of governance that the communist party adopted, which 
was similar to that of the ancient emperors in China. You know the ancient 
emperors were said to be the chosen one - the Son of Heaven (天子)，no 
one could overthrow their rulings. They could kill anyone who opposed 
them. Second, it was due to the Cultural Revolution. At that time, the 
Communist Party had just come into power. They were afraid of the 
supporters of Kuomingtang, that's the Chinese Nationalist Party, from 
revolting against them. That's why they had strict control over the minds of � 
millions of Chinese and used propaganda to praise the Communist Party. 
Even the parents of many people were caught and killed by their own 
children because they had said something bad about the Communist Party. 
They had a slogan, mommy and daddy cannot compare with chairman Mao 
[in Mandarin] die qin niang qin, burn Mao zhuxi qin (爹親娘親不如毛主席 
親)！ When Hong Kong people went to visit their relatives in the mainland, 
they had to be careful with their words. When I visited my relatives, my 
parents also ordered me not to say anything bad about the communists, not 
even jokes. That's why when many Hong Kong citizens got the news of the 
handover of Hong Kong to the Communist Party, they were frightened and 
chose to migrate. 
Another informant, Vince，a History teacher, said, "Today there is no ddbd 
anymore, but people are still very careful with what they say. We can see some 
activists are caught and put in jail because of their work or words." Some of my 
informants cannot explain the meaning of ddbd, but they still remember they 
were told to watch their words when they were small. Gloria, my informant, 25 
years old, told me, “I had heard of this [not to say anything bad about Mao and 
"Tso" 
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the Communist Part, or else one would be killed], but I was not sure why it was 
said. I guess it was just a way to threaten people, warning them against speaking 
without thinking." 
Events after 1976 
Apart from ddhd and execution, the two Tiananmen Incidents aroused the 
attentions of many Hong Kong people, especially the one in 1989. The 
Tiananmen Incident on April 5，1976 was triggered by the death of Chinese 
Premier, Zhou Enlai，who was a widely respected Chinese leader (Hutchings 
2000: 422). Hundreds of thousands of Chinese gathered in Tiananmen to mourn 
his death. The Chinese officials were alarmed by the huge number of mourners. 
On the night of April 5, armed military forces cleaned the square without causing 
any deaths. In 1989，Tiananmen broke out in another protest, which had a larger 
effect on the perception of many Hong Kong Chinese towards the communist 
government. The protest was triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang, a 
pro-democracy and anti-corruption official (Hutchings 2000: 423). Thousands of 
demonstrators gathered in Tiananmen, and most of them were students. On June 
4，1989，the government sent armed military forces to crack down oh the 
protestors. Bystanders were also killed and wounded (Hutchings 2000: 426). This 
incident enraged over one million Hong Kong people, and they expressed their 
anger and sorrow by demonstrating,- as mentioned earlier. Many were also � 
anxious about the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC (Hutchings 2000: 426). 
Apart from the more widely reported incidents listed above, stories about 
how the Communist government tortures opposition groups or dissidents are 
often circulated. Suspected dissidents are caught and sent to concentration camps, 
black jails and are reportedly brainwashed. In black jails, it is said people are 
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subject to violence such as rape, tyranny, threats and extortion. Furthermore, 
some people whx) are not opposed to the PRC can be caught and sentenced to jail 
too if they are considered to be "threatening" the "social harmony". The most 
recent case is Liu Xiaobo (蓥!|曉波).He was one of the authors of the manifesto 
"Charter 08”，which called for democracy and human rights in China {SCMP 
2009a). Liu, on December 23，2009, was sentenced to eleven years' of 
imprisonment under accusations of treason against and subversion of the Central 
People's Government. On 27 December, 2009, four activists and two journalists 
from Hong Kong protested at the immigration control point in Lo Wu in support 
of Liu. Mainland police crossed the border, dragged them to the mainland side, 
and detained them {SCMP 2009b). This, as argued by some Hong Kong people, 
damages the promise of "One country, two systems". Another case is about Tan 
Zmren (譚作人) .He investigated children's deaths in Sichuan earthquake in 
2008 under the proposal of "5.12 Student Archive". Tan, on 9 February, 2010， � 
was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for inciting subversion of state power 
(SCMP 2010). Reading these stories, one of my informants, June, 28 years old, 
told me, "My grandfather read these news, and he told me, ‘I always know it's 
dangerous to criticize the Communist.' He has always told me the dangers of 
saying anything bad about the Communist, so I am always conscious and careful 
when I talk about them." 
Here, I would like to borrow the case of Myamnar to illustrate how an 
indirect resistance is embodied in everyday life. Myanmar, formerly named 
Burma, still under the control of the military regime, has tight control over its 
people. Their daily life is under severe surveillance, so people tend to remain 
silent due to fear. Monique Skidmore (2006) says the Burmese do not directly 
resist to the military force. Instead, they turn to religion and medicine, which 
give them hope for changes, in both the present and after life. When direct 
resistance is considered taboo, weak and powerless citizens have to choose other 
ways to express their anxiety, discontent and even resistance against the 
» 
governance. Hong Kong people, like the Burmese, tend to be silence due to fear. 
The aforementioned examples, such as the cases of Liu Xiaobo and Tan Zuoren, 
who are accused of treason and subversion, illustrate the dangers of "words". 
Therefore, the majority of Hong Kong people rarely criticizes or expresses their 
discontent towards mainland China directly out of fears. 
Ma (2002: 85) also explores how Hong Kong filmmakers indirectly express 
their fears and hostilities esoterically and allegorically in films, such as A Better 
Tommorrow III (1989)，Song of the Exile (1990)，Farewell China (1990) and 
Chinese Torture Chamber Story (1994). For many Hong Kong people, demeanor 
and discourse on demeanor are one of the indirect channels to express their 
reluctance publicly. Chapter 5 will further illustrate the use of demeanor as an 
indirect resistance by Hong Kong people. 
Apart from the fears and concerns, Hong Kong people's character, also 
influences how they express their discontent. Hong Kong people have a habit of 
being silent when they encounter something they dislike. Expressing dislike and 
anger directly usually arouses conflict and disputes, which is considered 
face-losing in Hong Kong (this is discussed in Chapter 2). Provoking any 
disputes and fights is not preferred by most Hong Kong people, let alone the 
dangers of speaking out under the subversion law. Demeanor and discourse on • 
demeanor is thus a subtle way to resist without directly insulting the PRC. 
Mischievous gossip about mainlanders' behaviors is common. More importantly, 
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gossip is often circulated among Hong Kong people to belittle the image of 
mainlanders. Mainlanders may not know the spread of gossip and may not 
realize that they have made "cultural mistakes" through demeanor. Thereby, the 
expressions, through demeanor and its discourse, are conveyed in a symbolic 
form to mainlanders, so that Hong Kong people can avoid being charged with the 
accusation of criticizing the PRC. 
Identity, Emotions and Resistance 
The previous sections demonstrated Hong Kong people's bigoted attitudes 
towards mainlanders' demeanor, their complicated emotions towards mainland 
China and mainlanders, and the social marginalization of mainlanders in Hong 
Kong. In this section, I further elucidate the connections between identity, 
emotions and resistance. The resistance unraveled in this thesis is Hong Kong 
people's reluctance to accept, in an emotional sense, mainland China as their 
"motherland" and mainland Chinese as their "compatriots". 
Hong Kong, with a large proportion of immigrants from different parts of 
the world, often claims itself "a cosmopolitan society" or "a society of 
immigrants." Yet most non-Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong are ignored by 
many Hong Kong people as if they do not exist^^ Immigrants from mainland 
China, in contrast, receive much attention from Hong Kong people. Mainlanders 
face vitriolic criticisms towards their behavior. Other ethnic minorities, such as 
Indians, Pakistanis, and Caucasians, face less negative verbal attacks and receive 
55 Non-Chinese minorities do not catch much attention from Hong Kong people. The case of 
banban (Filipinos and Indonesians) is different since many of them are employed as domestic 
helpers and living together with Hong Kong people. African is another special case since 
Chungking Mansions have gathered a large number of Africans, but apart from this, they are still 
neglected by Hong Kong people in daily life. Gwdilou, Caucasian, is also different from other 
minorities for their "superior" status that is endowed with them by Hong Kong people. Other 
minorities such as a-cha (Indian, Pakistanis), Nepalese and Vietnamese are hidden in Hong Kong 
society. However, despite the different social status of these minorities, they still do not receive as 
much vitriolic criticism as mainlanders do. 
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less attention from heunggongyahn. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, initially this research aimed to 
find out differences in bodily dispositions between heunggongyahn and 
mn-heunggongyahn. I found, however, that these other groups do not matter to 
most of the Hong Kong people I spoke with, and that instead, there was 
abhorrence towards "mainlander's behaviors". The loathing towards mainlanders 
only developed quite recently; they were welcomed like family before the 1970s 
(Wong and Cheng 2004). What led to such an enormous change in attitudes 
towards mainlanders? Why do heunggongyahn have such negative attitudes 
towards mainlanders' behavior? The cultural knowledge of behaving "properly" 
distinguishes "others" from "us", or to be precise, it is used to create social 
boundaries, excluding some groups from being accepted as "us". Yet the situation 
of heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn is more than merely creating boundaries. 
In fact, the social boundary between heunggongyahn and daaihlohkyahn already 
exists, yet it is threatened by the political, economic and social changes in the 
relationships between Hong Kong and mainland China. 
The majority of Hong Kong people accept mainland China as their nation in 
a cognitive sense but not in an emotional sense (Mathews el al. 2008: 153). Hong 
Kong Chinese, though reluctant to accept China as their nation, do not try to 
overthrow the Chinese regime as their ruler, Rather, the resistance reflects their 
worries in changes which I have already introduced in Chapter 1: 1) political 
transformation in the transition from a liberal polity to a special administrative 
region with increasing communist authoritarian influence and 2) descent in status • 
from being "superior" and "dominant" to being "inferior" and "dominated". The 
once "inferior”，"dominated" and "poor" mainlanders have now become their 
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leaders. Many Hong Kong people feel uncomfortable about these changes. These 
changes upset the pride of many Hong Kong people and trigger them to resist 
these changes: to retain their liberty in the sense of protecting their social 
boundary from the "invasion" of mainland Chinese, and thus to maintain their 
"superiority". In other words, it is Hong Kong people's emotions persuade them 
to resist. 
丨 
E m o t i o n s ^ ^ 
Fig.5.1: An illustration for the relationships between identity, emotions and resistance. 
Jennifer Harding and E. Deidre Pribram discuss the relationships between 
social identity and emotions, 
[Emotions] are the means by which social and cultural formations affect us， 
that is, render us as feeling beings in a series of complex, intricate ways... 
Emotion and identity operate relationally. For example, gendered subjects 
are constructed through particular emotional events in which they express or � 
suppress specific emotions. Gendered subjects must live and feel the 
specificities of such emotional occurrences or events, and they must 
constantly re-enact 一 relive and refeel — those specificities as part of the 
ongoing performance and maintenance of their identities (2009: 13). 
Cultural identity, similar to social identity, is shaped by particular events and 
situations which motivate individuals to take up and identity with certain 
identities. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the simplified relationships between identity, 
emotions and resistance. It shows that the resistance that this thesis discusses is 
largely influenced and directed by Hong Kong cultural identity and Hong Kong 
people's emotions. The emotions include the complicated feelings that Hong 
{ 
. ： 
Kong people have towards mainland Chinese and these fears and concerns that 
Hong Kong people have. Due to the fears and concerns, this resistance is carried 
out in an indirect form - through demeanor and discourse on demeanor. 
" I s f 
Demeanor as "Weapons of the Weak" 
In this section, I introduce and elucidate the use of demeanor as a subtle 
weapon. In doing so, I draw on James Scott's Weapons of the Weak to unpack 
how Hong Kong people cope with the changes I have mentioned. I focus on 
Hong Kong people's "everyday forms" of resistance instead of the knotty power 
relations between Hong Kong and mainland China. 
Hong Kong Chinese people, here, are compared to the peasants portrayed 
by Scott in Weapons of the Weak (1985) for two reasons. First, most Hong Kong 
people, like the peasants, have to please the rich mainland investors or tourists in 
every way. Second, many Hong Kong Chinese people are afraid of direct 
expression of resistance against mainland China. In contrast, many rich mainland 
Chinese people, like the landlords, have gradually gained control over the fate of 
Hong Kong. "Weapons of the weak" are not only found in the struggles of power 
between populace and government; these weapons are embedded in everyday life 
where negotiations exist. 
Some may argue that Hong Kong people enjoy a higher social and 
economic status than mainlanders, and thus do not possess the same lower-class 
position as the weak peasants described by Scott. The majority of mainlanders 
are poorer than Hong Kong Chinese. According to the World Bank, Hong Kong 
GDP per capita in May 2010 stands at 34,587 US dollars while China's stands at ^ 
1,963 US dollars (Trading Economics 2010). However, politically speaking, 
Hong Kong is definitely subordinate to the PRC after the handover. As the 
subordinate, Hong Kong people, like the weak peasants, are controlled in many 
ways and have to please their political boss - mainland China, and their 
economic boss: rich mainland Chinese. With their distinct cultural identity and a 
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colonial background, many Hong Kong Chinese people have believed 
themselves to be different from mainlanders and that they belong to a "higher 
class", heunggongyahn, as they have proclaimed, are "more well-educated, smart, 
civilized, hygienic and moral", while daaihlohkyahn are depicted as 
"poorly-educated, stupid, uncivilized, unhygienic and immoral". Due to the 
handover, heunggongyahn, the presumed "higher class" people，have come to be 
ruled by daaihlohkyahn, the imagined "lower class" people. The vast change 
from going from superior to subordinate creates conflicting emotions for many 
Hong Kong people. 
Hence, many Hong Kong people are reluctant to return to the rule of 
mainlanders, who are presumed to be of "the lower class", yet any direct 
resistance may antagonize the new "colonial master”，and, in any case, 
contradicts many people's common sense of being "patriotic Chinese". As Scott 
(1985: xvi) argues, "They [the weak] make use of implicit understands and � 
informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they 
typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority". The poor can 
humiliate the rich through backbiting, malicious gossip, and inventing derogatory 
nicknames (Lewellen 2003: 117). Hong Kong people indeed have done similar 
things to mainlanders. Demeanor and discourse on demeanor are subtle methods 
that weak Hong Kong people use to express their deep-down feeling of resistance. 
As mentioned in the last section, the body is linked with the society in the sense 
that it represents the social boundaries that are threatened. 
Mary Douglas, in analyzing the concepts of pollution and taboo, illustrates 
the linkage between body and society: 
The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its 
boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious. 
The body is a complex structure (Douglas 1966: 142)... Each culture has its 
own special risks and problems. To which particular bodily margins its 
beliefs attribute power depends on what situation the body is mirroring. It 
seems that our deepest fears and desires take expression with a kind of witty 
aptness. To understand bodily pollution we should try to argue back from 
the known dangers of society to the known selection of bodily themes and 
try to recognize what appositeness is here (Douglas 1966: 150). 
Douglas employs the caste system in India as an example to demonstrate 
that the idea of pure and impure bodies is a symbolic system with the primary 
concern about the ordering of social hierarchy (Douglas 1966: 154). The earlier 
described changes in the relationships between Hong Kong and mainland China 
sway many Hong Kong people's senses of self identity, which have lapsed into a 
period of "identity crisis". This crisis is also expressed through the body. In 
chapter 3 I demonstrated how Hong Kong people consciously avoid practicing 
stigmatized demeanor to distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese and in 
this chapter I have discussed how discourses on "mainlanders' demeanor" have 
successfully segregated mainland Chinese in Hong Kong as "outsiders" and as 
"uneducated". They stigmatize certain demeanor as "mainlanders' behavior" and 
spread gossip about "mainlanders" breaking the rules in Hong Kong. 
Although the majority of Hong Kong people tend not to expresstheir 
reluctance towards mainland China verbally and directly, many of them do 
express their discontent and criticisms directly towards the Hong Kong 
government, whom is seen as the puppet of the mainland Chinese government. 
Hong Kong people participate in demonstrations, write complaint letters and 
criticisms. Like the mass media in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government often 
serves as the only target of attack, while the Chinese government is rarely . 
criticized. 
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Demeanor as Symbolic Violence 
The dominated apply categories constructed from the point of view of the 
dominant to the relations of domination, thus making them appear as 
natural. 
(Pierre Bourdieu 2004b: 339) 
In this section, I will conclude this thesis by arguing that the stigmatization 
of demeanor is a form of symbolic violence. Here, I use the term symbolic 
violence slightly different from Bourdieu's use of the term. Jenkins interprets 
Bourdieu's symbolic violence as "the imposition of systems of symbolism and 
meaning upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as 
legitimate" (Jenkins 2002: 104). In this sense, there is a legitimating and 
dominating force that compels and constrains people to perform in certain ways. 
I would like to emphasize that although mainlanders may not be forced to 
conform to the dominated Hong Kong cultural rules 一 to behave "correctly" 一 
their social and symbolic capital have been limited and they have surely 
experienced both social and geographical isolation. This is a form of violence 
that upsets mainland Chinese's social status and restricts their access to resources 
in Hong Kong. This thesis does not suggest that mainlanders are passive victims. 
Mainlanders also have their ways in dealing with this symbolic violence, but they 
are not the focus of this thesis. 
The stigmatization of "mainlanders' demeanor", clearly, is a form of 
"imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning" upon mainlanders in Hong 
Kong. By studying the relationship between manners and social relations, Jorge 
Arditi (1998) argues that etiquette affirms the aristocracy as a group and is used 
by the group to construct and affirm its power. As mentioned earlier, mainlanders 
who fail to perform "correctly" are perceived as "uneducated" and left out by the 
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mainstream, and thus possess less power. Similar to Bourdieu, Arditi looks at 
how the dominated group defines symbolic systems and etiquette, and how 
hierarchies are affirmed by these systems. 
Hong Kong people, being the majority and the dominant group in Hong 
Kong, define cultural rules and values. "Uncivilized" behaviors, such as jumping 
queues and spitting, are stigmatized as "mainlanders' demeanor", thus imposing 
a negative social image - "dirty, uneducated and rude" - upon mainland Chinese. 
The poor image of mainlanders hinders their permeability into Hong Kong 
society, which causes social exclusion and marginalization. 
Mainlanders, as a result of the mass media's malignant depictions, are 
identified as the source of "disease", and are also blamed as "dangerous" and 
"disturbing". They are blamed as the causes of social problems: First, Hong 
Kong is seen as getting "dirtier" because mainlanders "squat on seat-toilets, spit 
and urinate everywhere". Second, Hong Kong is becoming more "chaotic" 
because mainlanders "jump queues, squat on streets and simply ignore rules". 
Third, Hong Kong is getting even "more polluted" because mainlanders "talk 
i 
loudly and smoke in non-smoking areas". The above stigmatization not,only 
occurs in the daily dominant discourse, but also in the mass media and the 
government official discourse and in government policies as well. 
The double/multiple standards that Hong Kong people hold explain the 
social exclusion and marginalization of mainlanders. To some extent, these are 
deliberately exercised particularly on mainlanders. The diffusion of malicious 
gossip about "mainlanders' demeanor" and the malignant portrayals of • 
mainlanders are indeed a form of symbolic violence. Under such symbolic 
violence, the power and rights of mainlanders are exploited. Mainlanders are 
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positioned as "deviants", "outsiders", "intruders" and "inferiors", and as 
"second-class citizens". In contrast, Hong Kong people continue to proclaim 
themselves as "well-educated" and "superior", "first-class citizens" who "rule" 
Hong Kong. 
Conclusion 
The pivotal theme of this chapter is that of the relationships between 
demeanor，emotions and resistance; I have discussed the symbolic violence that 
is acted upon mainlanders through malignant portrayals of their demeanor. 
Mainlanders, as mentioned in the previous chapters, are perceived as 
homogeneous while differences in classes and ages are neglected. This chapter, 
by exploring Hong Kong people's everyday life, unveiled the double/ multiple 
standards that Hong Kong people hold towards the same forms of demeanor 
performed by different social actors. It then discussed the complicated emotions 
that Hong Kong people feel towards mainland Chinese. These complicated 
emotions lead to the social marginalization of mainlanders in the name of 
avoiding being polluted and downgraded by "uneducated" and "dirty" 
mainlanders. The social marginalization was then examined through three areas: 
the official discrimination against mainlanders by the Hong Kong government, 
the malignant portrayal of mainlanders by the mass media, and the vitriolic 
criticisms towards mainlanders by Hong Kong people. 
I then argued that Hong Kong people's reluctance to accept mainland 
Chinese as their "compatriots" and mainland China as their "homeland" is a kind 
of resistance. This resistance involves Hong Kong people's distinct identity and 
their complicated emotions. Due to fears and concerns, most Hong Kong people 
do not express their resistance directly and verbally. Instead they express it 
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through demeanor and discourses on mainlanders' demeanor. They spread 
malicious stories about mainlanders being "uncivilized" and breaking rules. 
These malignant descriptions about mainlanders' demeanor are Hong Kong 
people's weapons in order to limit mainlanders' competitiveness and upgrading 
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of social status in Hong Kong. This chapter finally argued that the deliberate 
segregation and stigmatization are a form of symbolic violence. 
To conclude, how Hong Kong people perceive and position mainlanders 
affects how they comprehend mainlanders' demeanor. The differences in bodily 
disposition may not matter as much as the identities that actors are identified 
with. Prejudice against mainlanders' demeanor conveys a fundamental but 





This thesis examines how Hong Kong Chinese people present their distinct 
cultural identity through their daily practice and discourse, particularly in terms 
of demeanor and body language. In this thesis，Hong Kong people's repugnance 
directed towards "mainlanders' behaviors" is explored and demonstrated. I argue 
that mainland Chinese people are indeed "scapegoats" for the PRC as a country 
and the anxieties and changes that Hong Kong people refuse to face. The 
underlying reasons for the diversion of sentiments have also been examined in 
the thesis. In this concluding chapter, I briefly review the arguments made and 
then recapitulate the larger issues of this thesis. 
The introductory chapter discussed the hidden factors that have contributed 
to Hong Kong people's discrimination against mainland Chinese since the mid 
1970s. It also gave definitions for the terms "demeanor" and "resistance". I then 
summarized various scholars' works relating to the human body, the presentation 
and embodiment of cultures, and Hong Kong identity. This helped to explain and 
understand the situation of using demeanor as an expression of resistance in 
Hong Kong. Finally the methodology employed in this thesis was presented. 
Chapter 2 unraveled the invisible social hierarchy that has been built, 
consciously or not, by imposing contrasting values upon various forms of 
demeanor. Certain forms of demeanor are believed to be "Hong Kong people's 
demeanor" and are attached to positive values such as "educated", "disciplined", 
and "clean". In contrast, certain forms of demeanor are stigmatized to be 
"mainlanders' demeanor" and are imposed with negative values such as 
i "uneducated", "rude" and "dirty". This marks a clear and conscious division 
i 
between Hong Kong Chinese people and mainland Chinese people. Moreover, 
the contrasting images of the two groups shape the sense of "superiority" and 
"pride" felt by Hong Kong people when they regarding mainlanders as "inferior". 
Through the stigmatization, the heterogeneities of mainland Chinese people are 
disregarded，and "mainlanders" are depicted as a static and homogeneous group. 
Chapter 3 examined the imagined of the "path to civilization" shared by 
Hong Kong Chinese. “Mainlanders, demeanor", according to the "path to 
civilization", is "uncivilized", "uneducated" and "dirty". I drew upon Bourdieu's 
capital theory and elucidated the power of demeanor in various contexts. 
Demeanor is a form of cultural capital that affects both symbolic and social 
capital. Since most mainland Chinese people have limited cultural capital in 
Hong Kong, such as knowledge of cultural rules and norms, they possess weaker 
symbolic capital (The weak symbolic capital means the rejection of recognizing 
as members and "compatriots" by Hong Kong Chinese people, which was 
discussed in Chapter 5). As a result, mainland Chinese people are marginalized 
and isolated in the Hong Kong community. They are left with weak social 
networks. I also examined how my informants consciously present their cultural 
identity in daily life by avoiding the practice of certain stigmatized "mainlanders' 
demeanor". The unconscious embodiment of cultural identity was also explored 
through the practice of eye contact. 
Chapter 4 looked into the changing relationships between Hong Kong and 
mainland China in terms of Hong Kong's political, economic and social 
situations. It then explored the shaping of Hong Kong identity chronologically . 
since the 1950s till the 2000s, understanding how an attributed sense of 
"superiority" in the identity of heunggongyahn works in tandem with the 
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imposed sense of "inferiority" on the identity of daaihlohkyahn. The identity of 
daaihlohkyahn, as a result of negative portrayals, carries symbols of shame and 
humiliation. The "middle-class" mentality of heunggongyahn was also explored 
to understand the imagined negative image of "mainlanders". Distinct identity, 
thus, acts as the "border in the heads" of many Hong Kong people after the 
handover in 1997, leading to the phenomenon of "one country, two castes，，， 
which separates Hong Kong people and mainland Chinese people by 
i distinguishing the opposing categories of "us" and "them". 
Chapter 5 explored my informants' everyday experiences and feelings and 
unpacked how they perceive the return of the sovereignty to mainland China. I 
first the double/multiple standards that Hong Kong people hold towards 
behaviors that are performed by different groups. This revealed Hong Kong 
people's bigoted views towards "mainlanders' behavior". I then depicted the 
Hong Kong people's complicated emotions towards mainland Chinese: love, fear, � 
anxiety, and discontent. I analyzed how demeanor is manipulated as a way to 
socially marginalize mainlanders in Hong Kong, in which mainlanders are 
treated as scapegoats. I also examined Hong Kong people's shared fears and 
concerns, which explained why Hong Kong people rarely express their 
complicated emotions directly. I then illustrated Hong Kong people's sense of 
resistance is influenced and directed by their distinct cultural identity and the 
complicated emotions towards mainlanders. To further elaborate the linkage 
between resistance and demeanor, I drew on James Scott's idea of "weapons of 
the weak" and the case of Burmese's everyday resistance as examples. The 
intentional and malicious social marginalization and isolation work particularly 
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and exclusively on mainland Chinese people. I argued that this as a form of 
symbolic violence that Hong Kong Chinese people exercise on mainland Chinese 
people to reject and prevent them from competing for power and resources on a 
fair ground. 
Now, in the final concluding chapter, let's turn to the larger and more subtle 
issues in this thesis: 1) What does the case of Hong Kong teach us about 
everyday politics? 2) Is the repugnance only a "residue" of political wants left in 
the 1980s? 3) In what ways can the term ''daaihlohkyahn'' be used as an adjective? 
4) What can we learn about the politics of cultural identity? 5) What is the 
prospect of the repugnant situation in Hong Kong? 6) Finally, I will close with 
my afterthoughts. 
The Case of Hong Kong 
What does the case of Hong Kong teach us about everyday politics? This 
thesis mainly focuses on Hong Kong people who live under the PRC's increasing 
hegemonic powers and their everyday wisdom in dealing with it^^. I have 
examined two cases in the thesis to bring up weapons used by the weak populace. 
In Chapter 2，Skidmore tells us how Burmese people, who live under tight 
military control, resist the hegemonic power by turning to spiritual supports -
religion and medicine. The strong belief in miraculous power is a strategy 
employed to improve their daily lives. In the same chapter, another case is 
illustrated. McFalls explores how East Germans, who were portrayed a s � 
"inferior", lived after the reunification of Germany. Under West Germany's 
56 I do not mean that the relationships of power are static. A group of people/ a person can be 
both the dominant and dominated, depending on situations and contexts. For Hong Kong people, 
as mentioned before, they are both the dominant and the dominated. In Hong Kong, they are the 
dominant and the majority, therefore they can exercise cultural hegemony upon mainlanders, who 
are the dominated and the minority. Yet, under the PRC, Hong Kong is definitely the dominated, 
and is experiencing various hegemonic powers from the PRC, which are discussed in Chapter 3. 
In other words, Hong Kong people socially dominated mainlanders but mainlanders politically 
dominated Hong Kong people. 
• 1 9 7 
political, economic and cultural hegemony, East Germans employed subtle ways 
to resist and form a new identity for themselves. 
What does the case of Hong Kong tell us? Hong Kong people, who 
perceived themselves as "superior" to mainland Chinese, became "inferior" after 
the handover - "relying on mainland China", "receiving economic benefits from 
mainland China", and "being taken care of by the PRC". With drastic changes in 
social positioning, and increasing hegemonic powers from the PRC, many Hong 
Kong people in their daily discourse spread horrifying stories about mainlanders' 
"cruelty", "greed" and "immorality". Furthermore, Hong Kong people magnify 
the differences in demeanor as a way to stigmatize and homogenize mainlanders 
as "uneducated" and "inferior", with an attempt to maintain Hong Kong people's 
sense of "superiority" and retain their power over "mainland Chinese". The 
stigmatization not only helps to maintain the Hong Kong Chinese's sense of 
superiority, it also reflects Hong Kong people's perceptions of mainland society 一 、 
"chaotic", "dirty", "unlawful", "corrupted", "undisciplined" and "uncivilized". 
News about mainland society's corruption, tainted food，censorship, and 
oppression are often heard in Hong Kong, and these pictures of mainland China 
reinforce Hong Kong people's perception of mainlanders, who are seen to be 
"representatives" of mainland society. 
In addition, the case of Hong Kong demonstrates another way of expressing 
unspoken messages and resisting hegemonic powers when direct resistance is 
considered "inappropriate" and "unpatriotic". Daily practices and discourse on 
demeanor such as social marginalization and stigmatization, thus, provide a 
subtle but efficient way of resisting "intrusion" by another social group. 
"Mainlander" as an Adjective 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, mainland Chinese people are simplified and 
homogenized by Hong Kong people as a static and fixed category: 
daaihlohkyahn. In Chapter 3, I have also explored how my informants perceive 
the identity of daaihlohkyahn, in which many Hong Kong people try hard to 
distinguish themselves from. Here, I will examine how the terms daaihlohk and 
daaihlohkyahn are used as an adjective, daaihlohkyahn (mainlander) and 
daaihlohk (mainland)，in different contexts are used as an adjective in Hong 
Kong, carrying negative meanings such as "low class", "inferior" and "bad taste". 
The terms can be used in many situations, although it is less commonly used 
today. For instance, it can be employed to describe certain behaviors and dressing 
style. Some Hong Kong people say, "This dress is so ‘daaihlohk’” or certain 
behavior "looks like daaihlohkyahn'', in which “daaihhhJe, and “daaMoh_n” 
are employed to substitute adjectives such as "ugly", "disgusting" and "bad 
taste". This also elucidates why the majority of Hong Kong people feel 
exaggerated in being misidentified as “daaihlohkyiihn”, under the connotations 
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of “daailohJ^, with some negative adjectives. 
Therefore, the use of “daaihhhie’ as an adjective is closely related to the 
image of "mainlanders" as homogenous, "dirty" and "poor". As discussed before， 
Hong Kong people have gradually changed their impression of "mainlanders" i n � 
the last decade, switching from "poor peasants" to "new rich" (or "parvenu"). 
Nonetheless, regardless of the increasing number of rich people in the Mainland, 
"mainlanders" in the perception of many Hong Kong people are still believed to 
be "inferior" to and "poorer" than Hong Kong people. 
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The “Residue” of Political Wants? 
As argued before, the bigotry towards "mainlanders' demeanor" conveys 
political messages，such as resistance towards the handover of Hong Kong to 
mainland China. Today, many Hong Kong people unconsciously discriminate 
against mainlanders. Most of my informants, like other Hong Kong people, do 
not realize their own bigoted attitudes towards “mainlanders，demeanor", and 
they believe wholeheartedly that mainlanders are "uneducated" and "inferior". 
Some of my informants did consider the differences among mainlanders when I 
interviewed them, but in their daily discourses, mainlanders were still 
"homogeneous" and "static". Some may argue that the unwitting prejudice 
against mainlanders no longer conveys political messages. However, my findings 
in this research show a different answer. This thesis demonstrates that political 
messages change along time and the intricate sentiments of Hong Kong people. 
In the mid-1970s, many Hong Kong people were afraid of the handover in 1997, 
and thus they rejected mainlanders as a way to express reluctance towards the 
return of sovereignty to the PRC. After the handover, although many of them 
have already taken the handover as "fate" and "a part of their life", mainlanders 
are continuously treated as "outsiders" and "intruders". Many Hong Kong people 
have experienced the increasing hegemonic power from the PRC, which was 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. Mainlanders are perceived as "representatives of the 
PRC". The increasing number of mainlanders is seen as a "mainlandization" and 
an "occupation" of Hong Kong. Rejecting mainland Chinese, as a result, serves 
as a resistance against the PRC's increasing hegemonic power, as well as a 
means to maintain Hong Kong Chinese's sense of superiority and to retain power 
over mainland Chinese, which are discussed in Chapter 5. Through the process of 
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stigmatization, the social status of mainlanders is belittled, the concern for rising 
status of mainlanders is alleviated, the insecurity of Hong Kong people is 
soothed, and most importantly, the sense of superiority Hong Kong people 
themselves is upheld. 
In sum, the daily practices of repugnance towards "mainlanders' demeanor" 
convey unspoken but crucial messages that vary with time and Hong Kong 
people's changing sentiments. 
Will the Repugnance be Gradually Alleviated? 
Hong Kong has been returned to the PRC for more than a decade. Although 
as shown in Chapter 5，most mainland Chinese people still encounter a great deal 
of difficulty in being recognized as part of Hong Kong community, 
discrimination has diminished compared to a decade ago. What gradually 
alleviated Hong Kong people's bias towards mainlanders (though the repugnance 
is still obvious)? As argued by Mathews et al. (2008), many Hong Kong people's 
nationalism is led by the Chinese national market. They love the economic 
fortune brought by mainland China's development, and also the huge revenue 
brought by mainland tourists. The majority of Hong Kong people have a 
cognitive sense of belonging to China, but not in'an emotional sense. In this case, 
many Hong Kong people do not share the same sense of "patriotism" with other 
Chinese people, who are willing to die for their country. However, the emotional ^ 
sense of belonging to China is becoming stronger under a series of propaganda 
campaigns especially among the younger generations, who had little experience 
under British rule. School education, the mass media and the Hong Kong 
government's portrayals of the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland 
China inculcate the Hong Kong populace with a national sense of belonging. 
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Mathews et al. (2008) have listed detailed examples to illustrate the changing 
sense of nationalism and the sense of belonging among Hong Kong people, and I 
have mentioned some in the thesis. With the gradual increase in Hong Kong 
people's sense of belonging, the distinct cultural identity of Heunggongyahn as 
opposed to daaihlohkyahn may eventually wither away. As I mentioned before, 
many Hong Kong people resist the PRC's increasing hegemonic power and the 
anxieties and changes that they refuse to face. When Hong Kong people's sense 
of nationalism becomes stronger and when Hong Kong people see how Hong 
Kong, led by a rising power - mainland China, plays a role in the global market, 
I believe the repugnance towards "mainlanders' demeanor" will diminish and 
mainland Chinese would be, once again, treated as "compatriots". 
Power Struggle 
Throughout this thesis, I explored the power relations between Hong Kong 
Chinese people and mainland Chinese people, and between Hong Kong and the 
PRC. As described in Chapter 5, many working class mainland immigrants are 
isolated and marginalized in Hong Kong society: limited social network, 
difficulties in finding jobs and making friends, and discrimination. Their power is 
thus exploited. In the meantime, rich middle class mainland tourists and investors 
exercise their power in a pecuniary sense. In return, Hong Kong people continue 
to belittle "mainlanders' demeanor" as "inferior" and "uncivilized", and in doing 
so, Hong Kong people's sense of superiority is maintained. 
The PRC, which is called "grandpa" in the daily discourse of many Hong 
Kong people, extend increasing influence and control over Hong Kong and the 
Hong Kong government - the "puppet of Beijing". On one hand, mainland China 
gradually gains control over Hong Kong. On the other, Hong Kong people 
t 
attempt to retain their power over mainland Chinese people, who are seen as "the 
representatives of the PRC". Although mainlanders are officially depicted as 
"compatriots" of Hong Kong people, they are left out as "unwanted" and 
"outsiders" for the charge of their "uncivilized" behavior. However, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, Hong Kong people are not focusing on the behavior itself, but 
targeting mainlanders. They have different comments towards the same behavior 
performed by mainlanders and Caucasians. The bias that Hong Kong people hold, 
thus, reflect their resistance to accept mainlanders as "compatriots". The blame 
lay on mainlanders for causing pollutions and dirtying Hong Kong is only a 
"weapon" that Hong Kong people employ to socially isolate mainlanders in 
Hong Kong society. This can be construed that many Hong Kong people are not 
yet ready to embrace mainland China as their "motherland". 
Hong Kong Chinese's daily practices, therefore, reflect how the intricate 
relationship of power is negotiated, struggled and changed. 
Forms of Resistance 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, resistance is defined by Seymour 
(2006) as the subordinate's intentional opposition. "Resistance" was a hot'topic 
in 1970s and 1980s when anthropologists and ethnographers were keen on 
finding cracks in hegemonic systems for subordinate groups to challenge the 
power of the dominants (Seymour 2006: 302). Seymour criticized Foucault's ^ 
tautology, "[.W]here there is power, there is resistance", for not defining the 
differences between consciousness and unconsciousness on "the dissatisfaction 
of the status quo" in leading to resistance. Also, she questions "how individuals 
learn a system of cultural meanings, internalize and draw upon these meanings, 
as a result, are motivated to act in ways that are, at times, contrary to dominant 
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powers and beliefs" (Seymour 2006: 304). Unlike Foucault and Seymour, who 
focus on the resistance towards the "discontent status quo", this thesis explores 
the changing resistance of Hong Kong people. In the early 1980s, Hong Kong 
people resisted the "intrusion into" and "any changes to" "the satisfying status 
quo" by another "foreign" - mainland Chinese - power and culture. After the 
handover, many Hong Kong people continue to resist the vast changes, such as 
the reverse of economic reliance, the descent in social positioning and power, 
which accumulate as the "dissatisfaction status quo". 
Moreover, this thesis focuses on how demeanor and discourse on demeanor 
are employed by Hong Kong people to express their resistance in daily life. 
Various scholars have done research on indirect resistance. This thesis mentioned 
James Scott's Weapons of the Weak and Skidmore's Burmese case of turning to 
medicine and religion to reject the reality. Hong Kong people manipulate the 
conceived differences in demeanor to demarcate mainland Chinese people from � 
"themselves", drawing a clearer distinctive line other than merely in the forms of 
dressing styles and language. 
The Politics of Cultural Identity 
Studying the cultural identity of heunggongyahn, this thesis also reveals the 
power of cultural identity, where cultural identity is employed as a local politic. 
To distinguish mainland Chinese people from Hong Kong Chinese people, the 
. ‘ 
sense of heunggongyahn gradually emerged, partly at a subconscious level. In 
her The Invisible Empire (2010), Wemyss describes how the dominant British 
public discourse constitutes a white violence on Muslims in Britain. She (2010: 
10) writes: 
The dominant class attempts to retain hegemony by achieving the consent of 
； 
subordinate classes by incorporating them into institutions that support its 
authority... Dominant ideology is manifested as ‘common sense' 一 that is 
the way individuals perceive the world uncritically and, to an extent, 
unconsciously. 
Hong Kong people, unlike the case described by Wemyss, have a physical 
appearance like the mainland Chinese, therefore skin color and "race" would not 
be useful weapons to demarcate them. On the other hand, Hong Kong people, 
very much like the "white" British, categorize and stigmatize mainland Chinese 
to isolate them from the community. Hong Kong people manipulate differences 
in demeanor and impose "civilization levels" upon various forms of demeanor to 
establish and reinforce the invisible social hierarchy. The cultural identity is 
produced and reproduced through demarcation of bodily dispositions. "Hong 
Kong people's demeanor" is adorned with positive values whilst "mainlanders' 
demeanor" is given negative labels, as illustrated in Chapter 3. Cultural identity, 
thus, is used to mark a social inclusion and exclusion in Hong Kong. 
After all, what does identity really mean? I did not focus on the 
manipulation of cultural identity in other means, such as using it as a tool of 
building nationalism, and a tool of building senses of belonging. Furthermore, it 
can be used politically by a nation to strengthen citizens' national identity to fight 
and die for the country. 
Afterthoughts: The Reproduction of Cultural Identity 
V 
While working on this thesis, the social reproduction of cultural identity 
often struck me. Demeanor plays an essential role in the process of shaping one's 
cultural identity. Chapter 4 explores the conceived differences between "Hong 
Kong people's behaviors" and "mainlanders' behaviors". It also shows the 
notions of "Hong Kong Chinese's behaviors" are constructed by social 
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institutions, daily practices, regulations and social norms. For instance, tight 
school rules and the laws regulate and constrain both students and the populace's 
behaviors in the public. These rules are embedded and internalized in the human 
body and embodied through demeanor. Cultural identity does not only reproduce 
in religions, beliefs, and ways of living, but also in the human body. Although I 
did not focus on the production and reproduction of cultural identity in this thesis, 
yet how the human body, especially demeanor, plays a role in it is definitely 
worth exploring. 
The social reproduction of cultural identity often takes place unwittingly. I 
had never given a deep thought to my own cultural identity until I started 
working on this research. The identity of heunggongyahn seems so natural to me 
that I have never thought about how this identity emerged and what it means to 
be a heunggongyahn. Also, similar to many Hong Kong people, I share a very 
weak sense of belonging to a nation, mainland China. What does a country really � 
mean? What does mainland China mean to me? Is heunggongyahn necessarily 
opposed to daaihlohkyahnl To be honest, I held negative attitudes towards 
mainlanders’ behavior, but I did not notice my own bias before doing this 
research. However, I believe Hong Kong could be a better place without 
discrimination. Differences in demeanor should not be used as a weapon to attack 
another group. Instead, one should learn to respect others and understand others' 
differences. I wish to live in a world without borders. Skin color, language and 
living style are not that important when we understand how the world works, 
which can easily be taken for granted. This also reminds me of Max Weber's idea 
of an "iron cage", where individuals are easily trapped in the social systems they 
create themselves. 
Appendix I 
"Papa, Mama" 一 Beyond 
You Better Check This Out [original in English] 
‘ 爸爸要爭論昨日是誰錯媽媽她心裏一把火（Papa argued whose wrong in 
yesterday, mama was also very angry deep down) 
乖乖已長大莫問是誰錯只想你一句講清楚 ( D o n ' t question whose fault, it's 
already grown up, just want you to make it clear) 
過渡期裏戰鬥未曾過去(Fights in transition period have not yet passed) 
我被遺棄太過令人費解(Too hard to understand why I am abandoned) 
爸爸他說媽媽真失敗今天真正主角是我嗎(Papa said mama is really a . 
loser, am I the true protagonist?) 
爸爸請你歸家休息吧今天真正主角是我嗎(Papa asked you to go home and 
rest, am I the true protagonist?) 
即管再爭吧命運是頻撲新聞我只覺真囉嗦！（E v e n if one continues to 
argue, fate is ever-changing, and news is long-winded) 
根本打選擇活著是迷惘新方向須要分清楚(There is no choice, living in a 
maze, new direction ought to be clearly noticed) 
真係唔知做人點至得（Really have no clue on how to live) 
我又唔知而家興 D M (And I don't know what's trendy now) , 
總 之 報 紙 寫 我 就 信 ( I believe whatever it's written on newspaper) 
電 視 做 我 就 蹄 t i (I watch whatever shown on TV) 
大倦講 t i 我 o 地 就 講 ( I speak whatever big brother says) 
見倒巨星著 t i 我 就 著 ( I wears whatever artists wear) 
總之老豆食tZ> 我就食 t i (Anyway，I eat whatever papa eats) � 
喂 傻 o 架！ (Hey, it's insane!) 
i ； 
盡快把私心收起沒戰爭沒鬥氣（P u t a w a y selfishness quickly，no war no . 
fight) i 
讓我的膚色不褪在某天再企起 ( M y skin color won't fade, stand up in some 
day) • 




According to Article 24, the right of abode is given to 
1. Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; 
2. Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a 
continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; 
3. Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents 
listed in categories (1) and (2); 
4. Persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered Hong Kong with 
valid travel documents，have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a 
continuous period of not less than seven years and have taken Hong Kong 
as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; 
5. Persons under 21 years of age born in Hong Kong of those residents 
listed in category (4) before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region; and 
6 .Pe r sons other than those residents listed in categories (1) to (5), who, 
before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, had the right of abode in Hong Kong only. � 
i 
GLOSSARY 
a-cha (阿差） Pakistani and Indian people 
A-Chaan A derogating name to call mainlanders 
a-siik (l^/iS) Literally means uncles. A name to call middle-aged 
men 
banban (S!®) Indonesian and Filipinos 
chahlauh (茶樓) Chinese restaurants 
Daaihlohkjdi (大陸仔） Literally means mainland boy, a derogating name 
to call mainlanders 
Daaihlohklei (大陸 • ) A derogating name to call mainlanders 
Daaihlohkyahn (大陸人) A comparatively neutral term to call mainlanders 
ddbd (打革巴） Execution by shooting 
gungdaksam (公德心） Public virtue 
Gwdilou (鬼偌） Caucasians 
Heunggongyahn (香港人） Hong Kong people 
keuhnggwok (強國） Literally means a strong nation, but a ironic term to 
call mainland China 
leuhnhaahm (J侖陷） Being occupied and intruded 
mihn pehi hduh ( U ® Means shameless and cheeky, not afraid of losing 
face. 
mduViuh (無聊) Boring, not interesting, something meaningless 
mduhgaauyeuhng (無教養)N o t Nurtured 
mduhgagaau (M^^) Not Nurtured 
pdih (i^) Stare at ‘ 
saan-jaaih (山寨） Literally means a mountain fortress, but 
symbolically means plagiarism 
sanyihmahn New immigrants 







Abbas，Ackbar. 2001. "(H)edge City: A Response to 'Becoming (Postcolonial) 
Hong Kong.'" Cultural Studies 15(3/4): 621-626. 
Ahmed, Sara. 2004. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge. 
Albinski H.S. 1965. "Australia and the Chinese Strategic Embargo." Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 19 (2): 117 — 128. 
Andreas, Joel. 2002. "Battling over Political and Cultural Power during the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution." Theory and Society 31:463-519. 
Andrewes, 2005. Bodywork, Dress as Cultural Tool: Dress and Demeanor in the 
South of Senegal. Boston: Brill. 
Apple Daily. 2000a. "Causes of Segregation (「分化 i成因)” .FOl, November 30. 
2000b. “'New，Immigrants (「新 i 移民)” .E14，December 22. 
2002a. A Girl was Battered by Senior Schoolmates for 3.5 Hours "I am 
scared of being battered, I want to go back to mainland China (女生遭高 
班童當虐打3 1 /2小時「我好驚再俾人打寧願返大陸 I ) . A04, 
November 07. 
2002b. "Demonstrate how new immigrants can permeate into the society 
丨'(示範新移民融入社會)” .E04, December 18. 
2003. "Free courses assisting new immigrants (免費課程助新移民)”. 、 
A04, January 01. 
2006. "Two-hundred-thousand people waiting for public housing, 30 
percent with less than seven resident years in Hong Kong, Wong Kwun 
suggested to separate new immigrants in the housing allocation systems 
(20萬人排隊上樓近3成居港少於7年王坤建議編配公屋分散新移 
民)，，.A20. August 4. 
Arditi, Jorge. 1998. A Genealogy of Manners: Transformations of Social 
Relations in France and Britain from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth 
Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Arnold, David. 1993. Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease 
in Nineteenth-Century India. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Ash, Robert, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook and Robin Porter eds. 2000. Hong 
Kong in Transition: The Handover Years. Centre for the study of 
Globalization and Regionalization: University of Warwick. London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. New York: St. Martin's Press, Ltd. 
Ash, Robert and Y. Y. Kueh eds. 1996. The Chinese Economy under Deng 
Xiaoping. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
； """IkT 
Ashton，Basil et el. 1984. "Famine in China, 1958 - 1961." Population and 
Development Review 10 (4): 613-645 . 
Au, W.L. and Cheung, Y.Y. 2004. "Daaihhohksang ngoigwok gunmihm 
doyeuhngfa" [Diversity in how University Students feel Love for their 
Country]. In U-Beats, April. 
Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of 
Culture Difference. Boston: Little Brown. 
Berdahl, Daphne. 1999. Where the World Ended: Re-unification and Identity in 
the Germany Borderland. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Berry, Bonnie. 2007. Beauty Bias: Discrimination and Social Power. The USA: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Blackman, Lisa. 2008. The Body: The Key Concepts. New York: Berg. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2004a. "Bodily Knowledge." In The Aberdeen Body Group ed.， 
The Body II: Critical Concepts in Sociology, pp. 52-82. London: 
Routledge. 
2004b. "Gender and Symbolic Violence." In Nancy Scheper-Hughes and 
Philippe Bourgois eds.，Violence in War and Peace, pp. 339 - 342. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
1990. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press 
1984. The Logic of Practice. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Burkitt，Ian. 1999. Bodies of Thought: Embodiment, Identity and Modernity. 
London: SAGE Publications 
Cahill, Spencer. 2006. "Building Bodily Boundaries: Embodied Enactment and 
Experience." In Dennis Waskul and Phillip Vannini eds., 
Body/Embodiment: Symbolic Interaction and the Sociology of the Body, 
pp. 69-82. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Calefato, Patrizia. 2004. The Clothed Body. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
Camaroff, Jean. 1985. Body of Power Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and 
History of a South African People. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Carroll, John Mark. 2007. A Concise History of Hong Kong. USA: Rowan & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Chan, Annie Hau-nung. 2000. "Middle-class Formation and Consumption in 
Hong Kong." In Beng Huat Chau ed., Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles 
and Identities, pp. 98 一 134. Canada: Routledge. 
Chan, Joseph Man, Kenneth K.L. Chau, and Francis L.F. Lee. 2000. Education 
and Principle-based Opinion: A Study of the Right of Abode Controversy 
in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies. 
:2 l l 
Chan, Kwok-bun ed. 2010. The Hong Kong China Mirror: Mainland Students 
view Hong Kong (港國鏡——内地留學生看香港 ) . H o n g Kong: 
Chunghua Books Ltd. 
Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday. 2005. Mao, the Unknown Story. London: Jonathan 
Cape. 
Chang, Li-mei. 2001. "Whose Fatal ways: Mapping the boundary and consuming 
the other in border crossing films." Asian Journal of Communication 11 
(2): 39 -57 . 
Charlesworth, Simon. 2000. A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Charmaz, Kathy and Dana Rosenfeld. 2006. "Reflections of the Body, Images of 
Self: Visibility and Invisibility in Chronic Illness and Disability." In 
Dennis Waskul and Phillip Vannini eds.，Body/Embodiment: Symbolic 
Interaction and the Sociology of the Body, pp. 83-94. England: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
Cheng，Joseph Y. S. 2001. Political Development in the HKSAR. Hong Kong: 
City University of Hong Kong. 
Cheng, Wang-tai (鄭宏泰）and Siu-lun Wong(黃紹倫).2004. To See through 
Hong Kong Identity Card (香港身份証透視 ) . H o n g Kong: Joint 
�Publishing (H.K.) Co.，Ltd (香港：三聯書店(香港)有限公司). 
Chow, Raymond. 1995. "Movie Seeks to Bridge Hong Kong-China Divide." The � 
Associated Press, 13 June. Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Classen, Constance. 2005. The Book of Touch. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
Cohn, Martin Regg. 1999. "Family Values Challenge Hong Kong Politicians -
Territory Blocks Flow of Mainland Immigrants." The Toronto Star, 23 
May. Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Coleman, Zach. 2008. "Identity: Nationalism Confronts a Desire to be 
Different." Financial Times, 29 June. Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Coll, Kelvin Lee. 2002. Chinese Nationality and Citizenship in Hong Kong SAR. 
Hong Kong: Civic Exchange. 
Connolly, N. 2005. "Survey Reveals Concerns Over Loss of Freedom Since 
1997." South China Morning Post, 2 June. 
Cox, James. 1997. "Hong Kong Politely says Farewell." USA Today, 24 March. 
Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Crossley, Nick. 2001. The Social Body: Habits, Identity and Desire. London: 
SAGE Publications. 
Csordas, Thomas. 1990. "Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology." Ethos 
18(1): 5-47. 
Degolyer，Michael E. and Janet Lee Scott. 1996. "The Myth of Political Apathy 
in Hong Kong." The Annals of American Academy 547: 68-78. 
2007. "Identity in the Politics of Transition: The Case of Hong Kong, 
'Asia's World City'". In Chan Kwok-bun, Jan W. Walls and David 
Hayward eds.，East-West Identities: Globalization, Localization, and 
Hybridization, pp. 21-54. Leidon: Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC 
Publishers. 
De Mente, Boye Lafayette. 1996. The Chinese have a word for it: the Complete 
Guide to Chinese Thought and Culture. Chicago: Passport Books, a 
division ofNTC/Contemporary Publishing Group, Inc. 
Douglas, Mary. 1966. Purity and Danger. London: Routledge. 
DW-World.DE. 2007. "Communism Seems Preferable to Some Germans After 
17 Years." 3 October. Accessed on 14 August 2010: 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144.28Q6093.00.html 
Easy Finder ®本便禾�J). Became stronger after brother's dead, don't called me 
Dailoklei (弟死變堅強咏再叫我大陸喱).EF098 April 19. 
Eileraas, Karina. 2007. Between Image and Identity: Transnational Fantasy, 
Symbolic Violence, and Feminist Misrecognition. New York: Lexington 
Books. 
Elias，Norbert. 1978 [1939]. The Civilizing Process: The Development of 
Manners: Changes in the Code of Conduct and Feeling in Early Modern 
Times. New York: Urizen Books. 
Engels, Friedrich. 2007. "On the Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape 
to Man." In Margaret Lock and Judith Farquhar, eds., Beyond the Body 
Proper: Reading the Anthropology of Material Life, pp. 25-29. London: 
Duke University Press 
Everett, Wendy and Peter Wagstaff. 2004.. Culture of Exile: Images of 
Displacement. Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Falk, Gerhard. 2001. Stigma: How We Treat Outsiders. Prometheus Books: New 
York. 
Faure，D. 1997. "Reflections on Being Chinese in Hong Kong." In Judith M. 
Brown and Rosemary Foot eds., Hong Kong's Transition, 1842-1997, pp. 
103-120 London: Macmillan Press. 
Financial Times (London). "Trapped in the Bamboo Maze: A Ruling on the right 
to Residency in Hong Kong has sparked a Heated Debate about Chinese . 
Immigrants." Rahul Jacob writes. Jun 5, p.09. 
2008. "Nationalism Confronts a Desire to be Different." Zach Coleman 
writes. Jun 30, accessed through Factiva Inc. 
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department. 
"^213 
http://www.fehd.gov.hk/english/pleasant environment/chk/40.html 
accessed on 30 May 2010. 
Fotonet 
2009 July 1 March: 
http://www.fotop.net/Aston/090701 March?page= 1 accessed on January 
20, 2010. 
Foucault，Michael. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: 
Penguin Books.. 
1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 -
1977. Colin Gordon eds.，New York: Pantheon Books. 
Fox, Kate. 2004. Watching the English: The Hidden Rules of English Behavior. 
England: Hodder and Stoughton. 
Fraser, Mariam and Monica Greco eds. 2005. The Body: A Reader. Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Friedman, Edward, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden. 2006. Revolution, 
Resistance and Reform in Village China. USA: Yale University Press. 
Fung, Chi-ming. 2003. "Labor under British Colonial Rule." In David Faure ed., 
Hong Kong: A Reader in Social History, pp.393 — 425. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gardner, Carol Brooks, and William Gronfein. 2006. "Body Armounr: Managing 
Disability and the Precariousness of the Territories of the Self." In Dennis 
Waskul and Phillip Vannini, eds., Body/Embodiment: Symbolic 
Interaction and the Sociology of the Body, pp. 35-67. England: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
Gatens，Moira. 1996. Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. New 
York: Routledge. 
Gershenson, Olga and Barbara Penner. 2009. Ladies and Gents: Public Toilets 
and Gender. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Gilley, Bruce. 1997. "Opinion: Is Hong Kong Having an Identity Crisis?" Dow 
Jones Online News, 20 June. Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Glenn, Collin T. 2007. Corruption and Economic Development in the People 's 
Republic of China. Master thesis. The University of Toledo: The Master 
of Arts in Political Science. 
Goffman，Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: 
Anchor Books. 
1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. England: 
The Penguin Press. 
I 
1966. Behavior in Public Spaces: Notes on the Social Organization of 
： ^ 
• "~214 
Gatherings. New York: Free Press. 
1968. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. England: 
The Penguin Press. 
1969. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Allen Lane. 
1972. Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-To-Face Behavior. London: 
Allen Lane. 
1982 [1967]. Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-To-Face Behavior. New 
York: Pantheon Books. 
Golden Forum 
In Retrospect: Hong Kong Disneyland's Opening (回顧：香港迪士尼開 
幕） 
http://foruml.hkgolden.com/view.aspx?message=2258412&page=12&co 
mpanvmode=Y accessed on 5 May 2010. 
Good Order and Cleanliness Ordinance. 1845. 
http://xml.lib.hku.hk/gsdl/collect/oelawhk/index/assoc/D6759.dir/doc.pdf 
accessed on 17 May 2010. 
Gustafsson, Mai Lan. 2009. "Pride and Prejudice in a Southeast Asian Refugee 
Community in New York." Asian Anthropology 8: 125 - 140. 
Gwyn, Richard. 2003. "Process of Refiguration: Shifting Identities in Cancer 
Narrative." In Justine Coupland and Richard Gwyn eds.，Discourse, the 
Body and Identity, pp. 209-224, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hall, Edward. 1969. The Hidden Dimension. New York: A Doubleday Anchor 
Books. 
1959. The Silent Language. New York: A Doubleday Anchor Books. 
Hall, Stuart. 1990. Cultural Identity and Diaspora. In Jonathan Rutherford eds” -
Identity: Community, Culture and Difference. Longdon: Lawrence 8c 
Wishart. 
Harding, Jennifer and Pribram, E. Deidre. 2009. "Introduction." In Jennifer 
Harding and E. Deidre Pribram eds., Emotions: A Cultural Studies Reader. 
New York: Routledge. 
Hong Kong Commercial Daily (香港商報).2009. "Over 80 percent mainland 
immigrants are discriminated (內地新移民 80%受歧視)”.A03，August2. 
Hong Kong Daily News (成報).2000. "Reader Shelly agrees that Hong Kong has 
many malignant economic tumor (讀者 S H E L L Y認同香港有多個 
經濟毒瘤)”.B09, December 01. 
2002a. "Approximately 90 percent new immigrants have experienced 
discrimination (九成新移民感到遭歧視)“.A09. October 28. 
2002b. "This article: Touch-base policy started in 1962 (這一篇：六二 
• 2 1 5 
年開始抵壘政策)”.E03, November 24. 
2002c. "This article: Immigrants had to have at least HKD$20 (這一 
篇：移民香港要有2 0元身家)”.E03, December 20. 
2003. "One over six applicants of Comprehensive Social Security 
Assistance are new immigrants (六份一綜援戶是新移民)”.E03, 
January 29. 
2009.补福界倡政府針對性培訓新移民 ,A01, February 17. 
Hong Kong Digital Vision 
July 1 March [2005]: Full Democracy. 
http://www.hkdigit.net/2005/07/iulv-l-march-hope-for-full-democracv/ 
accessed on 8 Dec 2009. 
Hong Kong Discussion Forum 
http://www.discuss.com.hk/viewtliread.php?tid=8961966 accessed on 30 
May 2010 
Hong Kong Economy 
http://www.hkeconomv.gov.hk/tc/pdf/box-06q 1 -cl-l.pdf accessed on 4 
May 2010. 
Hong Kong Economic Journal (經濟曰幸2003a. New Immigrant has not Yet 
Rectified 'Culture' Extort Classmate Twenty Dollar (新移民未改「文化 i 
勒索同學 20 元)A34, January 10. 
2003b. "New Immigrant 'used to the Practice of Giving Gifts' Red Packet 
to Driving Test Examiner, Convicted新移民「慣送禮 i考牌俾利市罪 
成.，，A24 January 01. 
2009. “45 minutes stole five shops, a student from Hong Kong university 
is waiting for his sentence (45 分鐘盗竊 5 店港大生候判V’ A24 
August 14. 
Hong Kong GDP per capita: 
http://www»tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Per-Capita.aspx?Sv 
mbol=hkd accessed on 5 May 2010 
； Hong Kong Headline/Headline Daily.(頭f丨条曰報).2009. "The quality of citizens 
is explored through the practice of lining up (從排隊看公民素質)”. 
P04, July 10. 
2006. Influx of Mainland Pregnant Women, Tighter Provisions of Beds in 
Maternity Departments (内地孕婦_續〉、勇丨巷藉年將至產科牀位更緊g長). 
P10, November 21. 
Hong Kong is finished (香港完蛋了). 2008. 
http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=iMVnreFcVYI accessed on January 20， 
2010. 
Hong Kong leuhnhaahm,(香港論陷)（1941 - 1945，1997 - ) 
http://hs butt.mvsinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&artideId二 154 
6314 accessed on 4 May 2010. 
Hong Kong leuhnhaahm (香港淪陷)http://www.inmediahk.net/node/l006842 
accessed on 4 May 2010. 




…OO.html accessed on 10 May 2010. 
Huang, Yasheng. 1997. "The Economic and Political Integration of Hong Kong: 
Implications for Government-Business Relations." In Warren I. Cohen 
and Li Zhao eds.，Hong Kong under Chinese Rule: The Economic and 
Political Implications of Reversion, pp. 96 - 113. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hung, H.L. Humphry. 2007. The Tragic City, Tin Shui Wai (悲情城市天水圍） 
http://www.nuiik.com/isarticle.php?lcid 二 HK.B5&artid=3000018941&artt 
vpe二MGT&artsection=CAREER accessed on 10 May 2010. 
Hutchings，Graham. 2000. Modern China: A Companion to a Rising Power. 
London: Penguin Books. 
Inglis，David and Mary Holmes. 2004 [2000]. "Toiletry Time: Defecation, 
temporal strategies and the dilemmas of modernity." In The Aberdeen 
Body Group ed.’ The Body III: Critical Concepts in Sociology, pp. 
341-362. London: Routledge. 
Immigration Department. 2000. Right of Abode in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. Hong Kong: Printing Department. ‘： 
Ip, lam-chong. 2001. "The Rise of a Sanitary City: the Colonial Formation of 
Hong Kong's Early Public Housing." 
http://www.hku.hk/hkcsp/ccex/ehkcssO 1 /issue2 ar iic 01.htm accessed 
on 12 May 2010. 
Jenkins, Richard. 2002. Pierre Bourdieu. London:- Routledge. 
Johnson, Don Hanlon. 2002. "Sitting, Writing, Listening, Speaking, Yearning: 
Reflections on Scholar-Shaping Techniques." In Sherry Shapiro and Svi 
Shapiro eds., Body Movements: Pedagogy, Politcs and Social Change, 
pp.97-115. Hampton Press, Inc.: New Jersey. 
Kan, Flora L. F. 2007. Hong Kong Chinese History Curriculum from 1945: 
Politics and Identity. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Khuri, Fuad I. 2001, The Body in Islamic Culture. London: Saqi Books. 
Ku，Agnes S. 2004. "Immigration Policies, Discourses, and the Politics of Local 
•217 
Belonging in Hong Kong (1950 - 1980).” Modern China 30(3): 326-360. 
Kung, Kung-sing James and Justin Yifu Lin. 2003. "The Causes of China's Great 
Leap Famine, 1959 一 1961." Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 52{\)\5\-13. 
Kwan, Lai-hung. 2003. "The Charitable Activities of Local Chinese 
Organizations during the Japanese Occupation of Hong Kong December 
1941 - August 1945." In David Faure ed., Hong Kong: A Reader in 
Social History, pp.613-628. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Lardy, Nicholas R. 1998. China's Unfinished Economic Reform. Washington: 
The Brookings Institution. 
Lai, Carol. 2007. Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom and Political Change, 
1967-2005. New York: Routledge. 
Lai Kin-keung: Can [I] squat?(黎健強：踏吓都唔得？ ) written by Siu-sai (小 
西） 
http://wwwjnmediahk.net/node/130958#comment-132928 accessed on 4 
Nov 2009. 
Lau, Jenny Kwok Wah. 1998. "Besides Fists and Blood: Hong Kong Comedy 
and its Master of the Eighties." Cinema Journal 37(2): 18 - 34. 
Lau, Siu-kai. 2000. "Hongkongese or Chinese: The Problem of Identity on the 
Eve of Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty over Hong Kong." In Siu-kai 
Lau ed, Social Development and Political Change in Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press. ‘ 
Lau, Siu-kai and Kuan, Hsin-chi. 1988. The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. 
Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. 
Law, Wing-Wah. 1997. "The Accommodation and Resistance to the 
Decolonisation, Neocolonisation and Recolonisation of Higher Education 
in Hong Kong." Comparative Education 33(2): 187-209 
Leung, Hon-chu. 2004. "Politics of Incorporation and Exclusion." In Anges S Ku 
and Ngai Pun eds., Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, 
Nation and the Global City, pp. 97- 114. USA: Routledge. 
Leung, Sai-wing. 1999. "Social Construction of Hong Kong Identity: A Partial 
Account." In S.K. Lau, M.K Lee, P.S. Wan and S.L. Wong eds., 
Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1997, pp. 111-134. Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press. 
Lewellen, Ted C. 2003. Political Anthropology: An Introduction. Westport: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Li, He. 2005. "The Chinese Path of Economic Reform and Its Implications." 
Asian Affairs: An American Review 31: 195-211. 
I " T i T ' 
> 
Liu, Eva and S.Y. Yue. 1996. Political Development in Hong Kong since the 
1980s. Research and Library Services Division, Legislative Council 
Secretariat. 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/vr97-98/english/sec/librarv/956rpl7.pdf 
accessed on 12 May 2010. 
Liu, Shuyong (劉蜀永).2009. A Brief History of Hong Kong (簡明香港史). 
Hong Kong: Joint 香港：Publishing (H.K.) Co., Ltd (三聯書店(香港)有 
限公司). ： 
Lo, Kwai-Cheung and Laikwan Pang. 2007. "Hong Kong: Ten Years after 
Colonialism." Postcolonial Studies, 10(4): 349-356. 
Lo, Ming-cheng M, Christopher P. Bettinger and Yun Fan. 2006. "Deploying 
Weapons of the Weak in Civil Society: Political Culture in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan." Social Justice 33(2): 77-104. 
Lock, Margaret and Judith Farquhar. 2007. Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the 
Anthropology of Material Life. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Lui, Tai-lok (呂大樂).2002. "The Self-contained Hong Kong Society (自成一體 
的香港社會)•” In Jiun-Shiung Wu and Zhi-wei Zhang eds., Reading 
Hong Kong Popular Culture: 1970 - 2000 (香港讀本：閱讀香港普及文 
化：1970-2000)，pp. 663-670. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (香港： 
牛津大學出版社). 
— 2007. Fourth Generations in Hong Kong (香港四代人).Hong Kong: 
Step Forward Multi Media Co Ltd (香港：進一步多媒體有限公司） 
Lui, Tai-lok and Chiu, Stephen W.K. 2003. Hong Kong becoming a Chinese 
global city. Hong Kong: Centre for China Urban and Regional Studies, 
Hong Kong Baptist University. � 
Lupton, Deborah and Wendy Seymour. 2003. '"I am Normal on the Net': 
Disability, Computerised Communication Technologies and the 
Embodied Self." In Justine Coupland and Richard Gwyn eds., Discourse, 
the Body and Identity, pp. 246-266. England: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ma, Eric Kit-wai (馬傑偉).1996. Television and Identity「電視與身份認同). 
Hong Kong: Breakthrough Ltd. 
) 1999. Culture, Politics, and Television in Hong Kong. London: Routledge. 
2000. "The Hierarchy of Drinks: Alcohol and Social Class in Hong 
Kong." In Gordon Mathews and Tai-lok, Lui eds., Consuming Hong Kong, 
pp. 117-140. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
2002. "Analysis of the History of TV culture (電視文化的歷史分析).” In 
Jiun-Shiung Wu and Zhi-wei Zhang eds., Reading Hong Kong Popular 
Culture: 1970 - 2000 (香港讀本：閱讀香港普及文化：1970-2000), pp. 
•219 
681-694. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press(香港：牛津大學出版社). , 
MacFarquhar, Roderick and Michael Schoenhals. 2006. Mao 's last Revolution. 
USA: the President and Fellows of Harvard College. 
Mainland Compatriots Urinated on MTR I (內地同胞 0 係地鐵小便 1) 
http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=AOzOguzw8Ro accessed on 10 
December 2009. 
Mainland Compatriots Urinated on MTR II (内地同胞 o 係地鐵小便 2) 
http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=7JB i StLOOwY&feature=rel ated 
accessed on 10 December 2009. 
Mainland tourists muck up Disneyland (大陸遊客玩臭迪士尼） 
httD://blog.iianghu.taobao.com/u/MiEvOTY3MTc=/blog/blog detail.ht 
m?aid=l 8240856 accessed on 2 February 2010. 
Malacrida, Claudia and Jacqueline Low eds. Sociology of the Body: A Reader. 
Canada: Oxford University Press. 
Mark, Chi-Kwan. 2004. Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo - American 
Relations 1949 -1957. New York: Oxford University Press 
2007. "The 'Problem of People': British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and 
the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949 - 1962." Modern Asian 
Studies A\ (6): 1145-1181. 
Masquelier, Adeline. 2005. Dirt, Undress and Difference: Critical Perspectives 
on the Body's Surface. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Mathews, Gordon and Tai-lok Lui eds., 2003. Consuming Hong Kong. Hong i 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Mathews, Gordon, Eric Kit-wai Ma and Tai-lok Lui. 2008. Hong Kong, China: 
Learning to Belong a Nation. USA: Routledge. 
Mauss, Marcel. 2007 (1935). "Techniques of the Body." In Margaret Lock and 
Judith Farquhar, eds., Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the 
Anthropology of Material Life, pp. 50-68. London: Duke University Press 
McFalls, Lauence. 1998. "Shock Therapy and Mental Wdls." In Patricia J. Smith 
eds., After the Wall: Eastern Germany since 1989, Colorado: Westview 
Press, A Member of Perseus Books, L.L.C. 
Meer, Nasar. 2010. Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The 
Rise of Muslim Consciousness. UK: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers 
Limited. 
Miners, Norman. 1999. The Government and Politics of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ming Pao (明報).2000. Manage Hygiene Before Olympics, Reform for Beijing 
Public Toilets (要辦奧運先搞衛生北京公廁大改革A 1 L December 
05. 
2004a. Expensive traveling fees, residents are unwilling to travel outside 
their town (交通費責居民不願出區).A04，April 13. 
2004b. Serious Planning Faults, Tang Kwok-wai admitted (規劃「嚴重失 
衡」都國威認錯).A04, November 23. 
2008a. Five years after a symposium for "returned students in Hong 
Kong", is it still in Hong Kong?(記「回歸學人在香港的情況i研討會 
五年後，還在香港不？）. D04，September 20. ：  
2008b. New Witness Said He was Battered and Named Daaihlohkjdi (大 
陸仔)，a Mainland Immigrant appealed Successfully in a Case of 
Assaulting a Passenger on the Bus (新證人指乘客圍歐罵「大陸仔i新 
移民巴士咬傷人上訴得直).A08，September 24. 
2008c. Two new immigrants challenge the eligibility of CSSA for 
discrimination against those who have not resided for 7 years (指歧視未 
住滿7年非永久居民申司法覆核雨新移民桃戰綜援申請資格).A16， 
October 24. 
2009. Revalue the impact of mainlanders in Hong Kong (重新認識內地 
來港人士的影響).B09, October 14. 
2009. New immigrants teach local residents(新移民教原居民).D07, 
December 25. 
2010. From the colonial history to future 一 the progress in Hong Kong 
society and the global values of colonialism (從殖民史尋找未來 ^ 
港社會進步與全球戰略價值的殖民地根源).D06, January 26. . 
Moore, Alison. 2009. Colonial Visions of "Third World" Toilets: A 
Nineteenth-Century Discourse That Huants Contemporary Tourism." In , . 
Olga Gershenson and Barbara Penner eds., Ladies and Gents: Public 
Toilets and Gender, pp. 105-125, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Moriarty, Francis. 2007. "Press Freedom in Hong Kong: The Trend is Down." In 
Hong Kong Journals, 
http://www.hkiournal.org/archive/2007 summer/moriartv.htm, accessed 
on 11 May 2010. 
Munck， Ronaldo. 2005. Globalization and Social Exclusion: A 
Transformationalist Perspective. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc. 
Navarro, Joe. 2008. What Every Body is Saying: An Ex-FBI Agent's Guide to 
Speed Reading People. New York: Collins. 
Nishida, Horoko. 2005. "Cultural Schema Theory." In William B. Gudyunst ed.， 
Theorizing about Intercultural Communication, pp. 401-418. California: 
Sage Publication, Inc. 
Nugent, David and Joan Vincent. 2004. A Companion to the Anthropology of 
； 2 2 1 
Politics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Oriental Daily (東方曰報).2000a. Chinese and Hong Kong people (中國人與香 
港人).龍門陣.December04. 
2000b. Who vilify Chinese (誰醜化中國人).December 06. 
2002a. Applicantion for CSSA increased sharply, the government should 
stop it (領綜援激增政府須止血) .A22, November 12. 
2002b. Immigrants compete for j o b s ? (新移民搶飯碗？ ). B04， 
December 26. 
2002c. Patriotism starts from loving compatriots (愛國由愛同月包{故 
H). B12, December 27. 
2003a. Hong Kong students' perceptions towards new immigrants (港學 
i 童對新移民觀感倒退).A21，January 28. 
2003b. The social welfare goes backward (倒退的社會福利).B16, 
January 29. 
2003c. Where to get peace when both the government and citizens hold 
bias?(官民齊歧視何來創共融？）. B16, January 30. 
2008a. New immigrant female student committed suicide before school 
term begin(新移民女生開學前跳樓).A14, August 31. 
2008b. Hard to Find Jobs with Mainland Qualifications (內地資歷在港 
難求職).FOl, September 19. 
2008c. Amendment in laws makes it harder for new immigrants to 
integrate into society (修例反令新移民難融人社會).A26，October 24. 
2010. Chaotic World Exposition Scared People, a Foreigner said, 'This is 
China.(世博亂象嚇怕人洋客：這就是中國).A34，May 05. 
Oriental Net (東方網). 
Pretty women dislike unhygienic seat toilets, squatting on it (青見女嫌馬桶 
不衛生兩腳站在馬桶沿上如廁「圖1) 
http://big5.eastdav.com:82/gate/big5/societv.eastdav.com/eastdav/node79 
841/node79861/node91102/userobiectlai 1519837.html accessed 11 
Nov 2009. 
Oriental Week Journal.. 
！ http://www.eastweek.com.hk/index.php?link=content detail&article id= 
6623 accessed on 7 May 2010 
Pandolfi, Mariella. 2007. "Memory within the Body: Women's Narrative and 
Identity in a Southern Italian Village." In Margaret Lock and Judith 
Farquhar, eds., Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the Anthropology of 
Material Life, pp. 451-458. London: Duke University Press. 
Pang, Sun-keung, Nicolas. 1999. "Students' Quality of School Life in Band 5 
schools." Asian Journal of Counseling, 6(1): 79 - 106. 
； . 
i ’• 222 
Pease, Allan. 1992. Body Language: How to Read other's Thoughts by Their 
Gestures. London: Sheldon Press. 
Pellow, Deborah. 1996. "Intimate Boundaries: A Chinese Puzzle." In Deborah 
Pellow ed., Setting Boundaries: The Anthropology of Spatial and Social 
Organization, pp 111-136, London: Bergin & Garvey. 
Peng, Xizhe. 1987. "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in 
China's Province." Population and Development Review 13(4): 639 — 
669. 
Phillips, Richard ed. 2009. Muslim Spaces of Hope: Geographies of Possibility in 
Britain and the West. London: Zen Books. 
Reuters. 2004. "20% Germans Want the Wall Back." The Guardian, 9 September. 
Accessed on 14 August: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/09/germanv • 
Roberts, Elfed Vaughan. 1996. "Political Developments in Hong Kong: 
Implications for 1997." The Annals of The American Academy 547: 24 -
36. 
Rocca, Jean-Louis. 1992. "Corruption and its Shadow: An Anthropological View 
of Corruption in China." The China Quarterly 130: 402 - 416. 
Rojek, Chris. 2003. Stuart Hall Oxford: Polity. 
Salaff, Janet W.，Siu-Lun Wong, and Arent Greve. 2010. Hong Kong Movers and 
Stayers: Narratives of Family Migration. Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press. 
SangPao (成報).2002. The Wisdom of Squatting.踏的學問.C07, January 15 
Sautman, Barry and Ellen Kneehans. 2002. The Politics of Racial Discrimination 
in Hong Kong. Maryland Series in Contemporary Studies 169 (2). « ； 
Scenerio. 2008. "What does Tin Shui Wai need?(天水圍需要什麼?).，’ Vol 21(1). 
http://www.hkcss.org.hk/cm/cc/scenario/download/21 focus.pdf accessed 
on 10 May 2010. 
Schoenwald, Richard L. 2004. "Training Urban Man: A Hypothesis about the 
Sanitary Movement." In The Aberdeen Body Group ed., The Body III: 
Critical Concepts in Sociology, pp. 296-319. London: Routledge. 
Scott, Ian. 1989. Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Scott, James. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resishitance. New Heaven: Yale University. 
2005 [1990]. "The Infrapolitics of Subordinate Groups." In Louise 
Amoore ed., The Global Resistance Reader, pp. 6 5 - 9 1 . USA: Routledge.： 
Reprinted from Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
•223 
Transcript. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 183 -201 . 
Seymour, Susan. 2006. "Resistance." Anthropological Theory 6(3): 303-321. 
Share, Michael B. 2007. When Empires Collided: Russian and Soviet Relations 
with Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. 
Sharma, Yojana. 1997. "Hong Kong: In Search of a Distinct Identity." Inter Press 
Service, 22 May 1997. Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Sina Finance. 
http://biz.finance.sina.com.cn/hk/macro data.php?tvpe=unemplovment 
accessed on 4 May 2010 
Sing，Ming. 2003. Hong Kong Government and Politics. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sing Pao Daily News (新報).2003. Around 20 per cent of Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance (CSSA) Users are New Immigrants (六份一綜援戶 
是新移民),E03, January 29. 
2009. "38% Identified themselves as Heunggongyahn The highest since 
2000 (38%自認香港人創2000年以來新高)”.A06，December 16. 
2010a. Parliament members criticizes immigrants for pushing up the 
property prices, suggests to lift the minimum price to ten million (議員ftb 
投資移民推高樓價倡檢討計劃下限提高至千萬以上).A07，April 29. 
2010b. Around half new immigrants parents practice corporeal punishment 
: (近半數新移民家庭體罰教導子女A08，April 30. 
Siu，F Helen. 1987. "Immigrants and Social Ethos: Hong Kong in the 
Nineteenth-Eighties." Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 27: 1-16. siinzi.lib.hku.hk/hkio/view/44/4401589.pdf 
accessed on 7 July 2010. 
1996. "Remade in Hong Kong: weaving into the Chinese cultural 
tapestry." In Tao Tao Liu and David Faure eds., Unity and Diversity: local 
cultures and identities in China, pp. 177 - 196. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press. 
2009. '"Hong Kongers" and "New Immigrants".' Published online on 
Hong Kong Journals 
http://www.hkioumal.org/archive/2009 summer/4.htm accessed on 7 
May 2010. 
Skeldon, Ronald. 1991. "Emigration and the Future of Hong Kong." In Pacific 
Affairs 63(4): 500-523. 
1994. "Hong Kong in an International Migration System." In R. Skeldon 
ed，Reluctant Exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas 
\ " 一 
Chinese, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Skidmore, Monique. 2006. "Scholarship, Advocacy, and the Politics." In Victoria 
Sanford and Asale Angel-Ajani eds., Engaged Observer: Anthropology, 
Advocacy, and Activism, pp.42-59. U.S.: Rutgers University Press. 
Smith, Carl. 2003. "The English-educated Chinese Elite in Nineteenth-century 
Hong Kong." In David Faure ed., Hong Kong: A Reader in Social History, 
pp. 268 一 303. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, Patricia. 1998. After the Wall: Eastern Germany since 1989. Colorado: 
Westview Press, a Member of Perseus Books, L.L.C. 
So, Alvin Y. 2000. "Hong Kong's Problematic Democratic Transition: Power 
Dependency or Business Hegemony?" The Journal of Asian Studies 59(2): 
359-381 . 
2003a. "Cross-Border Families in Hong Kong: The Role of Social Class 
and Politics." Critical Asian Studies 35(4): 515-534 . 
2003b. "Hong Kong's Problematic Democratic Transition: Power 
Dependency or Business Hegemony?" In Ming Sing ed., Hong Kong 
Government and Politics, pp. 466-501 . Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press. 
South China Morning Post (SCMP). 1999a. Anson warns of abode ruling burden. 
January 31. 
1999b. Migrants "to blame for social discord". January 13. 
2004. "How the seeds of Hong Kong's Identity took half a century to 
flower." Hans W.Y. Yeung writes, Septemberl6. 
2005. "Identify yourself; Several surveys have attempted to determine 
shifts in Hong Kong people's sense of identity since 1997. C.K. Lau , : 
weighs the findings." 1 October. Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
2007. "Rise in National Identity a "Two Systems" Success. 13 June. 
Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
2009a. A bitter blow for free speech on the mainland. Editorial. February 
10, EDTIO. 
2009b. Police crossed border, dragged us into Shenzhen, detainees say. 
Phyllis Tsang and Eva Wu, December 29，EDT3 
2009c. Dissident faces up to 15 years' jail for 'serious' crime, lawyer 
says. Verna Yu. December 11, EDT5. 
2009d. Scheme for rich migrants needs checking for fakes. March 15， 
EDTll . 
2010. CHECK CHAPTER 3 Tan，on February 9，20.10，was sentenced to 
five years' imprisonment for inciting subversion of state power SCMP 10 
• 2 2 5 
February 2010: EDTIO 
Stallybrass, Peter and Alldn White. 2005. "Bourgeois Perception: The Gaze and 
the Contaminating Touch." In Constance Classen ed., The Book of Touch, 
pp.289-291. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
2007 (1986). "The City: The Sewer, the Gaze, and the Contaminating 
Touch." In Margaret Lock and Judith Farquhar, eds., Beyond the Body 
Proper: Reading the Anthropology of Material Life, pp. 266-287. London: 
Duke University Press. 
Strathem, Andrew J. 1996. Body Thoughts. USA: The University of Michigan 
Press. 
Strauss, Claudia and Naomi Quinn. 1994. "A Cognitive/Cultural Anthropology." 
In Robert Borofsky ed., Assessing Cultural Anthropology, pp. 284 - 297. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Sun Daily (太陽報).2009. 2005. Face-losing behavior in Disneyland (丟臉丟到 
廸士尼).A49，September 16. 
Bad behavior in MTR (港鐵内惡行).CIO, February 07. 
Sun, Yan. 1999. "Reform, State and Corruption: Is Corruption Less Destructive 
in China than in Russia?" Comparative Politics 32(1): 1-20. 
Sung, Yung-wing. 1991. The China - Hong Kong Connection: The Key to 
China's Open-door Policy. Hong Kong: the Press Syndicate of University 
of Cambridge. 
Swartz, David. 1997. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Swedlow, Wesley C. 2010. Against Personification of Democracy: A Lacanian 
Critique of Political Subjectivity. New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group Ltd. 
Synnott，Anthony. 1993. The Body Social: Symbolism, Self and Society. New 
York: Routledge. 
Tai Yiu-ting Benny. 1999. "The Development of Constitutionalism in Hong 
Kong." In Raymond Wacks ed., The New Legal Order in Hong Kong, pp. 
39-94. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Takungpao (大公報).2010. Toilet Culture (廁所文{b). 26 February. C07. 
Tarn, Kwok-kan. 2000. "Identity on the Bridge: Double (De/)Colonization in the 
Hong Kong Poet Gu Cangwu." In Theo D'Haen and Patricia Kriis eds., 
Colonizer and Colonized, pp. 65-77. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Tambornino，John. 2002. The Corporeal Turn: Passion, Necessity, Politics. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
The Epochtimes.com 
； " " 2 ^ 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/35837/ accessed on 15 
July 2010 
The Standard. 1999. Public fear of huge influx of mainlanders, new survey finds. 
February 8，A02. 
2006. Mainland influx reviewed. August 25. 
The Ugliness of mainlanders in Mong Kok (旺角大陸人的醜陋)• 
http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=tMd4c8zdVpO accessed on November 
20，2010. 
The University of Hong Kong Press Release 2006 
http://www.hku.hk/press/news detail 5319.html accessed on 22 June 
2010 
Thomas, Nicholas. 1999. Democracy Denied: Identity, civil society and illiberal 
democracy in Hong Kong. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Tsang, Steve. 2004. A Modern History of Hong Kong: 1814 - 1997. Hong Kong: 
The Hong Kong University. 
Tsao, Chip. 2009. "The War at Home." HK Magazine, March. 
Tse, Kwan-choi Thomas. 2004. "Civic Education and the Making of Deformed 
Citizenry: From British Colony to Chinese SAR." In Anges S Ku and 
Ngai Pun eds., Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation 
and the Global City, pp. 54 -73 . USA: Routledge. 
Turner, Bryan S. 2004. "The Rationalization of the Body: Reflections on 
Modernity and Discipline." In The Aberdeen Body Group ed., The Body 
III: Critical Concepts in Sociology, pp. 320-341. London: Routledge. 
Turner, Matthew. 2003. "60s/90s: Dissolving the People." In Pun Ngai and Yee 
Lai-man eds., Narrating Hong Kong Culture and Identity, pp. 24-50. ,： 
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press(香港：牛津大學出版社).[See also 
in 1995. "Hong Kong Sixties/Nineties: Dissolving the People." In Turner 
M and I. Ngan eds., Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identities, pp. 13-34. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre.] 
Turner, Victor. 1988. The Anthropology of Performance. New York: PAJ 
Publications. 
Unemployment Rate of Hong Kong. 
http://biz.finance.sina.com.cn/hlc/niacro data.php?tvpe=unemplovment 
accessed on 4 May 2010. 
Visit World Exposition is Life threatening (開館直擊蹄世博溫命博） 
http://www.hkreporter.com/talks/thread-904445-l-1 .html accessed on 7 
May 2010 • 
Vogel，Ezra F. 1991. The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in 
• 2 2 7 
East Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Voice of America Press Releases and Documents. 2007. "Survey Finds Hong 
Kong Teens Comfortable with Chinese Identity." 27 June. Accessed 
through Factiva, Inc. 
Watson, James. 2009. "Cold War Borders in a Post-Socialist World: Hong 
Kong/China." Conference talk held in the Anthropology Department, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, on November 13. 
Wemyss, Georgie. 2009. The Invisible Empire: White Discourse, Tolerance and 
Belonging. Famham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Wen Wei Pao (文匯報)• 2005. Erroneous planning: Tin Shui Wai (規劃失誤的社 
區：天水圍).A22, March 25. 
2006. "Chinese people? Hong Kong people? Changes in identity in the 
last decade (中國人?香港人？身份認同十年之變)” 16 June, p. C06. 
Wolfreys, Jim. 2000. "In Perspective: Pierre Bourdieu." In International 
Socialism Journal 87. Accessed on 25 Jan 2010: 
http://www.isiltext.ble.org.uk/pubs/isi87/wolfrevs.htm 
2002. "Pierre Bourdieu: Voice of Resistance." In International Socialism 
Journal 97. Accessed on 9 February 2010: 
http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isi94/wolfrevs.htm 
Wong, Siulun. 1992. "Emigration and Stability in Hong Kong." Occasional Paper 
no. 7，Social Sciences Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong. 
1995. "Political Attitudes and Identity." In Ronald Skeldon ed., Emigration 
from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts, pp. 147-176. Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press. 
1999. "Changing Hong Kong Identity." In Gung-wu Wang and John Wong 
eds., Hong Kong in China: The Challenges of Transition, pp. 181-202. 
Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
Wong, Thomas W.P., and Tai-lok Lui. 1992a. From one brand of politics to one 
brand of political culture. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
.1992b. Reinstating class: A structural and developmental study of Hong 
Kong society. Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Center, The 
University of Hong Kong. 
Wong, Siulun and Janet W. Salaff. 1998. "Network Capital: Emigration from 
Hong Kong." The British Journal of Sociology 49(3): 358 一 374. 
Wong, Siuyi Wendy. N.A. Design Identity of Hong Kong: Colonization, 
de-colonization, and re-colonization. Accessed on 16 December 2009: 
http://www.vorkuxa/wsvwong/homepage/articlespdf/Droceedings/ead06 
• —五 r" 
id l l7 fmal.pdf 
Yan，Jiaqi, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok. 1996. Turbulent decade: a history 
of the cultural revolution. USA: University of Hawaii Press. 
Yang, Su. 2006. "Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three 
Provinces." In Joseph W. Esherick，Paul G Pickowicz, and Andrew G. 
Walder eds., The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History, pp. 96 - 123. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Yeh, Kungchia. 1993. "Foreign Trade, Capital Flow and Technology Transfer 
under the Open-door Policy." In Michael Ying-Mao Kau and Susan H. 
Marsh eds., China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform, pp. 
124-154. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 
Yeung, W.Y. Hans. 2004. "How the Seeds of Hong Kong's Identity took half a 
Century to Flower." South China Morning Post, 16 September 2004. 
Accessed through Factiva, Inc. 
Zito，Angela and Tani E. Barlow. 1994. Body, Subject & Power in China. 






0 0 4 8 2 8 1 0 4 
/ 
